Creating Citizens for Whom?
Participatory Budgeting and Citizenship Learning in Japan

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Abstract

This paper explores the ideological underpinning of Participatory Budgeting (PB) projects in Japan through critical analysis of the concept of citizenship advocated in PB. Through a case study of a PB project in Nabari, a local city in Japan, I have examined the type of citizenship municipal governments attempted to achieve through PB, and the nature of citizenship learning that may have occurred in the PB. Three questions are addressed: (1) What are main motivations to do PB projects for a local government in Japan? (2) How do governments frame their ideal concept of citizenship? (3) What kind of citizenship learning can occur and what can be missed under such framings and institutions? I argue that a PB framework underpinned by local autonomy and the small government may be at risk of promoting the depoliticization of citizenship learning. I close by suggesting that a key for democratic citizenship learning in Japan is to create a space to raise critical consciousness and to reform institutions to be more participatory, deliberative and inclusive.

Keywords: participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, citizenship learning, participatory budgeting
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<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPG</td>
<td>Empowered Participatory Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>Neighborhood Residential Association</td>
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<td>PB</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Let all the souls here rest in peace; For we shall not repeat the evil
-From the inscription on the cenotaph for A-bomb victims in Hiroshima

Every August 6, at 8:15am, in the morning of a hot and humid summer day, people in Hiroshima and all over Japan reflect with their eyes closed on our history and the moment of the great tragedy for humanity. The moment of silence asks us “Are all the souls resting in peace now?”

In the opening quote above, who are “we” who shall make decisions, and how could “we” justify our collective decisions such that we shall not repeat the evil caused by the decision? Politicians? The powerful? The public? My experience in a conflict caused by constructing a new nuclear power plant at Kaminoseki, a small village 80km away from Hiroshima, taught me how difficult it was to make decision-making democratic and inclusive if an issue at hand was historically and ethically controversial.

While I had worked as an accountant for that construction, I also came to be involved in an anti-nuclear power plant movement in which my friends were active. In a broad sense, there were two camps in the conflict: advocates for boosting the local economy by job creation and governmental subsidiaries, and those for ecological preservation and sustainable development. One thing I could say was the decision would deeply influence the destiny of the valuables: land, people and histories of Kaminoseki. My question was how these two sides would move forward together to deal with their historical dispute.
One major issue I saw was the fact that there was no formal dialogue between the two sides and also no citizen participation in the decision-making for 30 years, other than voting for elections. On the surface, there were many opportunities for civic participation such as public hearings, briefing sessions for locals and social movements. Yet none of them opened a gate for a public decision-making process or even public deliberation to ordinary citizens. Who can keep those who are affected by the decision the most from a decision-making process? How can ordinary residents participate in such a political decision-making?

There is one successful political attempt from which we can learn to answer these questions. That is Participatory Budgeting, one of the most radical forms of public deliberation, in which ordinary citizens can learn to be decision-makers.

Orçamento Participativo, so-called Participatory Budgeting (PB), was initiated at Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989, and has spread throughout the world. It has been implemented at more than 2000 cities. While there is no single definition for what is PB, according to UN-Habitat’s report, PB is a process (or mechanism) of public deliberation and/or decision making on the allocation of all or part of budget resources (“Global Campaign on Urban Governance,” 2004). Public deliberation has diverse forms: from En’owkin being used by indigenous people in Okanagan, Canada to “産合,” Yoriai in local villages in Japan and to 21st century town meeting in United States. What makes PB distinctive from other forms of public deliberation is the delegation of political authority for decision-making to citizens. The transfer of power makes it possible that people can join collective decision-making and reason together on the nature of public-minded ends and the best means to realize these. In short, citizens decide and governments implement. It sounds simple but rarely happens under representative democracy or other political systems. PB opens a new way of
democratic governance that is more compatible with the idea of participatory and deliberative democracy than interest-based democracy with competitive elections and voting.

Some may wonder whether mass participation in the contemporary democracy can be legitimate or practical. The issue around democratic legitimacy and practicality of PB will be explored later in the Chapter 2. While there are some disagreements on the basic principles of democracy, PB is a policy instrument that can deepen democracy by shedding light on social justice and political equality. As well, it can promote a more transparent and democratic decision-making process where decisions are made through public deliberation of the people, by the people, for the people.

In Japan, there are a variety of mechanisms similar to PB for citizens to get involved in decision-making processes for the allocation of public finance. Justifications for such initiatives include the educational effect for active citizenship and advancement of local autonomy. If these mechanisms can function as described, are they contributing to people’s learning for democracy? Are they contributing to deepen democracy?

1.1 Research Questions

To examine these questions, this paper will explore questions as follows:

1. What are main motivations to do PB projects for a local government in Japan?
2. How do governments frame their ideal concept of citizenship?
3. What kind of citizenship learning can occur and what can be missed under such framings and institutions?

Many studies on PB tend to focus on macro-factors such as political situations, state-civil society relationship or existing civil society in order to analyze case studies of PB. These external conditions may matter, yet micro-factors should not be ignored. Who are the ideal
and the real players who implement PB? What kinds of instruments are necessary for the players? This chapter will explore these questions and consider “Who can be decision makers and how can they be supported to do so?”

1.2 Structure of Paper

Chapter 2 starts from a literature review to explain the nature of PB as a policy instrument in democratic societies. This chapter will argue the desirability of PB as a “democratic instrument” for deepening democracy from the perspective of deliberative and participatory democracy. There are different views of the value of deliberative and participatory democracy. On the one hand, deliberative democracy differs from other concepts of democracy, due to the focus on deliberation as “a process that creates a public, citizens coming together to talk about collective problems, goals, ideals and actions” (Young, 1997, p.61), in which citizens reason together to hopefully reach public-minded ends. On the other hand, participatory democracy involves active participation and reform of undemocratic authority structures at its centre (Pateman, 2012, p.10). To combine both these normative concepts of democracy to analyze practical cases, this paper will adopt Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) as a model of a democratic framework. Fung and Wright develop a concept of EPG through their analysis on deliberative and participatory local governances. PB’s two main innovations in participation and deliberation will be highlighted through the EPG framework.

Moreover, this second chapter explores scholarly literature on citizenship and citizenship learning in order to understand how ideas of citizenship are connected with ideological underpinnings of these democratic theories. If democratic citizenship is the foundation of modern democracy, what kind of citizen is ideal for achieving participatory and deliberative
democracy? Even if some may argue people are born to be citizens, they may also agree that people should keep learning in practice if they want to fully tap into their skills, agency, and capabilities to be citizens. Then, what kind of political learning can be offered to citizens through participation in participatory and deliberative democratic practices such as EPG? My argument is that learning for democracy should be the process of practices where people learn to be critical citizens who can transform the concept of “citizenship” toward a more democratic one.

Chapter 3 will introduce the socio-political background, ideological underpinning and institutional design of a PB case in Nabari, a rural city in Japan. I start with an analysis of socio-political situation in Japan, particularly around the issue of local autonomy since civic engagement has been discussed as part of it. The question is how the city of Nabari and its mayor frame their concept of ideal citizenship in this socio-political atmosphere? What is their underpinning ideology for their view of citizenship? How does the city describe the concept in their official documents and bylaws?

These questions may help us to see larger picture behind the PB project, and conditions for citizenship learning.

In the end of Chapter 3, these questions will be examined: whose voice is counted in decision-making, where is the space for participation in decision-making, for what purpose was the space created, and what kind of power affects participation and learning in decision-making. The PB case of Nabari may fail to create the space for democratic citizenship learning in that decision-making is limited to only local and community issues that are marginalized from the centre of “formal” politics and capitalist corporate society. Although the Nabari case may produce more accountable and satisfactory policy outcomes and rich
soil for further civic engagement and democratization, it may also lack space to learn a democracy that is more participatory, deliberative and inclusive, and lack empowerment to let citizens learn to be agents in decision-making through effective voice, space and resources.

Chapter 4 will offer some recommendations to make the Nabari case more participatory, deliberative and inclusive as a space for learning for democracy by using an EPG framework. My suggestions for basic principles are grounded in three principles and three design properties of EPG. These include: adding a transformation-oriented approach onto resolution-oriented one, empowerment for city staff, institutional support for civil society, and a vigorous outreach to make local PB meetings inclusive and transparent. The recommendations for basic institutional design consist of mutual planning for alternative public-private collaboration, centralized coordination, institutional reform for collaboration, and empowerment for networks among diverse actors including governments.

This paper strives to show neither a new theoretical approach nor empirical findings of PB. It will give critical feedback to the on-going practices of a PB case in Nabari through my analysis on the ideological underpinnings. While there are many critiques on the method and outcomes of PB, the number of cases of PB put into practices is growing. PB can trigger more civic participation not only in government activities but also in civil society, and support self-organizing community development through collective decision-making and mutual learning. PB can be a school for more participatory, deliberative and inclusive democracy and transform the concept of democracy and citizenship from the bottom up.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Participatory Budgeting

Direct participation in political decision-making has been one of the ideal conditions of democracy since ancient times. Many of us may wonder if citizens who are not elected through the majority vote are eligible to participate into the public decision-making. Yet proponents of Participatory Budgeting (PB) may ask back if the majority rule and oligarchic control on the governance are also justifiable. Furthermore, some may argue that it is impossible to ask all citizens to join a process of decision-making, as they do not always want to spend their time in political participation. While there is much empirical data that shows how PB can enable fruitful participation and active engagement from citizens, studies have also shown that PB has its challenges including the impracticability of implementation, political apathy, and power imbalances between participants. This Chapter will explore the literature, political and educational theories in PB study, specifically “citizenship learning.” Each one of these topics may help us to understand the historical and socio-political nature of PB, and provide a theoretical lens and focus of this paper.

2.1.1 History of PB

There is no single definition for PB, because it differs greatly from one place to the next. Yet there is a general consensus among scholars that PB is a process (or mechanism) of public deliberation and/or decision making on the allocation of all or part of budgets resources by resorting to direct popular participation (Avritzer, 2002; Santos, 1998; “Global Campaign on Urban Governance”, 2004). PB was initiated in 1989 by the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), in Port Alegre, a southern regional capital of 1.3 million people in Brazil. Despite Brazilian histories of “delegative democracy” and clientilism
following after the era of military dictatorship, newly elected Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) government in Port Alegre advanced decentralized and democratized decision-making processes in response to the demand from civil society. Therefore, PB in Port Alegre was the result of a conjuncture of top-down and bottom-up processes of political action. (Sintomer, Herzberg & Röcke, 2008)

Between the 1960’s and the 1980’s, the population of Port Alegre doubled and many of the new comers started to live in shanty towns called favelas, where people live in makeshift houses without basic public services due to lack of land rights. Although resident of Port Alegre enjoyed relatively more equal economic distribution and higher educational achievement than the rest of Brazil, the rapid urbanization and subsequent suburbanization resulted in deteriorating public services especially in the peripheral areas. The city also experienced an exacerbation of unemployment and urban poverty because of the change in industrial structures and region-wide debt (Baiocchi, 2005). In spite of the long-standing military rule, neighborhood organizing and social movements have been active from 1930s in Brazil. In Port Alegre, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, neighborhood associations transformed from being clientelistic (i.e. being in patron and clients relationship with local politicians), into combative, and, in turn, collaborative ones. They started organizing more broadly and established the União das Associações de Moradores (UAMPA) in 1983, in which one third of neighborhood associations of the city took part (Abers, 2000, p.40). This coincided with the decentralization of the state power to the local municipalities or regions after the falloff the long-standing military dictatorship in Brazil. Before the Partido Trabalhadores (PT), a left wing “Worker’s Party,” took the majority of the Port Alegre parliament in the 1988 election, UAMPA had already negotiated their participation in the
city’s budget process with the previous government, though it never happened. When PT took office, this new government started to incorporate UAMPA’s proposal for the popular decision-making in budgetary matters into the government plan for promoting political participation of the poor.

The first attempt to implement PB occurred in five regions of Port Alegre, then after protests from neighborhood leaders, expanded to 16 regions in 1989. While the available budget was limited, the tremendous expectation for PB brought a long wish list, which later resulted in high frustrations and disappointments among participants. Due to the lack of ability of the PT administration, and miscommunications between the government and avid participants, only few of the projects that communities chose were initiated in that year. While optimistic spirits cooled, the protests got hot. The PT administration took several challenging actions to respond to this crisis, and transformed themselves into a healthy political body that was able to devolve a decision-making power to citizens, and account for the available budget allocation for PB process and the spending of decided projects. Within two years, three major changes occurred: recuperation of revenues with tax reforms, administrative restructuring that created a new centralized Planning Office and an office of community relations, and collaborative changes in PB structures and rules (Abers, 2000, p.80). As a result, the number of PB participants increased dramatically, after their decline in 1990. This success of remobilization of Port Alegre residents made the success of the PB model undeniable.

2.1.2 PB’s implementation structures

The PB’s success owed much to the structural changes of the PB’s design. It evolved gradually, to be more responsive to community priorities and broader issues. The PB in
Port Alegre originally consisted of two large regional plenary meetings and two District Assemblies within each of the 16 districts.

First, citizens discuss and prioritize their goals at a community level. Before joining a government-sponsored plenary meeting, each community association or popular council, an autonomous umbrella association for individuals and community associations, organizes their own meetings to discuss community issues, to prioritize their demand, and to appoint their spokesperson to higher level meetings. At a regional level, there are two-tier plenary sessions: a regional assembly and regional budget forum. The assembly includes an information session about previous works, Q&A sessions with a mayor and staff, and the voting of the delegates to the regional budget forum. As the number of participants increase, the number of delegates increases. Each community organization can mobilize as many participants as possible, in order to elect more delegates (i.e. the higher the turnout from a neighborhood, the greater the representation to the regional meeting). Since final votes are held at the regional level, a greater number of elected representatives from a particular neighborhood increase the likelihood of having a project selected. However, as participants increase, a larger number of participants are needed to increase the number of delegates. Since they use a sliding scale formula to decide the number of delegates chosen from a neighborhood (e.g. 1 delegate for every 10 people, from 101 to 250-1 for every 20, from 851 to 1,000-1 for every 70 people), they can prevent vocal or large associations from dominating the forum (Santos, 1998). The elected delegates come together to the regional budget forums and intermediary assemblies to talk needs and priorities, and to select potential projects that would be discussed further at the Municipal Budget Council. They also choose two councilors for the council from each regional budget forum. At the municipal budget council,
councilors negotiate for and vote on final projects. The final decision on budget allocation is passed to the legislature for their approval. The councilors job is not limited to decision-making, but includes monitoring the implementation of the budget, and revising the rules for the next year.

In addition, in 1993, the second PT administration introduced second-tier participatory institutions, thematic assemblies and forums. Different forums corresponded to each area of municipal priorities and attracted more middle class participants and experts to PB, and enabled participants to create longer-term and citywide budget plans for specific policy areas. Because of the success of the thematic participatory institution, the PB’s number of participants increased from 780 people in 1980 to more than 35,000 in 2003 (Wampler, 2007, p.119).

2.1.3 Why did Port Alegre succeed?

There are many analyses of the reasons for the success of the PB in Port Alegre. It depends on who measures and how to measure it. Yet there is no room to argue about the variety of changes PB brought to Port Alegre, especially in terms of participation, inclusion and deliberation in the city politics.

Increasing or even sustaining the number of participants for more than 20 years must have been extremely difficult. Nevertheless, in Port Alegre, a virtuous cycle took root among the government and civil society: as participation increases, the range of budget items and the amount of allocated budget for PB expanded. The governments’ openness and PB’s concrete results yielded public trust in the process and collaborative relationship between the government and civil society, even in the previously clientelistic society. Goldfrank (2011) through his comparison of three participatory democratic projects: Caracas, Montevideo, and
Port Alegre, concludes that PB’s success stemmed from national decentralization of political
decision-making power, weak institutionalization of opposition parties, and open design of
the participation program. As well, he mentions political actors’ ideologies in Port Alegre
made a difference in their motivation and quality of implementation of participatory
institutions. Wampler (2007) classifies eight Brazilian city’s PB cases into four categories:
institutionalized PB, informal and contested PB, co-opted PB, and emasculated PB (p.258).
He analyzes the outcomes of 8 cases focusing on interactions between civil society
organizations (CSOS), and the administrations and mayors. His findings suggest that a
mayoral support for delegations of authority to citizens, and CSOS’ willingness to use the
contentious politics might have helped to make PB in Port Alegre successful. Citizen’s rights
and their willingness to maintain their gained rights may be the most crucial point in his
analysis.

Abers (2000) argues for the importance of outreach by municipal officers and the delivery
of popular education programs for inclusion of the “hitherto excluded.” According to Abers,
whereas participatory democracy often struggles with the complex issue of inequality, co-
oplation, and implementation, successful PB cases show how these challenges are avoided
through autonomous rule-making, facilitation for distributional justice, and a social justice-
oriented and democratic strategy.

These studies all addressed the state-civil society relationship, where in successful cases,
they found a relative balance of power between civil society and the state. Well-designed
participatory institutions serve to enhance fruitful deliberation, inclusion of the “hitherto
excluded,” quality of implementation and consensus only when social powers are equalized
or at least the state-civil society’s synergy is positive.
2.1.4 Several critiques on PB

Fung and Wright (2001) describe PB as having a family resemblance to Empowered Participatory Governance, which has “the potential to be radically democratic in their reliance on the participation and capacities of ordinary people, deliberative because they institute reason-based decision making, and empowered since they attempt to tie action to discussion” (p.7). This approach sheds light on not only bottom-up participation and democratic institutional design, which participatory democrats principally value, but also deliberation as the normative ideal of reason-giving and practical means of decision-making.

In Port Alegre, deliberative decision-making brought transparency, reciprocity and accountability to political decision-making that used to be only made through aggregative voting as typified by clientelism and corruption in Brazil.

Some successful PB cases have offered an empirical rationale to the concept of deepening democracy; however, the devil is in the detail of this simple process. Fung and Wright (2001) outline six common critical areas of concern with respect to deliberative and associative governance model.

1. Deliberation can be dominated by the powerful. The legitimacy of deliberative decision-making stands on fair and equal citizens’ participation. Yet, as Young (1997) criticizes, the inequalities between the disadvantaged and the powerful make it impossible for them to put their feet into other’s shoes. The powerful could have more political efficacy to engage in political arenas and more political skills to constrain the scope of or just dominate deliberation processes. Or, indirectly, the powerful can use a formal public deliberation as an excuse to oppress social movements.
2. People can bypass deliberation by hinging on external powers. Even if deliberation can promote fairer and more inclusive collective decision making, the norms of deliberation do not function outside of a deliberative arena. Opposition parties or privileged elites may denigrate the legitimacy of a deliberative body and collective decisions by mobilizing external authorities or resources. They can easily bypass deliberative democratic institutions and their decisions, and trivialize it as disingenuous participation in politics.

3. Not only can self-interested persons pursue her/his rent-seeking decisions to maximize her/his interests and profits via deliberative forums, but also a group of unbiased participants can reach collective decisions that would be against the public good. Some scholars are skeptical about mass democracy and the quality of their decisions, since direct participation may not always produce a public good.

4. Deliberative and participatory processes may further the fluctuation and conflict between social factions. Contending groups would be incapable of addressing the wide-scale concerns or reaching consensus on morally controversial agendas. On the one hand, some deliberative theorists may respond to this by championing deliberative democracy as the only way to address public moral disagreement in the collective decision-making process (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). On the other hand, some radical democratic scholars may counter it with the argument that deliberative democracy cannot sufficiently respond to the constitutive nature of political contestation and antagonism (Mouffe, 1999).

5. If political apathy prevails, public deliberation itself may be not viable. Participatory governance cannot help but rely heavily on actively engaged citizenry for their
theoretical justification and real implementation. Because of the economy of participation, reasonable citizens may rarely participate in long-term deliberative experiments. They may be politically ignorant or want to be free riders on the efforts of others.

6. In comparison with oligarchic and institutionalized governance, the stability of empowered deliberative governance is in doubt. Disillusioned and exhausted citizens may return their gained authority back to professional political elites. Empowered participatory governance may be an innovative yet not historically proven governance model.

In addition to these critical concerns, there is always great concern for the scope of agendas that PB can bring to the political table. The scope can be limited to only local or regional issues that would affect participants directly. Or it can be more short-term and technical issues than long-term and thematic ones.

These critiques of participatory governance are just as valid with respect to PB cases. PB is neither a panacea for every socio-political context and institutional setting nor a one-off isolated innovation that lacks applicability and transferability. Although every agenda of PB can be decided through deliberation, every budgetary issue should not use PB for the collective decision-making. PB may undermine the quality of decisions on some budget items, which can be made through well-established governance. PB’s innovative architecture of the political platform can be customized case by case, from place to place, in line with each context of civil-society relationship and preexisting political institutional design. The main principles of PB may or may not lead other participatory experiments as successful as the Port Alegre’s case. The measure of democratic success of PB may depend on which
principle of democracy, such as equality, participation or freedom of choice, is valued. Still, more empirical studies are needed.

2.2 Democratic Theories behind PB

As I mentioned earlier, PB has many distinctive features in terms of institutional design, underlining ideologies and state-civil society relationships. It is innovative enough to deepen democracy and make participation, state authority and citizenship more democratic. But what does the term “democratic” mean here? Scholars approach PB from various democratic theoretical frameworks. A forest of democratic theories exists in the literature of PB with each scholar highlighting different aspects of democracy. There are two major democratic theories dominating the literature: participatory and deliberative democracy. While both of them value active citizenship, participatory democracy places more emphasis on direct participation while deliberative democracy focuses on deliberation and representation. Because one of values cannot be fully realized without sacrificing one of the other values, it creates some contentions between the two theories (Thompson, 2008). While both participatory and deliberative democrats pay greater attention to citizen’s participation and involvement, each may have different priorities and concepts of ideal citizenry.

This section will examine how both participatory and deliberative democrats take different views on PB as an empirical example of their normative ideals. Furthermore, it will explore what kind of citizen they describe as a political actor for deliberation and participation.

2.2.1 Participatory democracy

Since the ineffectiveness of top-down development approaches became evident, from 1980 onward, international nongovernmental organizations and UN agencies started to adopt
“participation” in their planning and research (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, p.5). In the World Bank’s booklet called “Participation Resources,” participation is defined as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them,” although they acknowledged participation could be a matter of principles, practices or an end in itself (“World Bank,” 1996, p. xi). Given the limitations of this paper, I will only give a brief overview of this debate about the definition of participation. Readers are advised of the rich literature on the role of participation in democratic society by many political philosophers and practitioners such as Aristotle, Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and Carole Pateman.

In the 1970s, Pateman introduced the model of “Participatory Democracy” when the discussion around democracy was whether it was realistic or “participatory.” Participatory theory stresses equal participation in decision-making and equality of power in determining the outcomes of decisions (Pateman, 1970, p.43). She argues that individuals learn to be participatory through participating in decision-making processes in politics and their social lives. What makes participatory democracy distinctive is twofold: a) the educational and developmental aspects as well as b) the delegation of political authority.

One of the scholars who exert great influence on the educative and development side of participatory democracy is Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator and philosopher. His radical and emancipatory philosophy is associated with individual and class actions, with attention to the transformation of power relations and structures of domination by, what Foucault called, the hegemony.

Freire argued that “conscientization” is needed for social transformation. “Conscientization” is defined as “learning to perceive social, political, and economic
contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality” and for radical institutional changes of the society (Freire, 1995, p. 17). His aim in education is to overcome “banking education” which Freire describes as the type of education in which the teacher deposits knowledge into the “inferior” students, reinforcing authoritative social order and the deference to power. Critical pedagogy, in contrast, encourages people to “read the word and world” through political literacy, and to raise critical consciousness of structural social injustices through reflection on their “taken for granted” language, daily experiences and world-views. His popular education is not limited to education in schools, but also can occur in the society through reflective and dialogical mode of learning and commitment to the cause of social transformation. For Freire, the goal of dialogue is to challenge existing domination and symbolic violence in school and society. These social constructions of inequalities impose passive participation or silence on people under the myth of “democratic” institutions and “equal” participation. (Shor and Friere, 1987, p.123) Thus, for him, “real participatory democracy depended on the “bottom-up” work of organizers and educators, with these actors slowly building critical communities that could enter political deliberations as conscious and empowered forces” (Beaumont and Nicholls, 2008, p.88). These collaborative actions for social transformation cannot be completed through political participation by separated “self-made” individuals or even through equally distributed opportunities, without any delegation of “real” power.

In terms of the delegation of authority, political participation in participatory democracy is by no means limited to voting, running for office, or associational activities. Rather, it includes a wider range of political participation under the term of “political,” and furthers the meaning of “democratic.”
In her review of political participation in decision-making, Pateman (1970) explains the similar dispositions between two influential advocates of democracy, Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. Rousseau is mainly concerned about the relationship between psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals (especially men) and social order and institutions that promote active participation in decision-making. Rousseau argues that the central government should consist of participatory institutions that increase individual freedom by enabling people to be their own masters, and that enable collective decisions to be more easily accepted by individuals. John Stuart Mill reinforces Rousseau’s argument by paying much attention to local political institutions rather than the central government. He argued that it is at local level individuals learn democracy and become public-spiritedness through taking public into account. In comparison with conventional competitive democracy that defines “participation” as participation in choosing decision makers, participatory democrats argue that a more radical idea of participation is required to complete political equality. Pateman discusses how Rousseau considers how social institutions and orders affect the education and development of citizens. Thus, a participatory society, Pateman advocates that more democratic institutions and authority structures need to be created. According to her, Rousseau believes that an individual is educated to distinguish between his own impulses and desires, and that an individual learns to be a public as well as a private citizen through deliberation and decision-making in a participatory system. Thus, one of the ends of participatory democracy is a change that makes our own social political lives more democratic. The change should maximize our opportunities to have the right to enjoy public provision, and to participate in political decision-making and living within the authority structures that make the decision-making possible.
Participatory democrats assume participatory democracy could school citizens by nurturing their public-mindedness and critical consciousness, while teaching them skills necessary for political action against hegemony. Their core assumptions are that people would join political action actively, and would be able to tap into their political capabilities if political institutions as well as the society are democratic and inclusive enough to offer learning opportunities for all citizens. Because of the influence of popular movements in South America, popular participation in politics was not seen as a burden nor a sacrifice of private life, but as a political right for people.

Classic liberalists oppose incorporating collective actions into political processes on the ground of individual liberty. Because they favor a state with minimal functions and the maximum liberty for individual self-choice, they regard any forms of mobilization for collective decision-making as a threat to individuals’ private lives. Under the liberalists’ view of political culture and institutions, participatory democracy would not be realized. Compared with classic liberalists, advocates of representative democracy cast doubts on the claim that civic virtue takes precedence over the economy of participation, and that there are physical and temporal constraints that impeded mass participation and legitimacy of representation. Because participatory democracy aspires to lower the barrier of political participation in decision-making for the voiceless and the poor, political representation can be arbitral, accidental and unfair (Dahl, 1989, p.228). Some may be concerned about the domination of decision-making by few politically active minorities, since not all citizens can take part in assemblies or meetings physically and economically.

In addition to participatory democrats, there is a different camp that also values civic engagement for promoting civic virtue and social cohesion through collaboration between
civil society and government officials. This camp of associational democrats such as Cohen & Rogers (1995), argues that radical social movements direct challenge of social institutions can improve political institutions but only at the great expense of social peace and civic sentiment in democratically mature countries (Fung, 2003, p.535). Due to different understanding on the nature of politics, in this camp, the reality of conflict and power in politics are dismissed?

Despite of these critiques, participatory democrats may still be able to stand up for their ideals of political equality and more democratic institutions, since it may deepen democracy by advancing citizen’s rights for political participation and learning democracy. Both advocates and critics of participatory democracy accept the necessity of democratizing institutions, democratic education, and the right of participation, even if they may oppose egalitarian or radical approaches toward participation and citizenship.

### 2.2.2 Deliberative democracy

From the last decade of the second millennium, there has been a revival of deliberative democracy as collective decision-making through discussion among free and equal citizen who are affected by the decision (Elster, 1998; Dryzek, 2000). Scholars put emphasis on different principles of this normative concept of democracy, and propose their own ideal concepts including: deliberative system, public deliberation, discursive democracy, communicative democracy, and so forth\(^\text{ii}\). Young (1997) distinguishes deliberative democracy from interest-based models of democracy by their fundamental approach to collective decision-making. While the former focuses on the attainment of citizen’s individual and collective interests, deliberative democracy envisages democracy as “a process that creates a public, citizens coming together to talk about collective problems,
goals, ideals and actions.” So why do citizens and officials need to engage in such political discussion? Gutmann and Thompson (1996) identify four principal benefits of deliberative democracy.

The first is promoting legitimacy of collective decisions. Even if people cannot agree on others’ moral foundation or satisfy their whole or partial interests, still they can more easily justify their moral concerns with one another on equal footing under deliberative democracy. “Deliberative Democracy does not assume that the results of all actual deliberation are just.” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p.17) Yet citizens still can have opportunities to justify their political procedures and constitutional rights to one another.

The second is encouraging public-spirited perspectives on public issues. The fora of public deliberation encourage citizens to consider public policy not only for their self-interest but also for the common good. In practice, we need a well-designed institution in which citizens can take into account a broader range of perspectives, and a higher level of political competence among informed citizens. As well, we need to ponder over what kind of socio-political culture is dominant, and how equally participants are situated in terms of distribution of resources (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p.42).

The third is to promote mutually respectful decision-making. Deliberation helps citizens to distinguish self-interested claims from public-spirited ones. It doesn’t necessarily help them to attain their interests but possibly achieve their mutual satisfactions for the process and consequences of political decision-making. Through this process, citizens and officials may clarify where moral disagreements exist among them, and recognize moral merits of other fellow citizens.
The fourth benefit of deliberative democracy is to correct the mistakes of the past. Due to the complexities, for individual and collective decision-making, citizens and officials should take into account and continue to learn from past experiences and failures; this is essential for making more widely justifiable policies.

Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that practice and principles of deliberative democracy should be separately examined. They define three chief principles that constitute the standards to guide mutually justifiable moral reasoning in the process of deliberation: reciprocity, publicity and accountability. Yet they also argue that a mere practice of deliberation is not sufficient and not always necessary to constitute the principles of deliberative democracy (Macedo, 1999, p245). Public deliberation without the political institutions may fail to include citizens into decision-making processes to decide what should be deliberated. Yet, at the same time, it’s not always necessary to publicly deliberate every single law and public policy, although a decision not to deliberate should be made publicly by agents who are accountable (Macedo, 1999, p.246). As well, they insist that individual’s basic liberty and opportunity should be assured in advance of participation in public deliberation, because it “cannot be deprived from other principles of deliberative democracy” such as reciprocity, publicity and accountability.

Some scholars see these types of liberal commitments of “liberty” and “opportunity” as well as public reasoning as substantial constraints on deliberation, because of the ideological legacy of liberal democracy (Young, 2000; Kahane & Winestock, 2010).

Young adds some critiques of the presumptions and goals of deliberative democracy: unity and reasonableness that are based on a speech-centered culture. Inasmuch as deliberative democracy assumes that people may change their subjective preferences to
objective collective ones, advocates of deliberative democracy expect that some shared understanding is discoverable among different individuals from different cultural, social or religious backgrounds. Yet if their assumption is true, it is not necessary for different individuals to transcend their subjectivity to agree with other people’s opinions. Since each individual is supposed to share common values and norms or a common will, one can easily stay with her/his subjectivity to reach common ground. By appealing to the common good and by putting unity as the end goal, deliberative democrats may then risk excluding people with different cultural and ethnic background, interests and ideologies from consensus making by appealing to the common good.

Another issue is the concept of mutual reasoning, which is the kernel of deliberative democracy. Habermas advocates that the “authority of better argument,” should prevail the power of politicians in political decision-making processes. For such reasoned argument to be rational, fair and equal participation in the discussion and domination-free conversation is needed. Young (1997) argues deliberative democrats tend to look over different social positions and cultures that may silence or devalue the marginalized. The norms that decide the appropriateness of speeches and reasons have never been neutral, universal, formal or objective, but culturally specific and dominated for a long time by the western, white and upper-class male. To bring emotion, competition, informality and cultural sensitivity back into deliberation, she proposes to add greeting, rhetoric and storytelling to deliberation as ideal components for her “communicative democracy”.

Furthermore, radical democratic theorists such as Mouffe (1999) challenge deliberative democracy that is strongly influenced by liberal pluralism. She puts emphasis on “disagreement” as a substantial aspect of democracy rather than agreement or consent. She
argues that the Habermasian concept of dialogue is too universalistic and rationalistic to understand the authoritarian nature of rational consensus, and antagonism and power in the political discussion that never starts without impediments to consensus. Instead of the Habermasian concept of free and unconstrained public deliberation, she advocates “agonistic pluralism,” that incorporates conflict and diversity inherited in a modern plural democracy into politics, and does not relegate passions under the veil of rationality and morality. By making room for dissent and diverse voices, those radical pluralists aim to remobilize people to the stage of democratic politics under different ideologies from deliberative and participatory democracy.

Mouffe’s concerns also bring important questions to the current context of neoliberal hegemony that merely recon structs new elites by offering alternative “legitimacy” and marginalizing the poor. In reference to the case of Britain, Beaumont and Nicolls (2008) argue, “Deliberative institutions in the area of poverty management have become strategic instruments to transmit, or more accurately download or impose, new rationalities (i.e. ideas of political actors, ideas of what should be done) to working-class communities” (p.90).

Needless to say, participatory budgeting projects and practitioners cannot be too careful in watching out for the oppressive possibilities of deliberative democracy. Political participation can reinforce tyranny by minorities or by maintaining the legitimacy of the privileged for making decisions.

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2.2.3 Empowered Participatory Governance

Fung and Wright (2003) place different interpretations on the emerging concepts of participatory and deliberative democracy. They juxtapose deliberative and participatory
democracy with a focus on pragmatic institutional perspectives and, through their studies of some empirical cases, including PB in Port Alegre, created the concept ‘Empowered Participatory Governance’ (EPG).

Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) is a unique twist of participatory and deliberative democracy because it includes both the radical ideas of direct participation and institutional change, and more liberal ones of reasonable deliberation and state control. EPG is (1) focusing on practical-oriented experiments (2) with bottom-up participation from empowered civil society and public administrations (3) that attempts to solve problems through reasoned deliberation. In addition, three qualities of institutional designs are essential to enhance and deepen these three principles: (1) devolution of decision-making authority to empowered local units, (2) collaborative and loosely decentralized connection between centralized office and local units, and (3) restructuring institutions from within the state by collaborative efforts between groups of citizens, officials and experts. To avoid co-optation or domination by experts and administrators, the rough equality of power among participants and the presence of vigorous and contentious empowered civil society organizations (CSOS) are not only essential but necessary background conditions for EPG. For pragmatic ends, these authors do not seek revolutionary institutional changes or a resurgence of direct democracy with massive popular participation. Instead, they keep the scope of devolution of the power mostly limited to local apparatus, and require the number of participants that is legitimate but feasible enough so that it can ensure the quality of participation and practical problem-solutions. EPG has the potential to be radically democratic because it relies on the participation and capacity of ordinary people. It can also be deliberative and empowered because it attempts to translate decisions made through
public deliberations by ordinary people into action. It can let people decide what affects their collective life. While EPG expects “reasonableness” rather than self-interest or agonism for political participants, EPG also includes countervailing power for the collaboration between civil society and administrations to balance adversarial power with practical governance.

Still, EPG shares same paradoxes with other accounts of deliberative democracy such as: representation versus participation, political equality versus affirmative inclusion, and self-interest versus common good. In terms of representation and participation, the legitimacy of both sides depends on the meaning of “democratic.” Which can be more democratic, “reasonable” decisions through popular deliberation with empowered direct participation, or “legitimate” decisions made by the elite representatives who are selected by voting? In response to this theoretical dispute, EPG attempts to bring practice back to the debate because the form of local institutions actually determines the quality and integrity of the resulting participation and deliberation (Fung, 2004). As I mentioned earlier, Dahl (1989) casts doubt on direct participation in decision-making due to difficulty in finding a right scale of participation: mass participation keeps people from deliberating deeply, and little participation will likely fall into oligarchy. As well, skeptics may be concerned about not only the issue of scale, but also the technical complexity of contemporary policymaking, compartmentalized administrative bodies, the privatization of public life, and so forth. The family of deliberative and participatory democracy hasn’t yet gathered enough evidence to defend that their seemingly idealistic concepts can benefit both theories of democracy and real people.

EPG is worthwhile as an analytical framework that bridges normative ideals and empirical facts, even if it does not go much beyond a hypothesis. Churchill said, “it has been said that
democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried, democracy is neither ideal nor universal” (Churchill & James, 1974). Thus, as long as we have defects in a current political system, we need to learn from EPG as a novel deviance from a dominant model of interest-based democracy. It should be strongly recommended to reflect its feedback on our century-old political mechanism of representative democracy and to reinvent everyday democratic practices.

2.3 Ideal citizens in democratic theories

This section is dedicated to citizenship, which is a centerpiece of modern democratic systems. Democracy usually champions equal and free citizens to participate in decision-making on matters that affect them directly or indirectly. Some democrats argue to what extent and how citizens can or should influence the means and ends of politics. Some ask people to be responsible and obedient, but others ask them to be active and critical. That is to say, it matters what type of citizenship we require for democracy. How can citizenship be democratic and what kind of citizenship contributes to deeper democracy? While a good instrument needs a good player if you want to make quality sounds, the meaning of “good” and its ideological underpinnings should be examined.

The former sections explored alternative meanings of “democratic” in participatory and deliberative democracy. What kind of citizenship do participatory and deliberative democratic theorists expect for the attainment of their ideal concepts of democracy in practice? What are an ideal concept of citizenship, and a core essence of the citizenship?

While liberal democrats are concerned about individual lights and liberty, communitarians emphasize moral and social responsibility. While the political right mainly worries about
social cohesion and integration, the political left is concerned with political participation and rights. Any universal concept of “good citizenship” has its advantages and disadvantages. Below the next section will explore the limits and possibilities of the views on citizenship, as described by participatory and deliberative democracy and EPG.

2.3.1 Citizens in participatory democracy

For a participatory society, the ideal goal of participatory democrats such as Rousseau or Pateman is that a private individual becomes an educated, public citizen. Such a notion might be regarded as both idealistic and radical. However, the current political mechanisms, such as parties and elections, have displayed vulnerability and poor response to a rapidly changing socio-economic environment and complexities of modern governance in a large scale. Citizens may feel bewildered somewhat by their government and official experts, due to lack of channels for reciprocal communications. This disconnection between the state and citizenry has led to a resurgence of participatory democracy. Participatory democrats hope to bridge this gap by empowering citizen participation in the decision-making process. They expect that citizens would learn democracy by participating and practicing a part of governance at the local level.

In reference to Rousseau’s work, Pateman (1970) argues citizens need to have a psychological attitude to be the master of their own life and decisions, and establish participatory institutions to enjoy collective decision-making that affect them. In addition, she cites John Stuart Mill, who sees “an active, public-spirited type of character being fostered” by popular, participatory institutions (Pateman, 1970, p.29). Because the concept itself gives preference for ordinary people over elite, participatory democracy needs citizens who want to learn to be public citizens and gain political skills to collaborate with political
elites. People are expected to be open for any political attitudinal changes and learning opportunities. As well, they are expected to be active, political, and passionate about public and collective issues and activities.

One of the main differences between elitist democracy and participatory democracy is the state-civil society relationship. Participatory democrats challenge the stable configuration of the relationship, and see the subject and object as not separated, but interconnected. The mediator of these divides might be diverse: from mass culture to individual activists to secondary associations or community (Baiocchi, Heller & Silva, 2011). The mediative process is not solely decided by the internal context of civil society but by a wider institutional context. As well, the institutional design for the process is interrelated with the educational aspects of participatory democracy: capacity building, skill and literacy acquisition, or efficacy and attitude fostering.

This close connection between the state and civil society not only benefits civil society, but also put them at risk of co-optation by the state and being reinforced by the economic hegemony by the state. This negative outcome of the collaboration between the state and civil society can be counteracted if citizens can practice Freire’s idea of being a transformative learner with agency. He argues that any person can collectively make a difference by reflecting on the codified version of their reality through dialogue and actions for social movement. This approach suggests that a fundamental social transformation occurs through the struggle against oppression and social inequalities, and a society needs to offer a place where the oppressed can interrogate this reality with critical consciousness, and can co-develop political literacy. Freire sees that citizens are inherently capable of establishing freedom inside of themselves despite their situation, which they are capable of being active
in the public sphere, and becoming a change agent who collectively works for the common good over their own self-interests.

Although advocates for participatory democracy provide us with a much richer view of citizenship than the elitist one, they have been criticized for their optimistic view of civic virtue. These advocates find the virtue of active political engagement in the struggle for power or in fellowship or solidarity to make a social change collectively. Achieving this emancipatory and humanistic view requires a politically active citizenry who has enough political information, knowledge, and interest, and time and money for political engagement. This critique is central to the political view of liberalists who view political participation as a burden of private life and a sacrifice of individual liberties. This concern ignores the most important contribution of participatory democracy, that is, the transformational educative perspective of citizen’s attitude and ability. It is difficult to examine if participatory democracy can change citizen’s attitudes or generic political culture, because many other influences on these attitudes and culture coexist.

2.3.2 Citizens in deliberative democracy

Habermas (1989) asserts that deliberation should ideally rest only on “the standards of “reason” and “the authority of the better argument” on matters of “common concern” (pp.28, 36,37, as cited in Mansbridge et.al, 2010). For this attainment, deliberative democracy requires a “reasonable” and rational individual. This idea of universal reasonableness traces back to the age of Enlightenment in the 18th century, where humans were seen to be intrinsically capable of reason, natural freedom and human equality, despite their status, ethnicity, biological endowment and so on. The recent accounts of liberal pluralism allow diverse sources of reasons, from religious to social ones, to justify people’s different
positions and arguments. Yet liberal pluralism raises fundamental doubts on an universal concept of democracy: how can people with such diverse moral, religious or philosophical thoughts work toward a simple agreement on democracy that treats people as free and equal citizens? In Cohen’s understanding, to say citizens are free is equal to saying that they can choose or reject the particular religious or political view without loss of status. To say citizens are equal is the same as saying that each is recognized as having capacities required to join deliberation for decision-making (Cohen, 1998, p.192).

Since a commitment to the political ideals of freedom and equality constitute a common ground of Enlightenment, the reasonable, equal and free citizens that deliberative democrats seek are based on the same normative ground of Enlightenment that presumes a certain form of civic virtue, and prefixed basic rights for democracy. While individual liberty and the pursuit of her/his own definition of good should be respected, deliberative democracy requires citizens to choose, more often, the option for the common good in deliberation, by being reasonable rather than self-interested. Given that this requirement is the result of normative claims from both liberalism and civic republicanism, we need to look at empirical cases to examine if those entry conditions are appropriate when people need to make communal and conflictual decisions.

Mouffe criticizes three aspects of deliberative democratic perspectives on citizenship: exclusivity of morality, gender-biased construction of reasonable figures, and lack of focus on collectivity (Ruitenberg, 2008). Deliberative democrats may consider only a reasonable person as a good citizen. This standard requires a specific moral set for participation in politics. It may set boundaries between a person who has that morality and who doesn’t.
The measurement for a good argument has been established by the dominant class in a modern society, specifically white upper-middle class males, and has never been neutral or natural. To hide the hegemonic relationship between the oppressor and oppressed never contributes to let citizens be free and equal. Mouffe insists that the conflict between political adversaries, not moral enemies, is essential for political realms, and cannot be swept under the carpet of morality and rationality (Ruitenberg, 2008). Without contentions, the hegemonic power easily dominates the marginalized, and establishes a social order that favors only one side.

As well, an overemphasis on objective and rational citizens ignores the important role of emotion in such contentious political realms. Because expressing emotion and excitement are seen as female-specific and subjective actions, dispassionate objectivity correlates with the particular speech culture of the privileged male in the West (Young, 2000, p.39). Reasonable citizens with dispassionate objectivity can be the product of one advantaged class or culture. This restrictive view on the virtue of citizens may exclude activated and passionate citizens who do not know or like the rules of the game and way of playing from the scope of a “good citizen”.

2.3.3 Citizens in EPG

EPG is a hybrid model of participatory and deliberative democracy with a pragmatic focus on empirical cases. Through deliberation, citizens may become wiser, more accepting and understanding of different political values. EPG assumes that citizens are able to reconcile their different positions by justifying their reasons mutually in good faith. Citizens are viewed as fundamentally good and being able to do good for the society (Fung, 2004, p.17).
In terms of participation, EPG inherits a similar concept of citizenship from participatory democracy with pragmatic interpretation. In EPG, participation is “empowered,” because citizen’s decisions can be translated into policy outputs. EPG puts professionals and citizens on the same footing for deliberative problem solving and decision-making. They stress ordinary citizens can overcome ignorance and incompetence through capacity building and skill training.

Yet there is one critique on active citizenry being taken for granted in participatory democracy. Opponents may say that only relying on self-motivated attitudes or altruism of citizens cannot solve the prevailing political apathy. It may be overcome when citizens value the benefit of their delegated power and influence on the outcomes over the cost of involvement. But EPG doesn’t consider citizens as the cause of the increasing political apathy. Instead, they see the cost of communication and lack of informed citizens as one of the causes of political apathy. As well, EPG doesn’t expect citizens to participate in every political action, yet believes that citizens can take one of many opportunities, from community activities to street protests, if they want. Through feedback from their participation, citizens may or can find themselves transformative enough to become active citizenry. As well, citizens may not be completely rational beings that strive to maximize their self-interest but can be flexible for choosing between the collective common good or self-interest, to the extent of which the choice is “reasonable.” EPG just shares some traits with deliberative democracy, in terms of the nature of citizenship.

Because of their pragmatic focus on democratic institutions and external contexts, what the ideal concept of citizenship in EPG is, is not explicitly expressed. They carefully divide a normative and empirical claim, and amalgamate deliberative, radical and participatory
democratic theories to describe citizens on the basis of research results from real practices. Although they may face similar critiques of these democratic theories or pragmatism in general, they bring a practical argument into the normative dispute over what is “good” and “active.”

EPG indicates that individuals do not necessarily and always keep the integrity of their attitudes, behaviors and thoughts. Citizens described in EPG are more transformative in a participatory democratic sense, reasonable in a deliberative democratic one, and collaborative but adversarial in a radical democratic sense. Therefore, we could say there is a sort of ideal concept of citizenship in EPG, although EPG relies less on citizenship than institutional renovations.

2.4 Democratic citizenship learning and learning for democracy

In terms of the ideal concept of citizenship, in many countries in the world, governments consistently attempt to infuse their own concept of “good citizenship” in citizens through their educational systems. Educating citizens to obey laws and social customs, to care about public goods and others, and to engage in community activities and volunteering is needed more by governments than ever before. Moreover, the governments under the influence of fiscal austerity and neoliberalism need more for independent, self-help, and public-spirited individuals. These particular qualities of “good citizenship” are in danger of promoting a narrowly interpreted concept of citizenship in favor of particular democratic ideologies. By the same token, the active citizenry that participatory and deliberative democratic theories advocate can be of two kinds. Not only is there a fine line between maintaining the public good by active citizens and domesticating citizens to be active, but also active citizenship can contribute to both privatizing political duties and building vigorous civil societies.
This section will examine the debate around the concept of citizenship that deliberative and participatory democratic theorists value, and the educational aspects of it. Since those democracies expect education to nurture specific qualities of citizenship in people, the next section will explore how people can learn to be the citizen that these democratic theorists value. I would argue citizenship itself should be not only something achieved but also something practiced in process of critical learning for democracy.

2.4.1 The concept of active citizenship learning and its critiques

Along with the dominant political context, the discourse and interpretation of citizenship has been changed gradually. In his influential work, Marshall (1992) defines:

Citizenship is a status bestowed on all those who are full members of a community. All those who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed (p. 18).

As seen above, traditionally, citizenship has been understood as the membership in a political and national community where individuals have rights and duties to the existing society. The emphasis in this context is two-fold: protection of individual liberty and equality, and responsibility to the welfare of the community (Marshall, 1992, p.41). Marshall believes that social rights to achieve social justice and social integration by laws and duties can render citizenship compatible with capitalism. He advocates that the state should mitigate the impact of the market through promoting individual social rights. There is a critique of Marshall’s assumption of the neutrality of the state, that is, he ignores the risk of “structural constraints,
which the market and coercive state place upon the distribution of the resource necessary for citizenship,”(Faulks, 1998, p.51, as cited in Lawy & Biesta, 2006b,p.67).

In the 1970s, under the influence of libertarian liberals or neo-liberal thinkers such as Robert Nozik and Frederic Hayek who trusted the free market to secure justice, social rights and the welfare state were gradually replaced by market rights to individual entrepreneurs, and by the neo-liberal state, for the guardianship of the free market. (Biesta, 2011, p.9) In such neo-liberal governance, individuals should be self-reliant, entrepreneurial and accountable for their actions, yet at the same time should take care of their community and nation. In exchange for this duty, they can possess freedom of economic activities and the right to own their own properties. This specific form of active citizenship is influenced by the liberal idea of universal citizenship, which asserts that individuals are born free and equal in the eyes of the law (Mouffe, 1992). It is also based on a particular diagnosis of society’s ill such as a decline in electoral turnout, and in sense of belonging to community and political associations. It attaches responsibility for these social defects to individuals, rather than seeing the state’s cut backs for public support for the marginalized, due to their ethnicity, gender, religion and so forth. While the state ensures no-interference to individual’s freedom of religion, speech or collective actions, the state requires individuals to be actively responsible for their community and society. This is one of the reasons why active citizenship has been encouraged through citizenship education in Britain.

There is another reason why active citizenship has been demanded. Through globalization and permeation of neoliberalism, small governments turn their attention from the role of government to the way of “governance.” Good governance needs a high quality of decision-making and efficacy in policy-making. For maintaining “good governance,” the cost of
negotiation with a social movement and civil resistance become so high that active citizens who can become conduits between the state and civil society are needed. As well, good governance requires limited scope and size of government activities to keep its quality. It needs the delegation of its authority to local polities. In turn, this devolution of the authority increases the variety and complexities of decisions in local politics. Thus, public engagement by active citizens is crucial to render the local decision-making transparent, reasonable and legitimate.

In this context, active and good citizenship is a right to be attained by individuals through practice and engagement. It seems that citizenship may be the capacity to co-develop and make decisions for the common good in collaboration with other individuals reasonably and rationally. On the same token, it is also the duty bestowed by the state to keep “our” governance effective and efficient. Thus, gaining active citizenship may enable individuals to act as a contributing agent to cure social ills.

Biesta (2011) criticizes these concepts of active citizenship from three perspectives: individualized responsibilities, outcome-oriented education, and disconnection between what is being taught and learnt. First, these concepts assume that the responsibility of social malaise can be individualized and resolved through the production of “good citizens” followed by individuals’ acquisition of good citizenship with a proper set of knowledge, experiences, skills and attitudes. As I mentioned earlier, this ignores the social construction aspects of contemporary issues. Second, the idea of citizenship as something achieved and gained presumes that people, specifically young people, are not yet citizens. This idea, regarding citizenship as an outcome, tends to focus only on an instrumental approach to citizenship: how such a thing might be achieved. It is problematic because “it is fabricated on
the assumption that citizenship is a status that is only achieved after one has successfully traversed a specified trajectory” (Biesta, 2011, p.13). As an alternative idea, he suggests “citizenship as practice” in which everyone in the society learns to be a citizen as the consequence of their participation in the actual practices that make up their lives (Lawy and Biesta, 2006a). Third, people’s learning of citizenship may be different from what is being taught, or what people are expected to learn from society. Their perception of citizenship is shaped by not only instruction and empowerment for specific knowledge, skills and dispositions, but also meaning making of themselves as learners in their community and society. The learning of democratic citizenship is situated within the lives of people who have social relationships with community, culture, economy and religion.

Biesta suggests altering the idea of citizenship as achievement to citizenship as practice. Citizenship is not a prefixed common goal that can be achieved by the best and appropriate methods or approaches, but something people continuously do and learn mutually and reflexively anywhere (Lawy and Biesta, 2006a, pp.42-45). Therefore, he pays much attention to the context and conditions of people’s lives, and the processes through which they learn the meaning of democracy, rather than effective means to bring about “good and active citizens.”

Schugurensky (2006) describes citizenship as legal and political status, civic virtue, identity, and agency. If citizenship is something in practice, status may be not something bestowed to belong, but something to practice in social activities. Civic virtue may not be the shared common good, but something people can gain from the process of meaning making of the common good. Identity may not be what people can have, but what people are becoming.
Agency may not be something achievable, but something necessary to practice and negotiate continually.

These interpretations do not resemble liberal understanding of citizenship as the common civic identity and/or individual rights. Nor do they share some civic republican’s views on citizenship as active participation that promotes intrinsic good, and the social bond within the state. Rather, it implies that active citizenship is a process of learning and knowing with a critical and reflexive consciousness.

This is very similar to Freires’s idea of concientization. Freirean understanding of citizenship involves “not just rights or duties, but a particular consciousness, one that goes beyond knowledge of political institutions and towards an understanding of the underlying social and political processes” (McCowan, 2006, p.27). Thus, to understand the contextualized nature of people’s learning for democratic citizenship, social, economic, cultural and political conditions for participation should be examined in practices.

2.4.2 Ideas for democratic citizenship learning

The foregoing implication by Biesta is that a participatory society might be a central and essential element of democratic citizenship learning. In other words, while participatory architectures of society offer people spaces for democratic citizenship learning, they learn to deepen democracy toward participatory one through practices of deliberation and decision-making. Collective decision-making fosters reciprocal learning for democracy and citizenship.

Berber (1984) argues for the importance of this virtuous circle in his concept of ‘strong democracy’. He suggests that “when politics is the participatory mode becomes the source of political knowledge, … then knowledge itself is redefined in terms of the chief virtues of
democratic politics” (p.167). For his theory of strong democracy, that is a “distinctively modern form of participatory democracy” (Berber, 1984, p.117), the main virtue of citizenship is the civility that can be nurtured by action and cooperation with reciprocal empathy and respect. He urges that the best supporting institution of citizenship is civic education for democracy that relies less on formal pedagogy and private-sphere social activity than on participatory politics itself. As many political philosophers and educational scholars have noted, democracy is best taught by practicing it. Thus, the quality of democratic citizenship learning depends on the degree to which political institutions and cultures are participative, deliberative and inclusive.

PB’s success suggests that participatory institutions and society can provide rich platforms for democratic citizenship learning. In reference to the success of PB in Port Alegre, Abbers (2003) mentions “the importance of participatory fora as civic learning space is critical” (p.206). From her observation of many PB cases, she concludes that the more participation people experience in public, the more deliberative and public-spirited popular decision-making can be. In other words, the more deliberation and participation increases in the process, people can develop more capacity to listen, argue and reason. In this sense, deliberation can be treated as not only a decision-making process, but also a mutual understanding and opinion formation process toward social learning (Kanra, 2004). However, even if deliberative and participatory democracy itself can be ideal civic education in the normative sense, there may be challenges and concerns in practice.

Gaventa (2006) brings up the negative aspects of participatory methods in development practices. He questions:
1. Whose voices are really represented as the name of collective categories such as “the poor” or “community”?

2. In whose space does participation occur? Is that space closed, invited, or claimed/created?

3. What are empowered participation and deliberation aimed for? Is the purpose for co-optation, consultation, or decision-making? Or is that for legitimacy or efficacy of predetermined policies? Or is that a blanket for economic inequality and austerity?

4. Whose power is affected? In order to coexist with different forms of power, such as the visible, hidden, or invisible ones, what capacities are needed to challenge power relations and make a change?

Those questions suggest that learning democracy through participation and deliberation may not automatically result in good things. To make learning contribute to deeper democracy and to make democracy contribute to citizens’ learning for democracy, we need to understand what conditions make a difference to participation and deliberation for people who are affected by the decisions. Gaventa (2006) expresses this concern:

A key conundrum for proponents of participation is that the emergence of more and more potential spaces of democratic engagement in the last decades has also accompanied by a rise of economic inequality in many countries and across the world. (p.64).

In an era of fiscal austerity and neoliberalism, civic engagement could become a mere administrative device to enhance the transparency, efficacy and efficiency of governmental policies, rather than a policy instrument to revamp the administration itself. In response to this, we should distinguish learning for democracy from learning to contribute effective and
efficient governance. While the latter is likely at risk of reproducing social inequalities and defects of capitalism, the former may help people to learn and deepen democracy for them.

The next chapter will examine the nature of PB practices in Japan, and explore what kind of learning for democracy may be possible or not. Are these practices a kind of New Public Management (NPM), or alternatives for democratization? Is learning in these practices promoting obedience and allegiance to hegemonic cultures and laws, or raising a critical consciousness of existing social inequalities and injustice? What kind of learning might be necessary to enhance democratic societies and institutions? Alternatively, what kind of institutions and societies are necessary for democratic citizenship learning? These questions will then be examined throughout the rest of this paper.
Chapter 3: Critical Examination of a PB Case in Japan

3.1 Socio-political context in Japan behind PB

One of the main concerns for PB is its transferability to different countries. Many comparative politics scholars attempt cross-national research and case studies to figure out whether PB is a specialty of some Brazilian cities (Sintomer, Herzberg & Röcke, 2008; Goldfrank, 2011; Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012). In Japan, there are several political experiments similar to participatory budgeting (Matsubara & Suzuki, 2011). Yet none of them share similar historical backgrounds or institutional designs with PB in Port Alegre. Among these experiments, the case of the city of Nabari is unique from others in terms of amount of the budget available for allocation (about one million dollars) and level of devolution of authority to communities. While the Nabari case can be a spin-off or variants of PB as “Porto Alegre model for Japan,” it does not necessarily deepen democracy in terms of achieving political equalities and social inclusion. Even if the case may advance accountability and efficacy of public service and support local autonomy through offering opportunities for citizenship learning, it is still unclear if it facilitates learning for democracy and empowers local citizens to be active in deepening democracy for them and their collective life.

Russel Einhorn (2007) identifies six key groups of factors into two categories that can limit the effectiveness of participatory mechanisms in achieving democratic and development goals. He distinguishes background factors such as sociocultural, political, and legal administrative traditions from institutional design, resource availability, and the capacities of key government and civil society actors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of these factors. Instead, this paper will look at socio-political and historical context of Japan and the underpinning ideologies of the legal and administrative frameworks so as to
comprehend if the case of PB in Nabari has led to a deepening of democracy or if it addresses only the specific interests for a certain society or group of people.

3.1.1 Quick review of the socio-political context of a modern Japanese society

Devolution of public authority has been a top-priority issue for domestic politics in Japan. Since the 1980s, Japan has started to aggressively open its market and has begun to adopt neoliberalistic policies common to the era of globalization. The state introduced the benefit principle of taxation and social welfare, and deregulation of the labor law to support global firms to compete with other countries. These changes were also coincidental with the rise of Thatcherism and Reganomics that accelerated the fall of welfare state in the UK and the US.

In the early 1990s, Japan experienced the burst of its economic bubble and entered the era of a protracted economic recession. The moving of the state’s focus from the equality of welfare to quality of economy supported the development of small government; the states also started to pay more attention to market rights than social rights. The orientation to small government advocated for efficient and effective management through the market mechanism. This process devolved responsibility of social welfare and basic services, such as health care service, postal service and public transportation, to local governments and private enterprises. Specifically, prime minister Koizumi who was a strong advocate of small government and the most popular prime minister after the World War II introduced a new concept of Kōzō Kaikaku (structural reform) to privatize the national postal service, cut back subsidiaries and allocated national taxes to local governments in exchange for shifting a smaller amount of tax revenues from the central to local governments. Koizumi was famous for his motto, “using private-sector’s and local governments’ resources wherever possible.”
Along with the tide of decentralization and privatization, the government has enacted three temporary laws regarding decentralization: Act for Promotion of Decentralization in 1995, Omnibus Decentralization Act in 2000, and Act on Promotion of Decentralization Reform in 2005. The 2005 act promoted restructuring of local governments to become service providers and as an alternative to the central government. The government directed local municipalities to merge with their neighbor municipalities in order to make use of the advantage of scale and reduce the number and cost of government officials and members of municipal assemblies. For instance, the number of municipalities in Japan decreased from about 3,200 to 1,800 by the end of 2006.

Another purpose of these acts was the abolishment of administrative functions imposed upon local governments from the central government. On the one hand, the local governments gained power to set their own bylaws for the tasks delegated to them by the central government. On the other hand, the central government still has the better part of budget allocation and authority of local governments in hand. While two-thirds of public expenditure in Japan is given to regions, only one-third of regional revenue is received through regional taxes.

In this context, the tasks for local governments became complicated and diversified while funding and human resource support for them were insufficient. The local governments started to introduce New Public Management (NPM) and public-private partnerships in order to enable more effective and efficient governance and management of their administration. At the same time, the local governments turned their attention to citizens and began referring to the concept of “active citizenship.” They advocated the principle of complementary effect among Jijyo (self-support), Kyôjo (mutual and associational support), and Kôjo (public
support), and argued that public support came last addressing whatever was unable to be covered by *Jijyo* or *Kyôjo*. This gradual collapse of “public,” dominated by local governments for decades, created a vacuum between “private” and “public,” and produced unexpected spaces for a civil society that had not yet matured. Building on this trend, in his policy speech of 2010, Prime minister Yukio Hatoyama argued for the promotion of “new public commons” as one of main pillars for the national growth strategies. He defined “new public commons” as the space and actions with which public-minded citizens and associations can support one another (*Kyôjo*), and deliver service in an alternative role of “public” that used be seen as “governmental.”

This turn from a model of centralized government to volunteer-based governance required active citizen participation to fulfill governmental accountability to their clients and to share their risk of administration. The committee for the Promotion of Decentralization recommended a “transformation from a centralized system from the Meiji era to a resident-led administrative system” as well as an expansion of freedom of self-choice and self-responsibility (“Chihoubunken suishin iinkai,” 1996). While the central government advocated equal participation in self-determination and policy-making, they give more weight to reform of their own administrative system compared with reconstruction of the relationship between citizen and the government.

So why has Japanese civil society not developed as same as western countries? I do not argue further in this paper yet point out that Japan did not follow the same path as western countries. On the one hand, western countries can realize a certain level of individual equality, freedom of choice, autonomy, and civil society through improving the welfare by not only industrialization and popular revolutions but also colonization and exploitation of
other parts of the world. On the other hand, centralized resources and authorities may come about as a result for achieving such an affluent society in other parts of the world that may include Japan. While this centralization of authority brought about concentration of population and wealth in a metropolis, it also promoted dependency on the government service in both urban and rural areas, and made it difficult for citizens to solve their local issues through social ties and collective actions. There were strong social movements in late 60s and 70s such as student protests, anti-war and peace movements, environmental activism, and so forth. As well, numbers of traditional community associations has been active for the local sovereignty. The channel between the central state and civil society has never been widely opened for civic engagement and advocacy; meanwhile, the central state has developed strong mutual dependency with the market.

In terms of the difference between western countries and Japan, some scholars argue that Japan has never been a social welfare state when compared with other developed countries. Rather, the strong triangle between family, school and corporation has offered not only social order but also social welfare with support from the central government that was dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party for about 40 years. Family supports school and corporate society by working hard and spending extra money in education. School supports family and corporate society by producing competitive students for the society. Corporate society supports family and school by ensuring lifetime employment and social welfare service for employees. This alternative model of social welfare casts doubt on the applicability of Western accounts of the Japanese case, that is, the argument that the collapse of the capitalist welfare state led to minimal states and economic neoliberalist regimes. As well, some intellectuals argue that decentralization, deregulation, and privatization of the central
government were a response to the aging society or systemic fatigue of centralized governance, rather than international pressure of economic neoliberalism or the eclipse of independent nation state triggered by globalization. This single focus on domestic issues may be too narrow to fully understand the effect of those changes on people and local society, yet it cannot be ignored.

Although the historical and political background is as unique as other nation states, Japan also shares some commonalities, especially in its contemporary issues. Japanese people realize the detrimental aspect of economic progress and capitalism, but they have not found alternative values and ways of life. As well, their rapid individualization and materialization have broken social ties and solidarity, and put people in isolation. The mobilization of laborers and flux of immigrants through globalization has caused exclusion of minorities and cast doubt on the common good.

Through the next section, the paper will examine how the city of Nabari, a rural city in Japan, introduced seemingly radical participatory public policies, and what this case it means in the current global and domestic socio-political context.

3.2 A Case of Nabari

Many cases of participatory budgeting in Japan are seeking to distribute a small percentage of tax revenue to non-profits or community associations. These cases are based on Hungarian percentage laws which allow individuals to allocate a portion of their previous year's paid residential taxes to an eligible NGO or non-profit of their choice. Usually the amount of money is around 5 million yen to 20 million yen, depending on the scale of the municipal budget. It is usually implemented in this way: Municipalities ask CSOS to submit proposals
of projects and budget plans; citizens then vote for the group they want to support; then, municipalities decide and monitor the allocation of money based on their accounting bylaws.

What makes the Nabari case different is as follows:

- There is a division of the municipalities into 15 districts in which community centers and elementary schools are located.
- The 15 districts have an over-arching committee on their communities and hold their own deliberation to decide rules and designs of their own committees, distributions of resources.
- One over-arching committee per one district receives budget and allocate by themselves,
- Community Residents participate directly in various associations under the district umbrella committee, such as *Jichikai* (Neighborhood Residential Associations, NRAs, with many task forces), *Chōnaikai* (NRAs based on administrative boundaries of neighborhoods), Promotional committees of the area vision, community social welfare councils and so on.
- Each association and districts’ umbrella committee deliberates and negotiates the allocation of resources with one another and uses consensual decision-making system.
- The umbrella committees should include representatives of communities to the management of committee (usually from NRAs).
- The city’s administration has changed the organizational design gradually to fit to the needs and situations of PB system.
• The municipal administration has kept their intervention into the committee to a minimal in order to promote autonomy of residents and community. However, big systemic changes have been brought up by the city.

• The Budget was secured by cutting other subsidiaries. Amount of the budget available for fifteen committees has been around forty million yen for basic fee for community budgeting, and thirty three million yen for neighborhood activities and eighty million yen for consignment of community centers operations. The basic fee is calculated on population basis (70%) and equal proportion basis (30%). The second one is calculated based on population (50%) and number of neighborhoods within districts (50%). These two are directly available for community’s own allocation.

According to an interview with a city staff, one reason that this system had worked well was the existing structure of historical community associations. More than 100 community members per district support this system through their work for umbrella committee or NRAs that consist of two layers of associations for regional autonomy. Yet one vice president of the committee mentioned that the negative legacy of historical associations was that it had not worked for development or creation of new enterprises but for sharing duties and reducing risks. Therefore, members and representatives have taken turns serving for the assigned jobs and have had no intention to engage in community development for the long-term. Thus one of the biggest challenges for this system is to secure motivated personnel and find successors.

3.2.1 Background history of PB policies in Nabari

The city of Nabari has been developed as a post station of a major road between Osaka and Nagoya from ancient times, especially Edo period from sixteen century. From the late 1960s to the 1990s, the city had flourished as a commuter town to Osaka regions, and many
mass housing complexes were developed to accept newcomers. The population increased rapidly from 30,000 in 1970 to 83,000 in 2000, and started decreasing gradually after 2000. Mostly farms, forest and mountains cover the land of the city.

In 1995, a year when the central government started the promotion of nation-wide decentralization, one district in the city started to form its own district committee to draw up a community master plan and implement activities for community rehabilitation in reaction to the plan to abolish a local school in response to depopulation and aging. Four other districts followed this route proposing their own community plans to the city. The city deployed support staff for community development in these communities. Yet there was no funding available for the committees to realize their community plans at this point.

In 2002, a newly elected Mayor, Kamei Toshikatsu declared a state of emergency of the city finance and initiated a project for renovations to city administration inspired by the concept of NPM. His main purpose for this declaration was making a shift in city policy from the idea of public administration to that of private management (Kamei, 2005). He introduced *Yumezukuri (Dream making) community budgeting* (YCB) to promote community development by autonomous citizens who can make decisions in line with their community’s needs and take responsibility for the decisions made. Around the same time, the city held a referendum to decide whether to merge with neighboring cities to reduce their financial deficit. The referendum was rejected by a majority of citizens.

In 2003, the city started to negotiate with the existing *Kuchô-kai* (a committee of 170 neighborhood representatives) to reform the system of community associations, and consolidated small districts into bigger 14 districts bounded by catchments area of community centers. The *Kuchô-kai* dates back to village organizations in the Edo period, and
was reformed as *ku* (a neighbourhood bounded by historical lines between villages) when the Meiji government introduced new town management system in 1889. The *Kuchô-kai* has a longer history than the city of Nabari that was formed in 1954 after WW II. *Kucho* (a neighborhood representative) has functioned as the lowest level of public administration. Its function includes finding out the word on the street and petitioning to the administration, disseminating administrative information and orders, and working for administrative works delegated by the higher level of public institutions. After nine months of negotiation, *Kucho-kai* accepted an agreement to form 14 districts and establish an umbrella committee on their NRAs and community associations to take responsibility for an allocated budget.

According to a city’s official document, there were three major stages in the history of Yumezukuri Community Budgeting (YCB) system. The first stage includes enactments of the bylaws, institutionalization of committees for community development, and creation of unrestricted grants for districts. While the city conducted briefing sessions, public comments, and special meetings with members of various community groups, they had only 374 participants and few public comments (“Nabari-shi,” 2012). The second stage comprised the reform of institutions, specifically abolition of *Kuchô-kai* and a commission fee for the members of *Kuchô-kai*. In 2009, in response to the report from a special advisory board for community development, the city decided to abandon the *Kuchô-kai* that had gained a commission fee in exchange for their cooperation to administrative works. They also reformed calculation methods for allocating budget for each community into the one based on number of communities and population in a district. The third set of changes came with the promotion of public-private enterprises and formulation of new community plans by residents. The city started to support communities to commercialize volunteer efforts with
establishments of non-profits or community businesses, which can deliver public services instead of the city. The city expected the communities to manage their own districts along with their new community plan in collaboration with public institutions, non-profits and other associations. The city started to distribute two million yen to each fifteen districts for implementing the plans.

The city’s organization has also changed correspondingly to some extent. From 2003 to 2009, they appointed 124 staff members for all levels of posts, who are familiar and connected with each districts as a bridge and resource person. The city staff worked in both their original position and this new position. In 2009, the city replaced their main task of comprehensive support for organizing by that of supporting formulation of community plan, and reduced staffs to two management staffs per district, thirty staff members in total. In 2012, the number of staff reduced to 3 main management staff for whole districts with some support staff and a chief executive.

3.2.2 The underpinning ideologies of city policies

How does the city of Nabari frame their ideal form of citizenship? What is their underpinning ideology for its view of citizenship? What kind of words is and is not used for the description of their policy? Are there any gaps between their stated policy and the institutional design of YCB? Those questions are crucial to understanding the nature of Nabari’s budgeting project and how it influences the quality of local democracy.

The city, in its official pamphlet for YCB, defines their goal for community development as one in which “citizens think and act by themselves.” The letter of bylaws shows its stress on “citizens” and its definition. For instance, in the preamble of the city autonomous basic ordinance (2006) reads as follows:
Our city’s local autonomy shall be determined based on the self-responsibility of its citizens as the sovereign member of Japan, and shall be advanced by proactive and independent actions. Similarly, the city shall respond to the trust of the citizen and be responsible to realize an affluent local society in collaboration with the citizen, where the current and prospective citizen can safely live (own translation).

The document also emphasizes, “Participation and collaboration for local autonomy based on the principle of self-determination and self-responsibility”. It defines three key terms as follows:

1. Citizen shall mean the people who reside, work, and study in the city, the business operator who own facilities in the city, and the associations who operate in the city.

2. Participation shall mean that citizen independently participate and engage in the decision-making process at each stage from policy planning to implementation to evaluation.

3. Collaboration shall mean that the city, city council and citizen recognize their own duties and roles, and work in collaboration with each other (“Nabari city autonomous basic ordinance,” 2006, own translation).

Although the letter of the ordinance appears democratic and inclusive, its definition of citizens relies on a minimal interpretation of citizenship: legal and social membership. This formal sense of citizenship as status or membership may not pay enough attention to the developmental or learning aspects of citizenship, and marginalized social groups such as children, LGBT people, immigrants, or foreign workers.
Furthermore, the ordinance requires citizens to share burdens associated with administrative services and take responsibility for their own statements and actions when they participate in community building.

In response to these principles of citizenship and participation, in the ordinance, the city explains the detail of means for participation in municipal government. Chapter 7 of the city autonomous basic ordinance (1996) states:

The city should offer information and ask for feedback in an effort to assure citizen participation into the policy-making and implementation process when the city intends to form the plan, legislate, revise or abolish an ordinance, and implement a measure, that has a great influence on the civic life (own translation).

As means of asking the feedback (input), the city proposes a “public comment system, questionnaire survey, public hearing meetings” and “referendum” if the mayor acknowledges the necessity for them (“Nabari city autonomous basic ordinance,” 2006). In terms of participation to community activities, the city imposes a minimum to the membership, decision-making process, and organizational structures of the committee in order to promote citizen-led autonomy.

One of the major concerns is the city’s double standard toward participation. The city encourages participation in policy making of community agendas; however, they allow only a few means of participation in the decision making of city agendas.

The legal and administrative aspect of YCB appears to offer a clear understanding of city’s and the citizen’s rights and duties. Although it places value on collaboration and participation, it also seems to be influenced by neoliberalistic perspective of the NPM that the central government has promoted for a long time. As well, it shares a civic republican
concept of citizenship, affirming individual liberties and autonomy slightly, but at the same time asking to accept duties to contribute the common good and social unity with civic attitudes. Since one ideology or value cannot avoid colliding with others, what should be sacrificed in order to realize the city’s ideal concept of citizenship? The next section will carefully scrutinize some missing aspects and limits of YCB.

3.2.3 What’s missing? – Limits of the Nabari case

Following some critiques on deliberation, participation and inclusion mentioned in earlier sections, this section will examine what is available and missing within the Nabari case in order to deepen democracy and learning for democracy. In accordance to Gaventa’s question, cited in Chapter 2, about representation of voice, the space where participation occurs, purpose behind the promotion of participation, and the power relations of participation, some limits of the Nabari case will be discussed.

As Fung and Wright (2003) argue deliberation can be vulnerable to serious challenges by the powerful (p.33). Each participant has different position of power and status in the society. Some can dominate others through unequal power structure embedded in the society. Nancy Fraser (1997) also warns that deliberation can serve as a mask for domination (p.78). Based on this premise, we should look closer at whose voices are counted as “citizen” in deliberation at meetings. Japan sought for liberation from the feudal society and establishment of “equal” society after WW II. However, this does not mean the emergence of new domination-free society. This is unlikely, in the case of Nabari, as middle aged and middle class males dominate the umbrella committee’s board or even participation into the community activities. There is no special treatment or consideration for women, youth, disabled people, or immigrants to support their meaningful engagement. Even if the
committee is open to everyone, paternalistic institutions and talk-centered deliberation can easily strip power and voice from the socially marginalized and dissenters. For example, most of the committee’s operation have relied on a hierarchical system and preexisting memberships that can be exclusive to outsiders and to new associations such as non-profit or grass-roots social movements. Retired male corporate employees usually occupy memberships, specifically boards of NRAs since the workload is heavy for someone who has a job in a corporation and no experience in community activities. Although a president of the district committee mentions expanding participation of women and their huge contribution to volunteering, it is unclear if women can participate in actual decision-making or work as service providers (“Atarashii jidai no kō kenkyukai,” 2004). Structural bias can easily silence dissenting voices or let these voices be marginalized or assimilated to the powerful voice. This is in part because the exit from community organizations is actually not optional for residents who want or ought to stay connected with a community. Although non-profits, women groups, and youth organizations exist, they can become incorporated as subsystems or ignored as outsiders by NRAs. In addition to inequalities of the power among members of NRAs, the voice from residents or NRA members are not as counted as equally as the voice from governments.

To learn for democracy in practice, it matters where the space is for participation in decision-making. In whose space does participation occurs? Because the space can be used for not only transformation but also co-optation or legitimization of the sponsor, we need to examine the process in which space and the role of users are formed. In an interview, many community leaders expressed that the process for the introduction of YCB was top-down and the city just threw things at communities (“Atarashii jidai no kō kenkyukai,” 2004). While
each district can create their own institutional designs, regulations and scope of works, residents should rely on the existing structure to mobilize participants and resources. The ordinance of the city defines the conditions of the district committee as follows: to set up regulations that need to operate the organization democratically, to select a president and board members based on the decision of members of the organization, and to have representatives of neighborhoods participate in the operation of the committee. Thus, the space for participation needs to coexist within NRAs. The space is first arranged by the city but developed on the preexisting structures by local residents. In terms of learning for democracy, it can be said that they gained political and deliberative skills, political efficacy and local knowledge necessary for decision-making through participation in internal politics within NRAs. However, as asked above, can we call the space democratic when only specific members can enter? Because the participation level has declined as difficulties to find successors have increased in NRAs, existing structures can hardly assure citizens’ free and equal participation. Only a limited number of active citizens may learn democracy in practice. As well the city provided the space only open for regional politics and community matters. The mayor’s motto is “communities do all they can do for communities. The city works only for social capital improvement” (Kamei, 2004). It seems that the city invited residents to participate into community activities and management within the provided space, but not into politics that the city and city councils have dominated.

Pateman (2012) argues, “The capacities, skills and characteristics of individuals are interrelated with forms of authority structure” (p.10). While rights and duties are delegated to community from the city to a certain extent, the embedded hierarchical system leaves the governmental authority untouched and keeps powerless citizens out of democratic decision-
making process in larger politics. Therefore, learning for democracy is easily converted into learning for the maintenance of dominant norms and virtues.

Furthermore, we must not only examine by whom and how, but also for what purpose the space was created. The mayor states that his final goal is the establishment of absolute regional sovereignty as a layer of national sovereignty (Kamei, 2004). Actually, most of modern NRAs have functioned as quasi-governmental bodies, since they often work with branches of local government in disseminating information, steer residents’ voices into the government, or maintaining public facilities and safety with governmental support and levies from residents (Pekkanen, 2006, p.161). It can be seen that the city gives some formal authority and accountability to NRAs through YCB so as to come closer to the goal.

Given an aging society with low tax revenue and high cost for social welfare, and increasing complexity and diversity of public services, the advancement of decentralization and devolution of rights and duties may be one of major purpose of YCB. The mayor mentions, “the basic concept for the reform of city administration is subsidiary, that is to say, the state, prefectures, and municipalities complement one another to support local residents for their community development…and as an effort to achieve a sustainable small government” (Kamei, 1995, own translation). Hence, the space for participation formed by the government can be thought of as the state seeing these supposed democratic structures as a silver bullet for contemporary socio-political problems in Japan.

This top-down pursuit for transformation may not facilitate praxis, as Freire defines it, that is “the action and reflection of men and women upon their world in order to transform it”. (Freire, 1995, p.60) There seems to be little room for critical-democratic dialogue between the authority and communities, and “bottom-up work” by community representatives to
transform their reality. Inasmuch as decision-making is limited to local issues, it can be a mere marginalization of citizens from the centre of “formal” politics. What is left for them is local and specific, a residue of the global market and a minimalist state that only works for those who fit their expectation (Root, 2007). While citizens are adjured to join community work with a feeling of belonging and sense of duty, they only have indirect opportunities to participate in the central political sphere. This republican sense of citizenship is well suited to small government, a Tocquevillian sense of pyramidal structure of the United States, from township to state to federal system (Heater, 1999). Since small polity tends not to be transparent and free from domination by the power, the republican concept of active citizenship asks for mutual respect and active pursuit of common purpose between virtuous citizens. Citizens as ethical beings with civic virtue need a combination of moral consciousness and civic skills in order to perform good citizenship. This republican view on active citizenship induces moral education, laws, and formal institutions as means to advance citizenship learning. It may particularly strip citizens’ of their political rights through the guise of common goods, accountability and efficacy. There is no room to negotiate what should be “morally good” and what measures should be used for the evaluation of content and form of laws and institutions. Without a channel for negotiation and contestation, citizens must choose what they learn from the menu prepared by so-called experts who have the power to decide what is the truth. In this context, minorities’ voices are likely to be silenced. The majority tends to blame the lack of motivation and effort on minorities, although the society’s tendency of passing over the reality of power inequalities and focusing on majorities’ consensus can cause minorities’ silence.
Last but not least, we need to examine what kind of power affects participation and learning in decision-making. Even if the government promotes decentralization, central government and bureaucracy still dominate decisions about which political agendas should be on the table. Given the neoliberalistic nature of Japanese politics, capitalism and the global market now have a strong presence in agenda setting of politics that “weaken egalitarian political structure by giving primacy to economic relationship” (Heater, 1999). In this approach, the citizen is viewed as a stakeholder, client, or consumer, seeking to maximize her/his self-choice and rights to protect their private property. Local autonomy comes to mean autonomy for economic prosperity and being a winner in a competitive society collectively and individually. As well, centralized effort for further modernization and economic prosperity colonize local politics by leveraging economic and power gaps between the center and periphery so as to structuralize local politics on the basis of the center’s own political ideologies.

There are serious problems with this prevailing fashion to decentralize capitalism rather than deepen democracy. Since the city expects that participation in decision-making may inculcate civic skills and virtues to be independent, participation within such prescribed limits makes citizens more dependent on larger socio-economical structure and, further, develops only skills to solve given agendas. People may grow as consumers and learn the principle of self-determination and self-responsibility as stakeholders, but not as democratic citizens. So long as corporations and a capitalist state holds the power, the expanse of the scope of self-determination and devolvement of some authorities may only result in facilitating a form of learning that is marginalized from politics. Citizens can be educated to be advocates of “the common good,” which may work out in favor of the powerful. These
results may reduce the risk for economy and security and reassure the corporations and state. Hence this form of decision-making is local and specific, a residue of global market and minimalist state that works for only those who fit to the expectation (Root, 2007).

Young (1990) argues that democratization requires not only the development of grass-roots institutions of deliberation and decision-making but also participation in economic power (p.249). Current structures of economic power often keep economic policy, fiscal policy, privatization and investment off-limits to citizens. This deprivation of decision-making opportunities to inform economic policies directly affects the powerless that needs financial support the most. Even if people have the right to mobilize and monitor the financial resources and budget, prescribed terms and precluded negotiation and conflict may offer only limited democratic citizenship learning that is already depoliticized.

YCB offers rich soil for further involvement and for building a momentum to form locally rooted communities of learning that would foster grass-roots movement to transform the society. A small local autonomous community may enable local politics to be flexible and accountable enough for most community members and may produce more satisfactory results for them. However, local autonomy may only benefit the majority who fit well within the existing social order, if citizens are unaware of social injustice and their right to participate in decision-making to live in a democratic society that makes such participation possible.

As mentioned earlier, citizenship is something to learn in practice, learning is a continuation of meaning making and social and individual transformation. Without a space to learn to question agendas, policies and institutions, people may not learn to be citizen as an independent or interdependent decision-makers. Without empowering citizens to fully realize their agency in decision-making through an effective voice, space, and adequate resources,
people may not become fully responsible and accountable for comprehensive collective good.

It is time to look at a larger picture to find reasons why good players are still inactive and ignorant in politics. The instruments but also venues, timing or surroundings should be reformed to move toward more democratic society.
Chapter 4: Recommendations and Conclusion

4.1 Recommendations

What does a successful case of PB that deepens democracy look like? How can more citizens and communities participate in community building autonomously and actively? How can citizens learn to be active and participative as local governments expect? The city of Nabari assumes the best solution in this theory of change: as more diverse actors and groups cooperate, collaborate and support one another, citizens gain greater autonomy from the state, and the city becomes more sustainable and autonomous (“Nabari-shi,” 2012). In other words, the city expects citizens to raise their awareness of resolving and thinking about local matters by themselves through practicing in YCB. YCB would also encourage citizens, staffs and councilors to become trusting, client-oriented people who are good at flexible and speedy decision-making. It would help achieve a higher level of maturity of citizen-led autonomy.

This theory of change presumes a lack of individual or collective awareness might be an obstacle for local autonomy and community building. It also assumes people can contribute to solving local issues by gaining experience and skills in practice. Nevertheless, the city does not explicitly express a specific set of knowledge and skills that make such contributions possible. Rather, they believe in people’s wisdom and ability, and presume that what they need is more information for deliberation and collective decision-making.

This level of trust in ordinary citizens is difficult to obtain for any government in such a privileged position. While it is one of the reasons why Nabari’s attempt is still valid, however, it overestimates citizen’s capacity and skills, thus leaving citizens still powerless to bring about structural changes and to achieve citizen-led autonomy.
Political autonomy is not analogous to self-help or even self-sufficiency. Autonomy suggests an element of privacy, meaning the right and authority to keep others out from decision-making that affects us personally and collectively. However, “political” autonomy should include an element of publicity; collective judgments should be critically examined through due deliberation and justified by giving reasons to each other, since members of the public sphere have diversity and multiplicity in their interests and voices (Warren, 2001). This distinction between dual elements of autonomy has merit. However, this Habermasian view of public reasoning and justification depends too much on human rationality and reasonableness. Some scholars have argued that this universalistic idea belongs to a specific class and form of masculinity operating in the era of Enlightenment (Fraser, 1997; Young, 2000). If some do not have an equal voice or are not recognized as equals, political autonomy becomes tyranny by the powerful, since democratic self-rule can be achieved “only when individuals are conceived to have equal (moral) claims to autonomy” (Warren, 2001, p. 62).

Young (1990) criticizes this exclusive nature of autonomy and argues the necessity of empowerment rather than autonomy. She argues citizens should have institutionalized means to participate in decision-making through an effective voice and vote to attain social justice (Young, 1990, p.251). All citizens, including those who do not have a legal citizenship, should be empowered to discuss ends and means of political decision-making on their own collective lives. They should also be allowed by the state to participate in a wider range of decision-making processes. Bureaucratic hierarchies of governmental and corporate power usually exploit people’s voices, especially those from less privileged communities. Because such centralized authorities are too distant for people to approach, we need make participation more “immediate, accessible, and local” (Young, 1990, p.252). This is why we
need to look back at an *Empowered Participatory Governance* (EPG) framework that promotes participation and deliberation through empowered local institutions and actions.

4.1.1 **Toward an EPG model of democratic institutions**

EPG shares three principles: (1) practical orientation to solve problems, (2) bottom-up participation, and (3) problem-solving through reasoned deliberation; and three design characteristics: (a) devolution of decision-making authority to an empowered local unit, (b) collaboration and supervision by a strongly centralized body and local units, (c) an attempt to harness state power through restructuring institutions and policies, and a background condition: rough equality of power between participants in deliberation. I would make some recommendations along with this EPG framework.

(1) **Practical orientation to solve problems**

YCB addresses a specific area of practical public concern by handling down the authority to community representatives. Each community cares about issues specific to itself. This practical focus on concrete issues can serve to mobilize people to collaborate and help to build congenial relationships among diverse residents. Additionally, it may open up further civic engagement into a wider spectrum of regional issues through fostering and highlighting political efficacy of residents or instigating deeper reflection on the efficacy of governmental policies and actions. Although this narrower focus on community, which may ignore region-wide interests and benefits, can be challenged, it is valuable as a resolution-oriented approach that increases empowerment or mobilization opportunities. Instead of rejecting a “resolution”-oriented approach, the city of Nabari may augment it by adding “transformation”-oriented approach.
Lederach’s concept of three different lenses to approach different layers of conflict demonstrate how the importance of using both these approaches (Lederach, 2003). He introduces a short-sighted, long-sighted and middle-ranged lens, depending on in which level of complex reality we need to approach. On the one hand, a resolution-based approach tends to be issue-specific so that it’s useful to use short-sighted lens to see the immediate situation. As an example, if the source of community issues is a personal one concerning individual emotion, preference or interests, or relational one such as interaction patterns or lack of mutual understanding, a resolution-based approach may work well to achieve agreement or solution to these issues in a short period.

On the other hand, a transformation-based approach tends to be relationship-centered so that we need these three different lens types in the same frame. Since many social issues are quite fluid and institutionalized in a structured way within the social system, it’s necessary to approach not only immediate issues, but also underlying causes and social, cultural or religious conditions of these issues. We need an approach that allows us to address the content, the context and the structure of social issues at a surface and deeper level. A transformation-based approach may take longer time to bring significant changes. Yet it can successfully build a collaborative platform in which residents can reflect on different aspects of social issues and transform the whole systems within which complex relationships are embedded.

In the city of Nabari, each community has already completed its new community plan, which would become a general guideline for future budgeting, and the city has stated its support for them. The city should encourage people to have multiple opportunities to reframe
and question their community plans and city policies, and it should offer capacity-building opportunities to develop their critical and political literacy to examine and assess these plans.

(2) Bottom-up participation

The city recognizes that the expansion of participation is necessary but time-consuming. While they set certain boundaries for what kind of authority should be delegated to local units, they do not expect that experts alone will solve complex issues. Rather, they trust citizen’s knowledge and capability, and they strive to remain in the background. Despite of these positive democratic conditions, many voices are still missing.

In terms of democratic legitimacy, the city should ensure the rights and opportunities of full participation and equality in decision-making. While the mobilization of citizens is a particularly difficult task in modern society because of the cost of participation, there may be two ways to improve this conundrum of bottom-up participation.

First, the city should at least remove obstacles and conditions that prevent people from participating and at most empower a specific group of people to participate by holistically changing of the systems surrounding them. This should be done in collaboration with local residents, corporations, academic institutions and non-profits. For example, the city of Takarazuka, a suburban city in Japan, is asking citizen’s committees to introduce gender quotas for their selection of the committee members, in order to empower women’s participation in politics. Many corporations have also introduced a system that supports employee community engagement, and some schools institutionally support youth engagement in public decision-making process and community activities. In addition to these external changes, NRAs need to transform themselves toward becoming more participatory, deliberative, and inclusive. To achieve this, they should first identify minorities and inactive
groups of residents, then conduct outreach in collaboration with other non-profits and restructure their organizations to accommodate participation of these social groups. Although these attempts to create participation opportunities alone are not enough to help the marginalized overcome the structural inequalities and constraints, it can be a significant first step to open a gate for political participation to them.

Moreover, the city needs to empower its own staff, since the resources and skills of these employees should be leveraged and fostered as an important part of the community’s resources. The most effective ways for city staff to learn may be through their direct participation in civil society. NPM frames government staff as service providers rather than experts or facilitators, and citizens as customers or clients. Such a dichotomized relationship between customer and service provider discourages staff from empowering citizens as professional collaborators, and from being members of their community as active citizens who can collaboratively initiate projects.

However, just allowing the autonomy of each district and supporting the personal development of city staff will not automatically produce democratic institutions. To achieve bottom-up participation by citizens and city staff, the city should increase opportunities to access public deliberation and for civic engagement. NRAs should also reconstruct their organizations and look for means to produce more immediate, accessible and just participation.

(3) Problem-solving through reasoned deliberation,

Deliberation assumes free and equal citizens reason together rationally to reach collective decisions or at least mutual understanding. Deliberation should not give exclusive privilege to a certain communication style, state institutions, social unity and a common good, or
orderliness (Young, 2000, pp.36-51). It should be inclusive of different social groups, agonistic to engage in political struggle, and communicative to allow for different style of political communication. Therefore, it is not enough for the city to let well-informed citizens to make decisions by increasing transparency of its administration. To develop more communicative and inclusive space incrementally, NRAs, non-profits, and the city should collaborate to leverage diverse voices in community, instead of concealing the voices as distractions for the social order. In addition, to keep public deliberation open to criticism and checks from the outside for a healthy and legitimate decision-making process, NRAs should attempt to keep their neighborhood meetings as open and transparent as possible, and the city should provide resources and capacity-building support.

These three recommendations, which are based on three democratic principles of EPG, may help assist the Nabari case to move towards a more inclusive, participatory, and deliberative model. In addition, to achieve mass participation in modern political institutions, EPG suggests three institutional design changes are essential.

Three design characteristics are as follows:

(a) Devolution of decision-making authority to empowered local units

Devolution of authority seems well done in YCB. A challenge may be how to expand the collaboration and deliberation to more and diverse actors. Since NRAs already serve to fulfill their mandate through many functions in their communities, new collaborations seem a bit overwhelming for them, particularly for the main actors who have been involved in many local events and positions. The wider and deeper the collaboration that is needed, the more commitment is required from the community and government. The collaboration may require all actors to go beyond the separation between community and governmental issues, or
private and public ones. The city should facilitate relationship building between non-profits and NRAs, and all actors should come together to decide which direction the city should take to move forward. Therefore, the collaboration should not be the same as public-private partnership in which the government delegates authority and goals exclusively to private enterprise. It should be participatory, in that the procedures, players and subjects of deliberation are open to be deliberated and determined by the public.

(b) Centralized coordination and supervision,

Centralized coordination and supervision seem contrary to the concept of decentralization, yet “local units do not operate as autonomous, atomized sites of decision-making in EPG” (Fung and Wiright, 2003, p.21). EPG requires not autonomous but coordinated decentralization. Both local units and the city should be accountable and reciprocal to one another. They therefore should not leave each other isolated and conversely should empower and stimulate one another to develop their capabilities toward being more innovative and creative. But how can the combination of small, decentralized government and immature local units achieve this balance?

On the one hand, we must acknowledge that small government is not always negative. If a small government helps stop the mere redistribution of wealth in favor of egalitarian material prosperity, it is necessary for us to live with limited resources. The challenge lies in the decision-making process of that redistribution. In the Third way politics, such as Great Britain, government allegedly distributes social welfare not to everyone but to the people who suffer the most. But the governmental authority exclusively decides who those people are, and who deserves to gain from the distribution of social welfare.
Young implicitly criticizes a focus on the distribution of goods, as opposed to capabilities, thereby casting people as passive consumers instead of as agents (Fraser, 1995, p.168). She argues that the division of labor, decision-making and culture that affects individual identities and capabilities cannot be achieved only through distribution of materials or social positions, but should be addressed at the institutional level through defining norms, rules, language and symbols in social and political institutions (Young, 1990, pp.21-24).

On the other hand, we need to distinguish the shrinkage of unnecessary public spending from that of necessary empowerment. The number of city staff members working for YCB and the amount of budget has been incrementally decreasing in recent years. This curtailment could be a sign that local autonomy has become vigorous and self-sustaining, but it also may show that the communities are asked to complete by the city are small enough to be self-contained. It may suggest that citizens restrict their social activities since the institutional context doesn’t support their broad and deep participation. If this is the case, centralized coordination is necessary to bridge city departments, private sectors, and communities to expand collaboration and participation. It does not necessarily mean only citizens and community groups should act to change the power balance and the existing system. To transform the society to be more participative and inclusive, corporate society and governments should also support and empower their staff to be more active in communities, and change their institutional culture to be more inclusive of the marginalized, such as women, elders, youth, disabled people, and sexual and ethnic minorities.

(c) Harnessing state power

Although corporate society, civil society and governments should all empower one another, expanding governmental and corporate empowerment without co-optation,
domination or repression is a challenge. Democratization of governance and decision-making processes seems to be the only solution.

Since the contemporary model of governance does not always prioritize “democraticness” over other qualities, actors inside the government need to learn how to make their governance model democratic through trial and error. Such experiments create more unexpected, diverse and non-consensual outcomes as opposed to those emerging from discretionary decision-making. It is also a more time-consuming, unproductive and inefficient process than the standardized one. Yet there is no shortcut for the democratization of decision-making, since it requires not only learning from a certain set of knowledge about political, economical or social issues but also from experiences in everyday practice.

Institutions can further progress toward democratization by allowing such an experimental space to exist, and by empowering people’s willingness to use it.

Such commitment can be very political in some cases. The costs of political confrontations and conflicts are easily regarded as undesirable in a modern governance; however, it is inevitable and maybe necessary to have conflicts between the powerless and the powerful if YCB is to remain connected with the local government.

Yet the problem lies in the confusion of empowerment with the authoritative use of power. To avoid co-optation, domination or repression by the authority, we should strive to keep politics participative, deliberative and inclusive. We cannot eliminate the political dimension of the public sphere since all issues and actors are inter-connected. To overcome pseudo collaboration and empowerment, it is recommended to have more long-term collaborative dialogue and deliberation among diverse actors. This enables mutual understanding of one another’s worldview from local, regional and state perspectives, leading to success in
designing inclusive and productive institutions that can offer a safe environment for multiple voices and in empowering networks where actors learn mutually through interaction and political struggle. The networks and inter-relationship among diverse actors in the public sphere should be regarded as a target for empowerment, which would spread through the networks themselves. It should be empowered through direct support and enough funding to make that happen.

Finally, as background conditions, EPG demands the rough equality of power between participants in deliberation. One suggestion might be to establish a democratic decision-making structure within district committee and exclude dominant use of power by their board members and representatives. However, more close observation and detailed survey are necessary to understand the nature of power distribution in organizations and communities.

4.2 Conclusions

I shall close with the three questions I raised in the introduction.

(1) “What are main motivations to do PB projects for a local government in Japan?”

Although available information resources are limited, local autonomy and privatization of local governance seem to be high on the city’s agenda. On the one hand, the state’s effort for small government and local government’s fiscal crisis may set the stage for further private-public collaboration and decentralization of decision-making, and thus may result in YCB in Nabari. On the other hand, the promotion of local autonomy has to do with rise of civil society as represented by non-profits, moving to re-evaluate community organizations and NRAs as a medium for community bond.
However, the idea of YCB did not originally emerge from civil society. Therefore, the nature and purpose of YCB are examined from the perspectives of the city and mayor to understand the institutional aspect of citizenship learning occurring in YCB.

YCB was originally intended for democratization at the local level, but at the same time it was intended for a depoliticization of local politics. Since the city replaced subsidiaries by unrestricted grants through which citizen can decide the allocations, YCB can promote democratization in a part of the administrative process, but at the same time it may marginalize people from the rest of administrative decision-making and depoliticize them by framing them as collaborators of the city.

(2) “How do governments frame their ideal concept of citizenship?”

While a Nabari city’s concept of ideal citizenship may be attributed to either the liberal idea of minimal citizenship or the civic republican idea of active citizenship, their ideal seems similar but slightly different from these Western ideas. The city idealizes both the liberal concept of autonomous and independent citizens and the republican concept of public-spirited and collaborative ones. In fact, city official documents do not seem to expect “active citizenship” as their ideal citizenship. Rather, they repeatedly emphasize “self-help” and “self-responsibility” as the civic virtues and obligation of citizens. They strive to advocate “self-help,” but they also appeal to civic responsibility as the common good. Their ideal citizenship seems to consist of public-spiritedness as membership of Japanese society and social unity as a part of Japanese identity, and autonomy as self-sufficient agency. It seems like a contradiction; their ideal may fall between two stools, “self-choice” and “obligation” to the society.
(3) “What kind of citizenship learning can occur or can be missed under such framings and institutions?”

The city seems to assume that social unity, people’s intelligence and motivation are natural, or that communities themselves should cultivate and foster these traits through their activities. Therefore, efforts to build social inclusion, capacity building and active support from the city can hardly be expected.

Given that the city values autonomy rather than empowerment, there may be a potential risk in limiting opportunities for democratic citizenship with respect to the scope of participation and social inclusion of residents in local decision-making processes. Inasmuch as the city expects social unity and local autonomy in communities, a person who hasn’t developed enough social ties or obligations to her community may not be included as citizens the city defines. It means some residents may be excluded compared to those who have learning opportunities to understand and experience democracy. As well, less empowerment and less direct support from the city may suggest that few people who are skillful, confident or motivated to participate in public sphere can participate in learning for democracy. These assumptions should be confirmed by further research, but we should pay special attention to missing voices of those who are excluded from participation in decision-making processes, even in a successful case like YCB.

Top-down promotion of local autonomy may not necessarily deepen democracy and advance “democratic citizenship leaning”. We need to distinguish local autonomy as the school of democracy from as a mere austerity measure. Since the rapid promotion of local autonomy and austerity measures may make it difficult to maintain larger social unity and equality, governments tend to cultivate regionalism or nationalism through education and
commercial promotion, shifting society-wide responsibilities to individual ones. Asking only devotion to the existing system and society can easily become a means to oppress the chance for developing critical consciousness and reflecting on progressive marginalization and social inequality. More participative, deliberative, and inclusive society, and empowered institutions where people can learn to be agents in such a democracy for their collective betterment are really needed.

Last but not least, although this paper has focused on institutional arrangement as means to promote democratic citizenship learning, it is important to remember the strength of informal settings such as cafés, study circles, community gardens, sports teams or workplaces as great spaces where people can learn democracy through interaction with others and practicing decision-making.

In short, YCB offers quite a bit of opportunity for decision-making and learning democracy in practice but still in limited sense. Still, there is room for improvement in YCB and the city policy of civic engagement. It is important for the city to proceed further with institutional reforms toward participatory, deliberative, and inclusive democracy, to promote empowerment and outreach efforts for a wider participation in YCB’s decision-making processes, and to create a space for citizens to learn democracy by doing and reflecting on the political systems, procedures, activities of their own communities and the city. It is not enough for a successful community development to call on only citizens to be active and self-reliant in community activities. The city of Nabari has a grave responsibility for the success of YCB with much potential for deepening democracy in Japan.
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Appendix


iii See Freire (1995), especially Preface for more detailed explanation about the term of concietizaçao.