Radical Routes and Alternative Avenues: How Co-Operatives can be Non-Capitalist

Sofa Gradin

School of Politics and International Relations
Queen Mary University of London

Please see full and correct version at http://rrp.sagepub.com/content/47/2/141.abstract
(DOI 10.1177/0486613414532764)

Introduction

In tumultuous times of financial crisis and government spending cuts across Europe, capitalism is increasingly challenged as a desirable economic system. One stereotypical view has it that, out of totalitarian socialism and capitalism, the latter is the 'least bad'. But thankfully there are other alternatives to the capitalist economic system. This article looks specifically at how the production of goods and services can be non-capitalist, with reference to working real-life examples.

Many theorists on the Left would object to the idea that any kind of production embedded in today's world dominant capitalist chains of production could be non-capitalist. As global production networks become more complex, each product and item we interact with in our daily lives bear the fingerprints of thousands, if not millions, of people (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1977). As David Harvey puts it, how many people contributed to your breakfast this morning? (2010: 40). And the answer includes the people who cut down the trees to make the cardboard for the cereal box; who built the roads your food was transported on; who distilled the tar to make the tarmac for those roads; and so on... Therefore, so the argument might go, it is useless to attempt any ostensibly non-capitalist activity. But while an awareness of the complexity of global production networks is important for understanding global capitalism, it does not follow that any organization that interacts with capitalist organizations is itself necessarily capitalist. To use an analogy, if my grandmother was served breakfast by a young person, my grandmother is *intricately linked* to young people, but it is still intelligible to define her as elderly rather than young.

Authors such as J. K. Gibson-Graham have written extensively on non-capitalist economic relations, and they do so as a case in point: to 'open up possibilities' and 'dislocat[e] the hegemonic framing of capitalism' (2008: 615). As Gibson-Graham showed, something like half of the world's economic transactions are *already* non-capitalist ones, whether non-monetary transactions, unpaid housework, favors between friends, co-operatively organized production. In this staggering plethora of (re)productive modes, it turns out there *are* other places on the map to put one's finger on and set off to travel to (even if the water in a lake has previously flowed through a distant river).

Several attempts have been made on the Left to present alternative social models for how a more holistically non-capitalist society could work. Branko Horvat in his magnum opus from 1982, The Political Economy of Socialism, offers a carefully designed socialist alternative model which is neither market-oriented nor 'etatist' (authoritarian socialist). Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel's Parecon is a more recent contribution, laying out a design for a better social and political economy (Albert 2003). As theorists of radical political activism such as David Graeber and Naomi Klein point out, the thrust behind these alternative models is not to prefabricate every aspect of human interaction – rather, the bottom line of the radical Left and its proposed alternatives is about *'real' democracy* (Graeber 2002, Klein 2002). As Graeber puts it, 'this is a movement about reinventing democracy. [...] It is about creating new forms of organization. It is not lacking in ideology. Those new forms of organization *are* its ideology' (Ibid. p. 70). In other words, these alternative models are all about enabling people to share opinions and think critically about the social models themselves.

Despite both academic and non-academic political writing having proposed such alternative models for over two hundred years, there is still an overwhelming skepticism against the Left, with accusations that it offers no realistic alternatives (described in Graeber 2002, Klein 2002). My offering in this article is that this debate could do with some grounding in empirical examples. The article starts by describing how capitalism can be understood, then discusses several examples of productive organizations that operate without any of the central features of that description of capitalism. I focus my discussion on co-operatives, making it clear that, while the co-operative enterprise form itself is not necessarily anti-capitalist, certain interpretations of the globally accepted ICA co-operative principles (see Figure 2) can result in a non-capitalist enterprise. This is not merely a fanciful theory, but is reflected in many practical examples.

Conceptualizing Capitalism

In an American propaganda film from 1948, six high school students gather in a broadcasting room for a radio discussion about capitalism. In a cringe worthy and contrived conversation these well-groomed youngsters extol the virtues of the capitalist economic system. Comical though it may be sixty years later, the script for this film is remarkably insightful, and one of the actors offers a very useful summary of what makes the capitalist system special: 'Freedom of contract; *competition; profit motive; private property.* And what do they all add up to? Free enterprise! Well, that's what capitalism is!' (Coronet Instructional Films 1948, emphasis added). Of course, this film was made as the US and USSR were plunging into Cold War – and when contrasted to other alternative economic systems than totalitarian socialism, it becomes clear that free enterprise and freedom of contract are features not only of capitalism. But the centrality and combination of *competition*, *profit motive* and *private property* (i.e. property owned by the bourgeois and not the laborers) do seem to be heavily recurring themes in theorists' descriptions of it (see e.g. Gibson-Graham 2006: 198, n.11; Klinedinst and Rock 2009; Wolff 2006).

At this point it is worth noting that there are many different definitions of capitalism, and in some ways they are all stipulative, 'made up' to serve a particular analytical purpose. Capitalism is an abstract analytical concept and not a material object that we can put under a microscope. Rather than claiming to have defined capitalism once and for all, I merely wish to offer a working description of some, or hopefully most, of its main features to enable a discussion of how production that is not capitalist can exist and take shape in the present moment.

Let us then look at the three features that will be discussed in this article: bourgeois ownership, profit and competition. To start with, and as Marx focused a lot of attention on, capitalism is built on a distinction between owners of the means of production on the one hand, and wage laborers on the other. It should be pointed out here that Marx and the debate that followed him has tended to focus on the *productive* aspect of capitalism (indeed, capitalism as a Mode of Production) rather than *re*productive aspects, such as housing or community organizing, or other aspects. My discussion in this article is therefore focused more on productive enterprises – workers' co-operatives – than other forms of co-operatives.

The means of production are possessions that one can make an income from, such as, typically, an industrial machine or a factory building, as opposed to other more personal property such as your toothbrush or a photograph from your childhood. The means of production in any capitalist company are owned by capitalists, whether individuals, families or a larger collection of shareholders, and so are the products made by the company. Laborers, who own no means of production, only have their own labor power to make a living from, so they sell their labor power at a price that, in the free labor market, is as low as possible and is always lower than the value created by their own labor (Lukes 1985: 60). Hence there is in capitalism a continuous transfer of wealth from the laborers to the capitalists (what Marx would call exploitation), and the capitalists make an income from the mere fact that they own the means of production, without lifting a finger. It is also, by the same ownership logic, the capitalists who make the decisions in a company, and who have all the rights to the company that ownership entails. In other words, even in a conventional privately owned company that is not-for-profit, a Marxist will find unequal and undesirable relationships between the owners of the company (who can make decisions that affect the laborers' working conditions) and the 'alienated' laborers (who have no direct say about their own workplaces or the products of their labor) (Lukes 1985: 80).

Secondly, capitalism sees *profit* as the driving force and motivation behind any commercial undertaking. Adam Smith, one of the founding fathers of capitalism, wrote in his seminal work The Wealth of Nations that '[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest' (2009 [1776]: ch2). By this Smith did not strictly mean to say that profit is what makes us tick, but profit is the most straightforward way in which a company can cater for its owner's self-interest. Profit in a quantitative, monetary sense, extracted by company owners from their employees, is specific to capitalism: for example, previous feudal economic models were not structured such that people primarily produced goods they themselves did not intend to use or own (whether individually or collectively) (Heilbroner 2008).

Profit is not just a pleasant one-off event, and there is no point in capitalism where the maximum or appropriate level of profit has been reached. The point for capitalists is not only to continue to amass the same level of wealth every year, but to continuously increase the rate of profit, so that each new earning is bigger than the last. Or as David Harvey puts it, '[n]o matter how much money they earn, all CEOs and billionaires want, and can get, more' (2010:73).

The third distinctive feature of capitalism here is that it strongly celebrates *competition* between firms, and most distinctively, *competition between firms in the same market* (what I will here call *intra-market* competition). Not only are firms encouraged by capitalist theory to compete against other firms in general, but different firms are also given the incentive to produce products or services that are similar to ones that already exist, thus competing for exactly the same customers.

Because of its track-record in creating and perpetuating inequality and human rights abuses – not surprising given the hierarchical and exploitative ideology it is built on – many find capitalism an undesirable economic system. Some people even structure their economic lives to avoid taking part in it altogether: some choose to separate themselves from society and live off a piece of land, or from rubbish bins – both very commendable forms of resistance (see e.g. Mark Boyle 2009). But once we attempt to engage in larger scale productive activities, questions arise about how we can organize ourselves and work together in an egalitarian, mutually beneficial, non-capitalist way. One type of productive organizational model that is attractive to anti-capitalists is the co-operative enterprise form. I will here discuss some co-operative examples with direct reference to how they function without deploying – in any meaningful way – any of the three distinctive features of capitalism I have listed.

Figure 1: Some Key Features of Capitalism

BOURGEOIS OWNERSHIP	PROFIT	(INTRA-MARKET) COMPETITION

Co-operatives Defined

A non-governmental co-operative organization can be defined as 'an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise' (ICA 2011a). In short, it is an enterprise owned, not by a private individual or external shareholders, but by co-op members. Membership structures vary, the most common forms being worker's co-ops in which a stated minimum quantity of labor is a requirement for membership; consumers' or users' co-ops; secondary co-ops which are owned and operated by other co-ops; community co-ops in which residence in a defined geographical area is a requirement for membership (Avon CDA 2013; Zeuli and Cropp 2004: ch4).

The two main differences between a co-operative and a shareholder company are that co-op members do not need to purchase any shares in order to have a democratic voice in the company, and that co-op members typically have one vote each in decision-making, as opposed to distributing votes by amount of money spent on the company as is usually the case in shareholder companies (Ibid.). These two basic features do not *per se* challenge capitalism – therefore, anti-capitalist co-operatives go beyond the minimum definition.

The most well-known and influential co-operative networking organization globally is the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA). ICA's members worldwide have agreed on a list of co-operative principles that co-ops can subscribe to voluntarily, outlined here in Figure 2. These principles are part in making co-operatives dramatically different from conventional companies in relation to social impact. In this article I will draw on several of the principles and discuss the ways in which they can – if interpreted in specific ways – inform a co-operative enterprise structure that does not incorporate any of the three distinctive features of capitalism I have here laid out.

Figure 2: ICA's Co-operative Principles

- Voluntary and open membership (and thereby ownership)
- Democratic member control
- Member economic participation (meaning that any surplus is shared between co-op members, reinvested in the co-op, or donated to other organisations)
- Autonomy and independence (meaning that no agreement entered with other organisations may jeopardize the members' full democratic control over the co-op)
- Education, training and information (both for their members and the general public)
- Co-operation among co-operatives
- Concern for community

(Adapted from Crowell and Reed 2009: 148-9; ICA 2011a)

Regarding Bourgeois Ownership

ICA's principles 1 and 2 lay out the key ways in which co-operatives can reject capitalism's distinction between the owner(s) of the company, and the laborers who sell their labor at the lowest price possible. *Co-operative membership,* and therefore I would argue *ownership* (Principle 1), is distributed equally among co-operative members. Anyone can be a member as long as they fulfill certain requirements – importantly these are not to do with wealth or class but about level of involvement with the organization (whether as a worker, volunteer, consumer or other). This is perhaps the most obvious and straightforward way in which co-operatives avoid the bourgeois ownership model: a co-op is owned by its members and not by some external master.

Another crucial point is that ownership of a co-operative is usually not individual in the same way conventional (capitalist) shareholders' shares are. Co-operative members will typically not buy and sell their shares on financial markets, and membership of a co-operative usually does not mean the right to any particular percentage of its assets – at least not in non-profit co-operatives. In this sense, non-profit co-operative members own the organization collectively, and the emphasis is on making decisions based on the needs of the entire co-operative and all its members, rather than on each shareholder's personal financial interest as in for-profits. *For-profit* co-operatives can of course float stocks openly on the market if they want to increase their profitability, one co-op that does this is CHS Inc, the enormous US American agricultural and energy co-operative, which is today traded on NASDAQ. Even CHS, however, uses a system of 'preferred stock', whereby non-member investors cannot vote or have a say in the company, they can only make a financial surplus from it (CHS 2013).

Ownership of a company and its assets can reasonably be said to have three main aspects: the right to use it and decide how it is to be used; the right to own any surplus made from it; and the responsibility to pay out any necessary costs to maintain it or compensate anybody who is negatively impacted by it (see e.g. Grunebaum 1987). The latter is in most cases limited by law such that people involved in a 'limited company' are immune to full liability should their company go bust or otherwise incur any major costs. As for the second point of profit, as I will discuss below, the earning of profit is not applicable to non-capitalist co-operatives. The main interesting issue when it comes to the meaning of ownership in non-capitalist co-operatives thus centers on decision-making and use. To have ownership of a non-capitalist co-operative is largely about taking part in its decision-making, and about sharing the use of it (whether, say, as an abode in a housing co-operative, a social centre in a community co-operative, or workplace in a worker's co-operative).

Here the ICA's second principle comes in, *Democratic member control.* Decision-making structures in co-operatives vary, and I will here discuss two examples of co-operatives with contrasting structures, chosen because they can be seen as representing extremes at either end of a democratic spectrum.

The first is the Basque (but now multinational) co-operative Mondragón, which uses a multi-tiered structure of managers and elected representatives (Mondragón 2013a; MacLeod and Reed 2009: 120-5). Mondragón is a very large conglomerate consisting of many member co-operatives. Each co-op elects delegates to the Co-operative Congress, which makes most major and strategic decisions. Congress elects a Standing Committee responsible for implementing the decisions made at Congress. The Standing Committee also elects the General Council, which has final authority (Ibid.). A map of Mondragón's decision-making structure can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Mondragón's Decision-Making Structure



(Compiled from Mondragón 2013a)

Mondragón uses a system of *trustee representatives* (i.e. autonomous actors acting in the best interest of their representees, without the need to consult the latter ahead of specific decisions (Mondragón 2013a,b; Dovi 2006). This type of representation can be contrasted with *delegated representation*, which allows representatives only to relay the expressed opinions of their constituents. The use of trustee representatives means that officers higher up in Mondragón's representational pyramid can exercise discretion when implementing and evaluating decisions, but are monitored by their electorate and can be voted out if they make unpopular moves (Mondragón 2013b).

Mondragón's trustee-representative democratic structure is vulnerable to the same criticism as state-level representative democracies: the argument has been used since democracy's birth in ancient Greece that using representative tiers, each of which leave room for discretion and use of trustees' personal judgment, lessens the real power held by the general public in the lowest tier (see e.g. Robertson 2002: 148-9). A separate real-life example of this can be found in a 2006 study of coffee producing Fairtrade co-operatives in Guatemala, where only 3 out of 53 members of multi-tier trustee-style co-ops had even heard of the term Fairtrade, indicating that they had very limited knowledge and control of their own co-operatives' dealings with the global North or other companies higher up the value chain (Lyon 2006: 459-460). However, though co-operative democratic structures may be watered down through the use of tiers or trustee discretionary freedom, this form of governance is starkly different from that of a capitalist firm, which typically allows no formal decision-making power for its workers whatsoever (Macleod and Reed 2009: 120-125).

Another type of democratic structure is a flatter structure without any permanent differentiation of responsibility. One co-operative that uses such a structure is Radical Routes, a British secondary co-op where co-operative enterprises and housing co-ops join together to help each other and share resources. Radical Routes formed in the 1980s as an overtly anti-capitalist organization, and it today offers an arena for around 40-50 member co-ops to come together and co-operate between them, whether financially, politically, practically or socially (Radical Routes 2013a). Most of these member co-operatives are small housing co-ops, often individual residential houses or smaller housing projects in various locations in the UK. Some members are workers' co-ops, for example social centers/venues, a printer's, a bicycle repair workshop and training centre, a co-operative support agency... The member co-ops are usually small, with 5-15 individual members being a typical number. Radical Routes is a voluntary organization, so none of its members are legally required to be a part of it or follow its policies – rather it works on a principle of mutual aid, and the idea is that co-operatives join because they share Radical Routes' aims and interests. Radical Routes' governance structure is laid out in Figure 4[1].

Figure 4: Radical Routes' Decision-Making Structure



(Compiled from Radical Routes 2013a; author's field research)

All member co-ops send at least one representative to attend a quarterly general meeting at a gathering hosted by a member co-op somewhere in the UK, where all major and strategic decisions are made (Radical Routes 2013a). Since Radical Routes is a secondary co-op its members are *co-operatives* rather than *individuals*, but the governance structure could apply to a primary workers' co-op without any major alterations. Members divide themselves into sub-groups (called 'working groups'), which meet and communicate more often than the quarterly general meetings, dealing with tasks within a specific area. These sub-groups are partly guided by Radical Routes' policy documents, which are written and discussed at general meetings, and partly by discussions in general meetings (Ibid*.;* author interview).

Radical Routes uses a consensus-favoring decision-making process, which means that consensus (i.e. agreement from all members that a course of action is desirable or acceptable) is sought before any majority-voting becomes relevant (Radical Routes 2011 Part 2 §3.11-3.16). Each final decision is discussed in the general meeting for up to ten minutes, and if a consensus cannot be reached within that time the discussion is continued at the next general meeting (Ibid.). The task is then to construct a solution that is acceptable to at least all but one for every twelve member co-operatives. If consensus cannot be reached, qualified majority voting is used, with a yes-vote for a proposed policy requiring a two-thirds majority (Ibid.). At every quarterly member gathering, Radical Routes organizes training workshops and discussion groups dedicated to improving member delegates' ability to use consensus decision-making in a constructive way.

If a member co-operative refuses to implement a decision or policy, Radical Routes does not have any strict formal sanctions other than exclusion from the organization, which would only be used in very severe cases. Whether a member co-op actively and willfully refuses a policy, or simply fails to carry out the tasks that are required of it (such as sending delegates to gatherings, responding to e-mails, etc), the issue is discussed at

[1] A few words on my methodology in researching Radical Routes: my empirical research consists of ethnography in the form of going to open organisational meetings, a few interviews, and using policy documents. The four in-depth interviews took place at a quarterly Radical Routes gathering over three rainy days in August 2010.

quarterly general gatherings with the aim of resolving it informally. In serious cases the sub-group for Development, a group focusing on the organizational improvement of member co-ops, can step in and offer in-depth mediation, training and advice. Generally, however, issues are resolved in an amiable fashion, and any disagreements with policies are discussed openly at gatherings (author interviews).

Representing a member co-operative at the quarterly gathering and taking part in a working group are tasks that, as Radical Routes members state in interviews, unfortunately give those individuals more power over the organization than those who are not representatives. To remedy this, Radical Routes encourages a *rotation* of these roles, so that different individuals carry out the tasks each quarter, half-year or year, the time period depending on the task at hand.

As we see from comparing Mondragón's and Radical Routes' decision-making structures, there are different interpretations of ICA's principle of democratic member control, and they challenge capitalism's division of labor between workers and owner-authority figures to different degrees. A key point to note here is that Mondragón has over 80,000 member individuals, while Radical Routes merely has something in the region of 500. One common analysis is that the size of an organization determines its ability to be genuinely democratic: the larger the group, the more difficult and the less rewarding it can be for individuals to participate (Birchall and Simmons 2004: 489). Another related analysis is that genuine democracy only is possible in smaller organizations because, if a co-operative grows too large, 'democratic decision-making simply becomes too cumbersome and conflictual to allow for effective business practices' (discussed in Olin Wright 2008: 168).

As Birchall and Simmons show, there is empirically some truth in this, and the research and debate required by all members in a more inclusive democracy undeniably takes up time and resources (2004; Olin Wright 2008: 168-169). Two points should be noted regarding this argument, however: firstly that other moral-political values can trump the value of organizational efficiency or decision-making speed. After all, it could easily be argued that state dictatorship is a much quicker way of making decisions on a national scale than democracy is, but this argument is unlikely to persuade many citizens of democratic countries to convert into a dictatorship. Indeed, my interviewees stated that having a democratic voice generally felt more important to them than achieving higher organizational efficiency.

Secondly, a meaningful democratic structure can be maintained even with – or perhaps only with (Erdal 2011) – some tiers of delegated representation. One interviewee from Radical Routes pointed out that temporarily delegated and individually assigned responsibilities do not lessen the level of democracy, as long as roles are, firstly *delegated* (see above), and secondly *rotated frequently,* encouraging all members to take on delegated responsibility at some point, if they want to. The interviewee describes having come across many housing co-operatives which, when a task or project arises, designates a 'gaffer who particularly follows through that job, […] but this kind of management role is only a temporary thing'. As we have seen, 'temporary' should in the case of Radical Routes be understood in terms of weeks or months, rather than years as in the case of Mondragón's standing committee and council (see Bakaikoa *et al* 2004 for the latter).

There is, I would argue, one caveat to the desirability of this rotational system. More permanent positions on the mainstream job market tend to be staffed through formal application and selection processes, requiring evidence of experience and skills as well as references. This is not currently standard practice in Radical Routes, though there is no logical reason it could not be: applications could be scrutinized by delegates from each member co-operative according to certain agreed criteria. Each time a role is created, which is usually done in a general meeting, a decision could also be made regarding whether the role should be staffed through a formal selection process.

Rotating roles thus increases the amount of democracy in an organization, and this can bring challenges as well as strengths. As is evidenced in Feldman and Brett 1983, each time someone enters a new job role there might be a settling-in period (learning how systems work, getting familiar with tasks, etc). The more often a role rotates, the more settling-in periods will be incurred, which could have a negative impact on the organization's efficiency in the sense that time goes into individual new learning instead of direct production. But studies of job rotation show that other gains can be made instead: employees become more versatile and can stand in for each other when needed, employees understand each others' roles better and can therefore carry out their own roles in a way that better serves the team as a whole, and the organization itself – if efficiency of production is a highly prioritized value – can learn which employees are better at which tasks by observing staff as they rotate (Ortega 2001; Eriksson and Ortega 2006).

As we have seen, there are many grey areas when discussing democratic member control and its ability to challenge capitalist private ownership. Whether any specific multi-tiered organization is 'genuinely' democratic is an empirical question that varies from case to case, but the discussion on democracy can here be distilled into this point: if democracy is the 'rule of the people' (dêmos kratos), member control is democratic to the extent that members take part in decision-making procedures, take on rotating delegated roles, and feel empowered. In times of practical necessity (when quick decisions are needed and the organization's short-term viability is at risk if they cannot be produced) representatives may need to use their own judgment and act as *trustees*, but under normal circumstances the use of *delegates* is preferable.

This is not to say that such a co-operative organizational form is an automatic path to true democracy: as many writers point out, formal democratic procedures sometimes conceal informal hierarchies, for example along traditional gender and class divisions (Miller 2012; Ross 2002). But the use of rotating roles of responsibility and open continual training and discussion about access to decision-making can make the anti-capitalist co-operative an exceptionally progressive organizational model.

This is part of the more general point that co-operatives, to the extent that they have open membership (and thereby ownership) and democratic member control, exist without the capitalist idea of private property and its ensuing division of labor.

Regarding Profit

Profit in capitalism is the financial surplus made from commercial activity after expenses incurred by it have been deducted (OED 2013a). What makes the capitalist conception of profit distinctive is that profit not only is desired in general but is *central* to human motivation. Furthermore, profit should not only accrue, but continuously grow. Let us now look at how co-operatives can function without the profit element.

Member Economic Participation, the third ICA principle, states that 'Members allocate surpluses for any or all of the following purposes: developing their co-operative […]; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with the co-operative; and supporting other activities approved by the membership' (ICA 2011b). Just like the first and second principles, this can be interpreted in different ways. The Co-operative Group (the world's largest consumer co-operative including The Co-operative supermarkets), for example, realizes this principle through giving all members a cash share of the company's surplus bi-annually, the dividend portion size being determined by the amount of money spent in the supermarkets during that period by the member in question (The Co-operative Group 2013a). While this 'benefit[s] members in proportion to their transactions with the co-operative', it does not challenge the idea of capitalist profit – it merely distributes the profit between co-op members.

Though most co-operatives are for profit in this way, many co-operatives choose to organize as not-for-profit. One example is café Kino – a workers' co-operative vegan café with around 15 members based in Bristol, England – which states in its Articles of Association that any surplus made shall either be reinvested into the co-op itself or donated to other not-for-profit co-operatives, charities or socially beneficial causes (Café Kino 2009: §62). There is a flat rate wage in the co-op, so all staff are paid the same hourly amount, which is the national minimum wage. There is thus a cap on wage levels, ensuring that while staff can earn a decent living from their jobs, no individual member of the co-operative is going to get abnormally rich. There have been discussions in Café Kino since its start in 2006 about whether the national minimum wage is indeed a 'decent' income, but the organization's financial reality has prevented any wage increases above the minimum wage.

Mondragón has also chosen to limit individual members' incomes to avoid anybody amassing exceptional wealth from the organization. Internally, incomes are limited through the use of maximum wage ratios between the least qualified workers and top executives to avoid the grotesque differences in income between bosses and workers seen in many capitalist corporations. Historically these ratios have been very low, allowing executives to earn only three times as much as the lowest qualified worker, but in recent years Mondragón has been forced to ease off on these restraints and now offers executive wages at roughly a third under market levels (Mondragón 2013c). Externally, the co-operative has set solidarity wage caps that ensure Mondragón members do not earn notably more or less than the average worker of any other company in the same sector and geographical region (Ibid.; Gibson-Graham 2006: 114).

When Mondragón makes a surplus, a certain portion (about ten percent) is donated to social or charitable projects. The rest is reinvested into the co-operative and/or eventually handed out to members as a dividend. A smaller share of this surplus is reinvested in the co-operative directly to promote growth and improvement. A larger share, around 70 percent, is distributed among Mondragón's individual members – but only when they retire or otherwise leave the co-op. This money is deposited into savings accounts that belong to each of the co-operative's members and that are held in Mondragón's own credit union Caja Laboral. This mechanism could be described as a kind of compulsory saving: the money held in these accounts is invested in Mondragón's member co-operatives or used to expand into new co-operatives, and the individual savers are not normally free to withdraw this money until they leave Mondragón. They can, however, benefit from interest payments from these savings, and they can use the accounts as collateral for private loans (Gibson-Graham 2006: 115).

Looking to Radical Routes again, we find yet another interpretation of ICA's third principle. Radical Routes does not have a specific policy on profit – instead it deals with the issue through focusing directly on the income cap. Its policy document states that two thirds of its member co-ops must have a policy limiting the permitted absolute income of all co-op members to maximum twice the amount they would receive on governmental income support benefits each year (Radical Routes 2011: Part 1 §6.1, 2013a; author interviews). Thus, even if such a co-operative's dividend is shared out among members, none of its members will earn a wage that could be described as exceptionally high in relation to the national average. This is a roundabout way of ensuring member co-ops are not profit-driven – the reason a more direct policy has not been written being that not all member co-ops distinguish between wages and surplus, often operating on a 'from each according to ability, to each according to need'-basis in a traditional Marxist spirit, rather than having stipulated monthly wages (author interviews; Marx 1999 [1875]).

This latter point raises the question of how we can distinguish between profit (or dividends) and wages in a co-operative. If members of a workers' co-op or a community co-op decide what their own wages should be, the distinction becomes less obvious: the wages and the potential surplus are coming from the same pool of money. Members of a co-operative could thus in theory siphon off money from the surplus by setting their wages at a higher level. They could price their goods and services more expensively, not to make a profit, but to earn a higher wage, which is a meaningless distinction in practice. That explains why both Café Kino and Radical Routes have decided to put a cap on individual earnings, ensuring that their members are motivated not by the pursuit of profit, but by other aims.

Does this mean it is capitalist to amass exceptional amounts of wealth? In Marx's conception of exploitation discussed above, the crux was not the creation of wealth in itself, but the transfer of wealth from the laborers to the owners of the means of production. In a co-operative there is no such distinction – all members are both contributors and owners simultaneously. (Excepted are those co-operatives that employ additional wage laborers without offering them an opportunity to join the co-op as members.) But if an individual amasses exceptional amounts of wealth as a result of their own labor, is that capitalist? For Marx the answer was no. Granted, for Marx a higher and more advanced form of communism would distribute resources according to need and not ability, so amassing exceptional wealth would not be relevant there. But Marx also described socialism (a less advanced form of communism) as entitling workers to goods containing the same number of hours of social labor as they had individually spent – so those who worked more would be entitled to more resources (Marx 1999 [1875]). However, even if exceptional wealth accumulation in non-capitalist economies strictly speaking could be possible, it is quite clear that no reasonable conception of a Marxist, or socialist, radically democratic egalitarian society would be built on personal exceptional wealth accumulation as a main productive motivator.

Capitalist theory typically assumes that profit is the incentive behind any commercial enterprise, without which people would not be driven to 'serv[e] customer needs', become efficient, innovate and progress (Hill 2005: 48). The prolificacy and success of not-for-profit organizations worldwide (see Steinberg and Weisbrod 2008, Gibson-Graham 2006), of which non-profit co-operatives are only one form, indicate that this assumption is not correct about large portions of humanity, if about anybody.

Unlike not-for-profit companies, profit-motivated companies are prone to be driven to disregard human rights issues in their pursuit of profit. Examples here include allegations by the BBC and the NGO People & Planet that British retailer Topshop has been buying cotton harvested by forced child labor in Uzbekistan (BBC 2007, People & Planet 2008). Similarly, The Coca-Cola Company has displayed repeated criminal and violent behavior, whether selling waste products from a bottling plant in Kerala as a fertilizer to local farmers, which turned out to contain dangerous levels of cadmium and lead (BBC 2003, India Resource Center 2013) or assassinating union leaders in Colombia (Killer Coke 2013). Innumerable similar allegations have been made by NGOs against various multinational corporations. By treating profit as the main justification for and driver of any commercial enterprise, capitalist theory *cannot logically* result in practices that seriously regard either long-term (e.g. 50+ years) or collective consequences. Some for-profit companies do engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) schemes that consider wider or more long-term consequences of their activities, for example by sponsoring hospitals, water projects or animal protection schemes. However, many writers agree that CSR schemes are motivated either by a company's need to improve their public image and possibly divert attention from its otherwise harmful practices – or by motives *other than profit* (e.g. moral sentiment) (Kolstad 2007: 143; Van Tulder and van der Zwart 2006: 134; Schaefer 2008). Being not-for-profit is thus, following the argument laid out here, a necessary part of ensuring co-op members are not motivated (only or mainly) by short-term individual interest.

In the absence of the guiding principle of profit, other principles will have to take its place. This is an area where ICA's principles fail to provide satisfactory guidance. Only principle 7 is relevant, stating that co-operatives shall have a '*Concern for community*' – a more specific meaning of which is not given. This could feasibly be interpreted as calling for outcomes that increase the cohesion, feeling of belonging and fellowship, life opportunities or otherwise well-being of people within a specific geographic area in which the co-operative is based, or of a marginalized group (see OED 2013b). However, this is quite vague and does not provide sufficiently specific guidance for how co-ops can operate in a non-capitalist way.

Many not-for-profit co-operatives write their own policies on what principles, in addition to ICA's seventh principle, should guide them instead of profit. Interesting principles summarized from existing not-for-profit co-operatives' policies include: providing high quality and useful services/products at affordable prices; being both economically and environmentally sustainable; and offering mutual gain for all stakeholders (see Radical Routes 2011; Café Kino 2013; Kebele Community Co-operative 2013; author interviews). We will return to this shortly.

Regarding (Intra-Market) Competition

In free market capitalism, privately owned firms seek to gain profit by competing against each other. Capitalist theorists generally hold that monopoly (i.e. the existence of only one firm providing a specific good or service to many different customers) is an undesirable thing: as firms compete against each other for customers they lower their prices, increase efficiency, increase product quality, and are in other ways forced to give customers a better deal (Stigler 2008).

In my analysis of capitalism I make a distinction between competition between firms in *different* markets, and between firms in *the same* (or very similar) markets. Firstly, capitalism heavily promotes competition in general, and secondly, it heavily promotes *intra*-market competition, i.e. competition *within* markets. Since capitalism contains no central element of co-operation between firms and since the sole aim of each firm is to make a profit for its owner(s), firms are driven to offer products or services equivalent to those that already exist, but at a cheaper price or with more persuasive branding and advertising (Bowles *et al* 2005: 257, Stigler 2008).

The word 'market' simply denotes the extent of demand for a product or service on offer. Thus, distinguishing between different markets can be very difficult: for example, is a vegetarian restaurant competing in the same market as a nearby steakhouse? The answer to this question will vary depending on the context. Though it is difficult to define a specific market in generalized theoretical discussion, firms and market researchers do confidently distinguish between different markets in practice, often using stipulative definitions (see Hill 2005: 584-587; Gupta 2008). The distinction between inter- and intra-market competition is therefore not nonsensical.

As long as citizens' consumption is not planned by the government as in state socialism (see Ericson 2008), competition *between* markets is inevitable: for every product or service offered there are other, perhaps greatly different, products or services a customer might choose instead. For example, instead of buying a car, a customer might choose to buy a bicycle (Stigler 2008). Not-for-profit co-operatives can therefore not avoid competing in this way – but they *can* avoid competing with firms in the same or similar markets. When asked about this in an interview, one co-operative activist stated that 'part of setting up a co-op [is] looking around at other services and seeing what is required. […] [Y]ou wouldn't set up something that competed with an existing co-op'. Before a not-for-profit co-operative is set up to serve a need, members would survey and contact other similar co-operatives and discuss whether a new co-op could be introduced without damaging existing ones.

In capitalist theory such a lack of rivalry would be disastrous: what is to incentivize a market's lone firm to achieve efficiency and serve customers well? One of the most oft-cited terms in capitalist economic theory is the 'invisible hand', coined of course by Adam Smith, referring to the idea that individuals acting in their own self-interest will, if left undisturbed by state regulation, render social consequences that are 'harmonious in mutually promoting the interests of all members of society' (Blaug 2008; see also Smith 2002 [1776]: Book IV, Chapter II). In other words, free market capitalism is built on the idea that a rivalry of all against all will bring about a good outcome for everyone: producers are driven to become better at what they do, and consumers get a better deal. This means that capitalism not only promotes intra-market competition specifically, but also competition as a value in general. This is true for capitalism's economic theory but also for its wider cultural and political world-view (Harvey 2005: ch1; Duchrow 2005: 34; Lazzarato 2009).

Accumulation of profit means that individual actors who do well can achieve economies of scale, brand strength and advertising advantages, and can accumulate yet more profit by investing their saved surplus in other, separate, profitable ventures (Bowles *et al* 2005: 151, 394). On a cultural level, individuals are widely differently equipped through social hierarchies and class (Olin Wright 2008: 32). Postmodern critics in the vein of Michel Foucault, critical theorists and postmodern feminists would argue that the elevation of competition as a principle to guide social and economic interaction is in fact a tool of oppression and distribution of wealth from the poor to the rich (see Lazzarato 2009; Cox 1996; Salih 2002: 38; Young 2003: 113).

Not-for-profit co-operatives, however, can function fully without the capitalist logic of competition. Since they are not motivated by profit, there are other driving forces: most notably (and simply) the will to provide the services or goods they were set up to provide; and maybe additionally offering customers affordable prices and good service, as we saw above (see also Co-operatives UK 2009: ch 2). Without making unfounded assumptions about human nature, it is difficult to prove that humans need competition to be able to engage in useful productive activities (see Steinberg and Weisbrod 2008).

What remains true as I have already argued, is that not-for-profit co-operatives inevitably will compete against each other *across* markets. Competition thus *does* play a role in incentivizing co-op members to work hard, but it should be noted that this fact is seen by non-capitalist co-operatives as an unfortunate fact of life rather than (as in capitalism) an inspiration and positive driving force. This reluctant attitude is evidenced in ICA's sixth principle – *Co-operation among co-operatives* – which attempts to replace competition with co-operation wherever possible.

This principle, like the others, can be interpreted in different ways. The British Co-operative Group (of supermarkets, banking, etc) realizes 'co-operation among co-operatives' through being a member of the national trade body Co-operatives UK, which 'campaigns for co-operation and works to promote, develop and unite co-operative enterprises' and which is not a non-capitalist organization (Co-operatives UK 2013; The Co-operative Group 2013b).

Radical Routes and its member co-operatives interpret the sixth principle more narrowly. Many Radical Routes co-ops are also members of Co-operatives UK, but have policies that demand even thicker co-operation with other Radical Routes members. Radical Routes can be described to fulfill ICA's sixth principle in three main ways, laid out in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Activities Undertaken by Radical Routes to Fulfil ICA's Sixth Principle



(Compiled from Radical Routes 2009; author's field research)

Radical Routes' quarterly gatherings are dedicated to meetings, workshops, discussions and social events that allow member co-operatives to discuss their own and each other's strengths, weaknesses, challenges, needs and resources (Radical Routes 2013a). Co-op representatives share experiences through discussing and giving advice, but also through sharing informational materials and bureaucratic documents such as policies or accounts. Gatherings allow members to meet face-to-face, but the sharing of skills and information continues via the internet or telephone in between them when members need help with specific questions. Gatherings also prompt member co-operatives to request and share in-kind resources such as vehicles, equipment and labor power. In-kind requests can also be made via the internet or telephone in between gatherings.

Through its investment arm Rootstock, Radical Routes allows member co-operatives to access loans at favorable interest rates (currently 0%, 1.5% or 3%, depending on the interest investors request) and flexible repayment schedules (Rootstock 2013a). Anyone who is interested and who agrees with Rootstock's and Radical Routes' policies can invest their savings in it – technically this is done by buying shares in Rootstock, but in practice this transition is not much different to an investor from opening a savings account with a bank and transferring money there, or transferring it back when needed, as long as notice is given (Rootstock 2010a; author interviews). Rootstock lends money to Radical Routes' member co-ops only, and decisions about whether and how much to lend is made by Radical Routes through network-wide consensus (Rootstock 2009). Investors can be both individuals and co-operatives, and it should be noted that Radical Routes has a policy stating that 'We encourage/expect members of member co-ops to invest some of their capital (if they have any) in Radical Routes or its member co-ops' (Radical Routes 2011: Part 1 §7.1).

Effectively, then, this is a system of surplus-sharing: if a member co-operative or any otherwise interested individual makes a surplus beyond their individual/firm needs (a reference point for which is indicated in policy §6.1 discussed above), it is shared with other Radical Routes co-operatives.

A possible problem for co-operatives, applicable also to investment organizations such as Rootstock, is pointed out by Darryl Reed: co-operatives 'tend to be under-capitalized because members have little incentive to invest (because their shares do not appreciate […])' (2009: 25). Put simply: long-term collective gains such as social equality, reduced global poverty and environmental sustainability may not always be attractive incentives for rich people to invest. Radical Routes has had access to over £770,000 since it started lending in 1991 (Rootstock 2010b), which for a small voluntary organization is significant. Investing money in Rootstock is open to anybody, not just member co-operatives, so Rootstock can find capital from an open pool of anybody who is willing to lend money at an interest of up to 3%, and with a notice period of thirteen weeks ahead of any withdrawal. The option of lending at no interest is available to Rootstock investors, and the application form for lenders states that investment in Rootstock should be seen as a way of supporting the organization's aims rather than as a source of financial gain (Rootstock 2013b). To split hairs, the fact that interest rates of up to 3% are available means that Rootstock does (if to a very limited extent) make use of the profit motive in attracting investors. However, even if 3% is a relatively high interest rate for a savings account in Britain in the current economic climate, it will hardly attract any profit-obsessed venture capitalists, and even if it did, they would not have any decision-making powers in the co-operative.

Returning to Mondragón again, we can find a different solution to the undercapitalization problem. Mondragón requires its members to deposit a large joining fee of roughly a year's salary, which can be paid off in installments over a period of several years (Arando et al 2010: 32). It is questionable, however, whether this solution is open to smaller co-operatives that are unable to guarantee an installment payment plan, or even long-term employment stability. If members were required to put up a lump sum in order to join, without the option of paying the membership fee in small installments, the principle of *open membership (ICA Principle 1) would be violated.* For smaller co-operatives undercapitalization is often a major problem, whether the source of capital would be private individuals or conventional banks (Dubravčić 2000: 83). Of course, that small anti-capitalist organizations find it difficult to attract capital is neither surprising nor puzzling. Nor does it make the reality of existing non-capitalist alternatives any less interesting.

Conclusion

Radical Routes, Rootstock, Mondragón, Café Kino and other co-operatives discussed here show that a non-capitalist and egalitarian productive enterprise form is possible, and indeed already in existence. These co-operatives do not distinguish between the owners of the means of production on the one hand and workers on the other, rather, the two roles are merged. In practice this happens through the use of delegated and rotating roles of responsibility (with the frequency of rotation and amount of room for personal discretion varying but being as high and low as possible respectively). As for profit, these co-operatives find various ways of ensuring the motive behind their enterprises is not to amass individual wealth: they make their enterprises non-profit, using income caps and surplus sharing. When the profit motive is exchanged for organizational aims that are more collective and long-term, companies no longer have the incentive to violate human rights or the environment. And as for capitalism's obsession with competition, these co-operative enterprises co-operate with each other through networks such as Radical Routes, sharing skills and resources rather than trying to put each other out of business.

A common criticism of radical alternative economic models is that they are unlikely to work in practice, but the success and strength of anti-capitalist co-operatives such as these make such a criticism difficult to maintain.

References

Albert, M. 2003. *Parecon: Life After Capitalism*. London: Verso Books. Also online, available from http://www.zcommunications.org/zparecon/pareconlac.htm.

Arando, B., Freundlich, F., Gago, M., Jones, D. C. and Kato, T. 2010. Assessing Mondragon: Stability and Managed Change in the Face of Globalization. William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 1003. Online, available from wdi.umich.edu/files/publications/workingpapers/wp1003.pdf.

Avon CDA [Avon Co-operative Development Agency]. 2013. What is a Co-op? Online, available from http://www.cda.coop/whatarecoops.htm.

Bakaikoa, B., A. Errasti, and A. Begiristain. 2004. Governance of the Mondragon Corporación Cooperativa. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 75(1): 61-87.

BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation]. 2003. Face the Facts Investigates Coca-Cola Plant in India. Online, available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2003/07_july/24/face_facts.shtml.

BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation]. 2007. Child Labour and the High Street. Online, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/7068096.stm.

Birchall, J. and R. Simmons. 2004. The Involvement of Members in the Governance of Large-Scale Co-operative and Mutual Businesses: A Formative Evaluation of the Co-operative Group. *Review of Social Economy* LXII(4): 487-515.

Blaug, M. 2008. Invisible Hand. In *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics* (2nd ed), ed. S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume. Online, available from http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_I000220.

Bowles, S., R. Edwards and F. Roosevelt. 2005. *Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command and Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boyle, M. 2009. I Live Without Cash – And I Manage Just Fine. *The Guardian*. Online, available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/green-living-blog/2009/oct/28/live-without-money.

Café Kino. 2009. 'Articles of Association'. Available on request from eat@cafe-kino.com. Used with permission. Note that Café Kino was originally called Café Mono and still bears this name in its legal entity as a limited company.

Café Kino. 2013. About Us. Online, available from http://www.cafe-kino.com/about/index.htm.

CHS. 2013. Investors. Online, available from https://www.chsinc.com/portal/server.pt/community/2investors/351.

Co-operative Group, The. 2013a. Membership Overview: Sharing the Profits. Online, available from http://www.co-operative.coop/membership/what-is-membership/Membership-overview/.

Co-operative Group, The. 2013b. The Co-operative Movement. Online, available from http://www.co-operative.coop/corporate/widermovement/.

Co-operatives UK. 2009. Simply Legal: All You Need to Know About Legal Forms and Organisational Types for Community Enterprises (2nd ed). Online, available from http://offline.cooperatives-uk.coop/SimplyLegal.

Co-operatives UK. 2013. About Us. Online, available from http://www.uk.coop/about/co-operativesuk.

Coronet Instructional Films. 1948. Capitalism (1948). Online, available from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TtOtV-gE3YQ.

Cox, R. 1996. *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crowell, E. and D. Reed. 2009. Fair Trade: A Model for International Co-operation Among Co-operatives?. In *Co-operatives in a Global Economy: The Challenges of Co-operation Across Borders,* ed. D. Reed and J. J. McMurtry. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Dovi, S. 2006. Political Representation. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. E. Zalta. Online, available from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/.

Dubravčić, D. 2000. Illyrian Theories of Cooperative Rent-Sharing and Their Application in Real Life. In *Equality, Participation, Transition Essays in Honour of Branko Horvat*, ed. V. Franičević and M. Uvalić. London: Macmillan Press.

Duchrow, U. 2005. Capitalism and Human Rights. In *The Essentials of Human Rights*, ed. C. van den Anker and R. K. M. Smith. London: Hodder Arnold.

Erdal, D. 2011. Better Business. Unpublished lecture and Q&A held at Watershed (Bristol, UK) as part of Bristol Festival of Ideas, 21st March 2011. Dr Erdal is Honorary Senior Research Fellow at St Andrews University and chairman of the Employee Ownership Trust.

Ericson, R. E. 2008. Command Economy. In *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics* (2nd ed), ed. S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume. Online, available from http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000219.

Eriksson, T. and Ortega, J. 2006. The Adoption of Job Rotation: Testing the Theories. *Industrial & Labor Relations Review* 59(4): 653-666.

Feldman, D. C. and J. M. Brett. 1983. Coping With New Jobs: A Comparative Study of New Hires and Job Changers. *Academy of Management Journal* 26(2): 258-272.

Gibson-Graham, J. K. 2006. *A Postcapitalist Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Gibson-Graham, J. K. 2008. Diverse Economies: Performative Practices for 'Other Worlds'. *Progress in Human Geography* 32(5): 613–632.

Graeber, D. 2002. The New Anarchists. *New Left Review* 13(1): 61-73.

Grunebaum, J. O. 1987. *Private Ownership*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Gupta, A. 2008. Definitions. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. E. Zalta. Online, available from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/#StiDef.

Harvey, D. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, D. 2010. *A Companion to Marx's Capital*. London: Verso.

Heilbroner, R. L. 2008. Capitalism. In *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics* (2nd ed), ed. S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume. Online, available from http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000053.

Hill C. W. L. 2005. *International Business: Competing in the Global Marketplace* (5th ed). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Hopkins, T. K. and Wallerstein, I. 1977. Patterns of Development of the Modern World System. *Review* 1(2): 111-145.

Horvat, B. 1982. *The Political Economy of Socialism: A Marxist Social Theory*. New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc.

ICA [International Co-operative Alliance]. 2011a. What's a Co-op?. Online, available from http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op.

ICA [International Co-operative Alliance]. 2011b. Co-operative Identity, Values & Principles. Online, available from http://ica.coop/en/what-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles.

India Resource Center. 2013. Campaign to Hold Coca-Cola Accountable. Online, available from http://www.indiaresource.org/campaigns/coke/index.html.

Kebele Community Co-operative. 2013. Principles. Online, available from http://www.kebelecoop.org/?page_id=8.

Killer Coke. 2013. Coke's Crimes: Colombia. Online, available from http://killercoke.org/crimes_colombia.php.

Klein, N. 2002. Farewell to 'The End Of History': Organization and Vision in Anti-Corporate Movements. In *The Socialist Register 2002: A World of Contradictions*, ed. L. Panitch and C. Leys. London: Merlin Press.

Klinedinst, M. and Rock, C. 2009. 'Topology of Economic Systems', Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No. 43209. Online, available from http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43209/1/MPRA_paper_43209.pdf.

Kolstad, I. 2007. Why Firms Should Not Always Maximize Profits. *Journal of Business Ethics* 76(2): 137–145.

Lazzarato, M. 2009. Neoliberalism in Action: Inequality, Insecurity and the Reconstitution of the Social. *Theory, Culture & Society* 26(6): 109–133.

Lukes, S. 1985. *Marxism and Morality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lyon, S. 2006. Evaluating Fair Trade Consumption: Politics, Defetishization and Producer Participation. *International Journal of Consumer Studies* 30(5): 452-464.

MacLeod, G. and D. Reed. 2009. Mondragon's Response to the Challenges of Globalization: A Multi-localization Strategy. In *Co-operatives in a Global Economy: The Challenges of Co-operation Across Borders*, ed. D. Reed and J. J. McMurtry. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Marx, K. 1999 [1875]. Critique of the Gotha Programme: Part I. Online, available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm.

Miller, G. R. 2012. "Gender Trouble": Investigating Gender and Economic Democracy in Worker Cooperatives in the United States. *Review of Radical Political Economics* 44(1): 8-22.

Mondragón. 2013a. Organisational Structure. Online, available from http://www.mondragon-corporation.com/language/en-US/ENG/Who-we-are/Organisational-structure.aspx.

Mondragón. 2013b. Who Makes Up the Governing Bodies of a Co-operative? Can Any Member be the Managing Director?. Online, available from http://www.mondragon-corporation.com/language/en-US/ENG/Frequently-asked-questions/Internal-Operation.aspx.

Mondragón. 2013c. Payment Solidarity. Online, available from http://www.mondragon-corporation.com/ENG/Co-operativism/Co-operative-Experience/Co-operative-Culture/Payment-Solidarity.aspx.

OED [Oxford English Dictionary]. 2013a. Profit. Online, available from http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/profit?q=profit.

OED [Oxford English Dictionary]. 2013b. Community. Online, available from http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/community?q=community.

Olin Wright, E. 2008. *Envisioning Real Utopias* (pre-publication typescript). Online, available from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.143.693&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Also published by Verso publishing (London) June 2010.

Ortega, J. 2001. Job Rotation as a Learning Mechanism. *Management Science* 47(10): 1361-1370.

People & Planet. 2008. Why Target Topshop?. Online, available from http://peopleandplanet.org/redressfashion/topshop.

Radical Routes. 2009. Aims and Principles. Online, available from http://www.radicalroutes.org.uk/aims-and-principles.html.

Radical Routes. 2011. Policy Document, Autumn 2011. Obtained through author's fieldwork.

Radical Routes. 2013a. An Introduction to Radical Routes. Online, available from http://www.radicalroutes.org.uk/publicdownloads/introrra5.pdf.

Radical Routes. 2013b. Welcome. Online, available from http://www.radicalroutes.org.uk.

Reed, D. 2009. Analysing the Internationalization of Co-operatives. In *Co-operatives in a Global Economy: The Challenges of Co-operation Across Borders*, ed. D. Reed and J. J. McMurtry. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Reed, D. and J.J. McMurtry. 2009. Introduction. In *Co-operatives in a Global Economy: The Challenges of Co-operation Across Borders*, ed. D. Reed and J. J. McMurtry. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Robertson, D. 2002. *A Dictionary of Modern Politics* (3rd ed). London: Europa Publications.

Rootstock. 2009. Radical Routes. Online, available from http://www.rootstock.org.uk/radical-routes.html.

Rootstock. 2010a. How to Make an Ethical Investment in Rootstock. Online, available from http://www.rootstock.org.uk/how-to-invest.html.

Rootstock. 2010b. Radical Routes Loans. Online, available from http://www.rootstock.org.uk/radical-routes-loans.html.

Rootstock. 2013a. Share Application Form. Online, available from http://www.rootstock.org.uk/images/application-form/shareapp.pdf

Rootstock. 2013b. Introduction. Online, available from http://www.rootstock.org.uk.

Ross, S. 2002. Is This What Democracy Looks Like? The Politics of the Anti-Globalization Movement in North

America. In *Socialist Register 2003: Fighting Identities*, ed. L. Panitch and C. Leys. London: Merlin Press.

Salih, S. 2002. *Judith Butler (Routledge Critical Thinkers).* London: Routledge.

Schaefer, B. P. 2008. Shareholders and Social Responsibility. *Journal of Business Ethics* 81(2): 297–312.

Smith, A. 2002 [1776]. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Online, available from http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext02/wltnt11.txt.

Steinberg, R. and B. A. Weisbrod. 2008. Non-profit Organizations. In *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics* (2nd ed), ed. S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume. Online, available from http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_N000164&edition=current&q=not%20for%20profit&topicid=&result_number=4.

Stigler, G. J. 2008. Competition. In *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics* (2nd ed), ed. S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume. Online, available from http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000261.

Van Tulder, R. and A. van der Zwart. 2006. *International Business-Society Management: Linking Corporate Responsibility and Globalisation*. London: Routledge.

Wolff, R. 2006. Marxian Class Analysis and Economics. *Dollars and Sense*, May/June Issue. Online, available from http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2006/0506wolff.html.

Young, R. J. C. 2003. *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zeuli, K. A. and R. Cropp. 2004. Cooperatives: Principles and Practices in the 21st Century. University of Wisconsin Center for Co-operatives. Online, available from http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/uwcc_pubs/primer.html and http://learningstore.uwex.edu/Assets/pdfs/A1457.pdf.