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White Paper on the Options for Managing Systemic Bank Crises

Bernard Lietaer (blietaer@earthlink.net)
Dr. Robert Ulanowicz (ulan@cbl.umces.edu)
Dr. Sally Goerner (sgoerner@mindspring.com)

Abstract

The on-going financial crisis is not the result of a cyclical or managerial failure, but a structural one. Part of the evidence for this assertion is that there have already been more than 96 other major banking crises over the past 20 years, and that such crashes have happened even under very different regulatory systems as well as at different stages of economic development. We urgently need to find better solutions because the last time we faced a breakdown of this scope, the Great Depression of the 1930s, ended up in a wave of fascism and WW2. However, so far the conventional solutions being applied – nationalization of the problem assets (as in the original Paulson bailout) or nationalization of the banks (as in Europe) – only deal with the symptoms, not the systemic cause of today’s banking crises. Similarly, the financial re-regulation that will be on everybody’s political agenda, will, at best, reduce the frequency of such crises, but not avoid their re-occurrence.

The good news is that a systemic understanding and technical solution are now available that would ensure that such crashes become a phenomenon of the past. A recent conceptual breakthrough, that takes its evidence from balanced, structurally sound, and highly functioning eco-systems now proves that *all* complex systems, including our monetary and financial ones, become structurally unstable whenever efficiency is overemphasized at the expense of diversity, interconnectivity and the crucial resilience they provide. The surprising systemic “a-ha” is that sustainable vitality involves diversifying our types of currencies and institutions and introducing new ones that are designed specifically to increase the availability of money in its prime function as a medium of exchange, rather than for savings or speculation. Additionally, these currencies are expressly designed to link what would remain otherwise unused resources with unmet needs within a community, region or country. These currencies are known as “complementary” because they do not replace the conventional national money, but rather operate in parallel with it.

The most effective way for governments to support such a strategy of a more diverse and sustainable monetary ecology would be to accept a well-selected, robust complementary currency in partial payment of taxes during the period when banks will not be in position to fully finance the real economy. The choice of which complementary currency to accept reflects both a technical issue (robustness and resilience against fraud) and a political one (what type of activities are desirable to support). We recommend as first candidate for this role, a professionally run business-to-business (B2B) complementary currency on the model of the WIR system, which has been successfully operational for 75 years in Switzerland, involving a quarter of all businesses of that country. This system has been credited by an American econometric analysis as a significant counter-cyclical stabilizing factor that explains the proverbial stability of the Swiss economy.


This paper begins with a short metaphoric story, followed by seven sections as follows:

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A Metaphoric Story

*“Money is like an iron ring we put through our nose.
It is now leading us wherever it wants.
We just forgot that we are the ones who designed it.”*
Mark Kinney

In the early 1980s, the most prominent citizens of a small town in Western Germany were having dinner together. The group included notable local businessmen, the mayor and the local judge. They had plenty of wine with the dinner and after the wine added some schnapps, so soon they were getting all getting jolly tipsy. On the plaza outside the restaurant there was a carnival, with a merry-go-round. By the time the group left the restaurant it was well after midnight and the plaza was empty. One of them thought it would be fun to jump on the merry-go-round, and soon everyone followed suit. They each got in a chair while one of them put the motor in action and then leapt on a chair as it started turning. However, the laughter came to an end after a few minutes of going round and round as they realized, one by one, that they could not stop the machine: the control button was now well out of reach and they could not dismount without incurring serious injury. They could get the machine running from its starting position, but lost the capacity to manage it once it got in full swing.



They started shouting louder and louder for help but nobody heard them. It was not until after six o'clock the next morning that someone finally came by and called the fire department and the police who stopped the machine. By then one had died from a heart attack and three ended up unconscious in the hospital. One of them dropped out to become a member of an obscure religious sect. All of them suffered psychological scars that would take years to heal.

This is a true story.¹ It is also a metaphor for where we are now with the state of the world's money system, as we are all embarked on a huge planetary machine running on autopilot. And we seem to have lost the capacity to slow it down, without risking its collapse.

I. The Crisis of 2008

By now, everybody knows that we have entered a major global financial crisis. Indeed, the infamous "subprime crisis," which first hit the American banking system in August 2007, has been spreading internationally. It reached a new level of global banking systemic contagion in September 2008. The question that is being debated is the depth and extent of the crisis — whether it can become as bad as the 1930s Depression. For instance, Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, stated publicly: "Let's recognize that this is a once-in-a-half-century, probably once-in-a-century type of event."²

¹ Source: Peter Sloterdijk: *Aus Herbstschrift I*, Steierischer Herbst 1990

² Interview of Greenspan on ABC television channel by Stephanopoulos on September 14, 2008
See <http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2008/09/greenspan-to-st.html>

The causes of this crisis will be debated for years to come. Some will blame unrestrained greed, others a “sorcerer apprentice” problem in which financial engineering created products too complex even for their creators, still others condemn excessive financial deregulation, incompetence by bankers and/or regulators, or even willful manipulation. What nobody is arguing about is that the financial sector has chalked up simultaneous losses on an unprecedented scale. Here is a sample of what had been officially acknowledged by mid August 2008:

- Lehman Brothers (USA) - \$17 billion (bankrupt on Sept. 15, 2008)
- Morgan Stanley (USA) - \$12 billion
- Merrill Lynch (USA) - \$46 billion (taken over by Bank of America on Sept. 15, 2008)
- Citigroup (USA) - \$47 billion
- Bank of America - \$7 billion
- JP Morgan (USA) - \$5 billion
- Goldman Sachs (USA) - \$3.8 billion
- Bear Stearns (USA) - \$3.2 billion (went bankrupt in March 2008)
- Wachovia (USA) - \$6 billion
- UBS (Swiss) - \$37 billion
- Credit Suisse (Swiss) - \$6 billion
- Northern Rock Bank (UK) – £50 billion + (went bankrupt in February 2008)
- Royal Bank of Scotland (UK) - \$11.8 billion
- Barclays Bank (UK) - \$9.9 billion
- HSBC (Bank, UK) - \$6 billion
- HBOS (Bank, UK) - \$2 billion
- Lloyds TSB Bank (UK) - \$1.7 billion
- Deutsche Bank (Germany) - \$10 billion
- BayernLB (Germany) - \$3 billion
- IKB (Germany) - \$2.6 billion
- Commerzbank (Germany) - \$1.1 billion
- WestLB (Germany) - \$1.5 billion
- Credit Agricole (France) - \$7 billion
- Societe Generale (France) - \$6 billion
- Nataxis (France) - \$4.3 billion
- UniCredit (Italy) - \$1.6 billion
- National Australia Bank - \$1 billion

Adding it all up, so far simultaneous losses of a record US\$ 348 billion are being acknowledged. We estimate, however, that this represents less than half of the total of the subprime issue alone. Indeed, the total loss to the financial system due to the subprime crisis is at least US\$ 1.2 Trillion.³ The subprime is only the tip of the iceberg, however, as the same lax practices that were applied to mortgages were also prevailing for car loans or student loans, and particularly credit card debt in the United States

³ This rough estimate is based on the following facts:

- the total US residential mortgage market has a volume of about US\$ 10 Trillion. See statistics of debt outstanding for home mortgages in <http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/Coded/coded-2.pdf>
- of which about US\$ 6 Trillion has been packaged in derivatives technically called COD's
- the interbank market discounts those instruments by at least 20%, which is confirmed by the estimates that about 20% of the mortgages payments will not be honored. The market discount in actual exchanges of these instrument as of September 2008 was in fact 40 to 60%. Conservatively applying the 20% discount, we have therefore 20% of 6 Trillion = 1.2 Trillion.

What all this means, in practice is that, we have now entered the period of unprecedented convergence of four planetary problems – climate change, financial instability, high unemployment and the financial consequences of an aging society - that was predicted in my 2001 book, *The Future of Money*⁴. It is most likely that the ensuing crisis will play out in a classic two or three steps downwards for every step upwards pattern. Every small step forward (i.e. any temporary improvement) will predictably be hailed as the “end of the crisis.” It is quite understandable why governments, banks and regulators will make such statements simply because saying otherwise would only make the situation worse.

The next logical phase in this systemic crisis is now unfolding on automatic pilot. Whatever governments do, the banks and other financial institutions will want to cut back drastically on their loans portfolios wherever possible, in order to rebuild their balance sheets after huge financial losses. This in turn will weaken the world economy to the point of a recession, which in turn, will strike the banks’ balance sheets, and so on, down a vicious spiral towards a possible depression. Thus, while cutting back on its loan portfolio is a logical reaction for each individual bank, when they all do it simultaneously, it deepens the hole that is being collectively dug for the world economy and ultimately for the financial system itself.

We are not alone anymore in this view. The London-based newspaper *The Independent* gathered the opinions about the on-going crisis from a series of outstanding personalities⁵:


- *"This recession will be long, ugly, painful and deep. All the credit losses associated with it will be closer to \$2 trillion – leading to the most severe systemic financial and banking crisis since the Great Depression. The credibility and viability of the most sophisticated financial system is at stake now, as most of this financial and banking system is on its way to substantial and formal insolvency and bankruptcy."* (Nouriel Roubini – Professor of Economics and International Business, New York University)
- *"The USA is a nation that is consuming too much, and the Bush Administration’s response has been to tell people to consume more." "The idea that banks should self-regulate, relying on their own risk management systems and rating agencies, is absurd. We lost sight of why regulation is needed. The trouble is that regulators are too close to the people they are regulating. There was a party going on and nobody wanted to be a party pooper."* (Joseph Stiglitz – Professor of Columbia University and 2001 Recipient of the Nobel Prize for Economics)
- *"The second stage [of this economic crisis] is an attempt by the banks to cut their losses and leverage and reduce their lending so helping to drive the economy into recession. That will then feedback via bad debts and impact the capital strength of the banks so we will see an adverse vicious circle of weak banks creating a weak economy, which in turn creates more weak banks."* (Charles Goodhart – Professor Emeritus, London School of Economics)
- *"There is a super bubble that has been going on for 25 years or so that started in 1980 when Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister and Ronald Reagan became President. That is when the belief that Markets are best left to their own devices became the dominant belief. Based on that we had a new phase of globalisation and liberalisation of financial markets. The idea is false. Markets do not correct towards equilibrium."* "The

⁴ Lietaer, Bernard: *The Future of Money: Creating new Wealth, Work and a Wiser World* (London: Random House/Century, 2001).

⁵ All subsequent quotes in this section originate in *The Independent* (Business Section) August 5, 2008

whole construct, this really powerful financial structure, has been built on false grounds. For the first time this entire system has been engaged in this [economic] crisis.” (George Soros – Global Financier and Philanthropist)

In short, our financial system is in serious trouble from whatever angle one looks at it.



The Economist editorializes on October 11, 2008, in its lead story: “Confidence is everything in finance...With a flawed diagnosis of the causes of the crisis, it is hardly surprising that many policymakers have failed to understand its progression.”⁶ This paper will show that this is indeed the case, although in a deeper way than *The Economist* itself believes.

The last time we dealt with a crisis of this scale, the 1930s, it ended up creating widespread totalitarianism and ultimately World War II. The trillion dollar questions are:

- How can we do better this time?
- What are the strategies that will avoid getting us caught into an economic tailspin?
- What are *all* the options available to deal with large scale systemic banking crises?

II. Why Save the Banks?

Since governments’ initial response has been to bailout banks and other financial institutions, the first question must be: Why should governments and taxpayers get involved in saving banks in the first place? After all, when a private business fails, it is considered part of the “creative

⁶ *The Economist* October 11, 2008 pg 13.

destructiveness” that characterizes the capitalist system. But when large banks fail, somehow that doesn’t seem to apply, as shown again in the present-day scenario.

The short answer to why banks are being saved is fear that the 1930 Depression nightmare would again become a reality. Since banks enjoy the monopoly on creating money through providing loans, bankrupt banks means reduced credit which in turn results in a lack of money for the rest of the economy. Without access to capital, business and the means of production contract which causes mass unemployment and a host of collateral social problems. Thus, when banks are in trouble, they can trigger what is know as a “Second Wave” crisis, through a ferocious circle making a victim of the real economy: bad banking balance sheets => credit restrictions => recession => worse bank balance sheets => further credit restrictions and so the spiral downward goes...

It is to avoid such a tailspin that governments feel the need to prop up the banks’ balance sheet. This exercise is under way. For instance, several major banks were able to refinance themselves earlier in 2008, mainly by tapping sovereign funds. But, as the depth of the rot has become more obvious, this has become harder to do. Central banks will help by providing an interest yield curve that makes it easy for financial institutions to earn a lot of money at no risk.⁷

The next logical step is also formulaic. Whenever a bank that is “too big to fail” is in real trouble, the recipe has been the same since the 1930s: the taxpayers end up footing the bill to bail out the banks, so that they can start all over again. Of the 96 major banking crises around the world that the World Bank has counted over a recent 25 year period,⁸ taxpayer bailouts have been the answer in every instance. For example, the United States government that had funded Reconstruction Finance Corporation during 1932-53 period, repeated the exercise with the Resolution Trust Corporation for the Savings and Loan crisis in the 1989-95 period, and now again with the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) of 2008. Other recent examples include the Swedish Bank Support Authority (1992-96) and the Japanese Resolution and Collection Corporation which started in 1996 and is still ongoing. In the current international crisis, among the first institutions that were “saved” in this way we can mention Bear Stearns in the US, and the nationalization of Northern Rock in the UK. Mid-October 2008, European governments pledged an unprecedented 1.873 trillion Euros, combining credit guarantees and capital injections into banks, based on the strategy pioneered by the United Kingdom.⁹

These bailouts end up being expensive for the taxpayers and the economy at-large. One exception has been in Sweden, which ended up costing “only” 3.6% of the GNP because important parts of the portfolio could be unwound over time at better conditions than those when the assets were originally acquired. But such outcomes are rare, the exceptions rather than the rule. Some examples of the staggering cost of bailing out banks as a percent of the corresponding countries’ annual GNP, as estimated by the World Bank.¹⁰

⁷ Central banks will encourage low short-term interest rates and higher longer-term ones, which makes it possible for banks to borrow at low cost from customers and the markets, and invest in long-term government bonds. This was done for instance in the US during the late 1980s, and it worked as planned. It enabled the banks to rebuild their balance sheets. However, even this relatively “mild” crisis (representing a bailout of 3.7% of GNP) took more than six years to be absorbed.

⁸ Caprio and Klingelbiel, “Bank Insolvencies: Cross Country Experience,” *Policy Research Working Papers* no.1620 (Washington, DC: World Bank, Policy and Research Department, 1996).

⁹ Front page headline in the *Financial Times* Tuesday, October 14, 2008 pg. 1.

¹⁰ *The Economist* September 27, 2008, pg 79 as well as the earlier Caprio and Klingelbiel “Bank Insolvencies: Cross Country Experience,” *Policy Research Working Papers* no.1620 (Washington, DC: World Bank, Policy and Research Department, 1996).

• Sweden 1992-96	3.6%
• USA 1988	3.7%
• Spain 1977-85:	16.8%
• Venezuela 1994-5	18%
• Mexico 1994	19.3%
• Japan 1997	24%
• Chile 1981-83	41.2%
• Thailand 1997-2000	45%
• Malaysia 1997-2000	45%
• Argentina 1980-82:	55.3%
• South Korea 1997-2000	60%

At the time of this writing, the crisis in the US has already cost 5.8% of the country's GNP¹¹, and a very conservative estimate is that it will end up costing at least 10%. Governments, the world over, have just bled themselves dry to a totally unprecedented extent, just to save the banking system -- to the point that the *Financial Times* even wonders whether the worldwide panic in the stock markets in October 2008 "is not about faith in the banks, but faith in the governments to save them."¹²

For instance, the scale of the commitments made by European countries for the bailout of the banking system is without precedent, representing potentially a multiple of their annual GDP. To give an idea of what we are dealing with, here is the ratio of the assets of the three largest banks in each country that were now guaranteed by their respective governments. This ratio represent 130% of annual GDP for Germany; 142% of annual GDP for Italy; 147% of GDP for Portugal; 218% for Spain; 257% for France; 253% for Ireland; 317% for the UK; 409% for the Netherlands (2 largest banks); 528% for Belgium-Luxemburg; 773% for Switzerland (2 largest banks); and 1,079% of the GDP for Iceland (the first country that went formally bankrupt).¹³

This begs the question: What happens when the costs for rescuing the bank system become unbearable? Governments learned in the 1930s that they can't afford to let the banking system go under, as this brings down the entire economic system. What they may learn in our times is that they can't afford to save the banking system.

III. Re-Regulation of the Financial Sector

The first strategy, re-regulating the financial sector, will predictably be on everybody's political agenda, particularly for a new administration in the US. The debate about how and what to regulate will be intense. History shows, however, that we have engaged in the same cat and mouse game between regulators and banks for several centuries, since the beginning of the privatization of money issuance function to the banking system. To be precise, while such re-regulation may avoid the repetition of the identical traps and abuses next time, over time new

¹¹ Values to September 15, 2008. This includes the US\$ 700 Billion Paulson bailout, the US\$ 85 Billion for AIG, and 25 Billion for Bear Sterns. It doesn't include the likely costs of the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae packages which own or guarantee some US\$ 5,400 Billion in mortgages, or whatever guarantees were provided that aren't public knowledge yet as of this writing.

¹² Gillian Tett "Leaders at wits' end as markets thrown one tantrum after another" *Financial Times* October 11/12, 2008. pg 1.

¹³ All percentages computed from data from the map in the *Financial Times* September 30, 2008 page 3

loopholes will be discovered or created, resulting in a new variation of the same type of banking crisis.¹⁴

Some re-regulation is, at this point, politically unavoidable, and we concur with the general consensus that it is also necessary. It will be clearly shown below, however, why this solution will, at best, only reduce the frequency of such crashes, not their repetition. Furthermore, stricter regulation may also lengthen the period necessary for banks to improve their balance sheets, which will simply deepen and prolong the “Second Wave” problem.

IV. Conventional Solutions: Nationalizations

There are two conventional ways for governments to prop up the banks balance sheets, both involving a form of nationalization. The first is nationalizing what Ben Bernanke called in his presentation in the US Congress, “the banking system’s toxic assets”; the second is nationalizing the banks themselves. Let’s briefly explore the advantages and disadvantages of both.

A. Nationalizing the Toxic Assets

This solution is invariably preferred by the banks themselves. It consists of either the government itself (in the initial Paulson bailout plan, for example, it is the U.S. Treasury Department) or a specially created institution funded by the government buying assets from the banks that they now want to jettison. Of course, determining the price at which these assets are purchased is a very tricky issue, particularly when a liquid market for such assets has dried up completely, as is the case now. If the government buys the assets at too high a price, it will be seen as a straightforward subsidy for previous bad behavior, and accentuate the “moral hazard” problem (defined below), something that is politically unpalatable. On the other hand, if the government buys the assets at too low a price, it doesn’t really replenish the banks’ balance sheet.

Buying the toxic assets is also by far the most expensive solution, because it doesn’t take advantage of the leveraging factor available in the banking system. Consequently, the injection of money by the government as capital directly to the banks is a lot more effective financially.

B. Nationalizing the Banks

The second way to buttress the banks is by governments providing capital directly to banks themselves, either by buying stocks, or by acquiring a newly issued preferred stock. For example, this is what Warren Buffet did for Goldman Sachs in September 2008 in the US: he injected \$ 5 Billion in the form of preferred stock that would give him not only 7% of the capital, but also a guaranteed 10% dividend forever.

In Europe, governments have typically taken the bank-nationalization road, although with less demanding terms than what Warren Buffet obtained. Nationalizing the banks was the option taken for instance in Sweden in 1992; and in 2008 first for Northern Rock in the UK, and then for a wide range of banks in all countries by mid-October 2008.

There are two advantages in this approach compared to the previous one of nationalizing the toxic assets. First, thanks to the fractional banking system by which all money is created, when banks

¹⁴ See the classics in this domain, such as Charles Kindleberger *Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

make loans to customers, they can create new money at a multiplier of the amount of capital they actually have. Consequently, if a bank's "leveraging factor" was 10, then injecting \$1 billion in the bank's capital would make it possible for it to create at least \$10 billion in new money, or carry \$10 billion in problem assets. In fact, the multiplier is typically much higher. For instance, Lehman's and Goldman Sachs' ratio of assets to capital was respectively 30 and 26, before they both disappeared. Some European banks had even a higher leverage: BNP Paribas at 32; Dexia and Barclays' leverage ratio are both estimated at about 40; UBS' at 47; and Deutsche Bank's a whopping 83.¹⁵ Therefore, very conservatively put, it is 10 times more financially effective for governments to bolster the balance sheets of the banks directly than to buy toxic assets.

The second advantage to buying bank shares instead of toxic assets is that there is generally a market which indicates some relative value between different banks. In contrast, when the market for toxic assets has dried up, there is no such indication, and the decisions can be quite arbitrary.

The banks themselves, of course, prefer to avoid the dilution of bank equity and control that this approach implies. Politically, nationalizing the banks also sounds like the "socialization" of the economy, since the former communist states nationalized their banks. This ideological taint may explain why this approach was not initially considered in Washington.

Yet, we must also not underestimate some of the unmentioned additional risks of the crisis. The cost of bailing out the world's financial system will unquestionably significantly increase most governmental debt, which somehow will have to be financed from somewhere. For instance, today, the US' biggest financiers — China, Russia and the Gulf states — are rivals to the US, not allies. The question is: What will happen to already shaky national currencies, including the dollar, during such wrangling?

C. Unresolved Problems

The first objection to nationalizing banks or their toxic assets is the well known "moral hazard" problem. If banks know that they will be saved when in trouble, they may be tempted to take higher risks than otherwise would be prudent. When these risks pay off, the profits are held privately and translated into generous dividends for the banks' shareholders and extraordinary bonuses to management. But when they fail, the losses end up being absorbed by the taxpayers. The current salvage programs confirm that this problem hasn't gone away and is unavoidably further strengthened by new bailouts. Christine Lagarde, Minister of the Economy, Industry and Employment in the current Sarkozy government in France, stated "Moral hazard has to be dealt with later...Maintaining the functioning of our markets is the top priority".¹⁶ This is exactly the argument that pops up at every systemic crisis...

Secondly, even if both strategies —bailing out the banks and re-regulation of the financial sector — are implemented reasonably well, neither resolves the "Second Wave" problem: the banking system will get caught in a vicious circle of credit contraction that invariably accompanies the massive de-leveraging that will be needed. Depending on how the re-regulation is implemented, it may actually inhibit banks from providing the finances needed for a reasonably fast recovery of

¹⁵ The leverage ratio is total assets/capital, which is the inverse of capital/assets ratio. The estimates for the capital to asset ratios are respectively 2.4% for Barclays, 2.1% for UBS and 1.2% for Deutsche Bank according to the *Economist* September 27, 2008 pg 84. See also "Briefing" in *Trends-Tendances* October 2, 2008, pg 17.

¹⁶ Michael Macenzie and John Authers, "The week that panic stalked the markets," *Financial Times* October 11/12, 2008, pg. 2.

the real economy. In any case, given the size of the losses to be recovered, it will take many years, in the order of a decade, certainly more than enough time to bring the real economy into real trouble.

In practice, what this means for most people in the US, in Europe, and in most other parts of the world, is that, in Professor Nouriel Roubini's words, "*this recession will be long, ugly, painful and deep.*" We are only at the beginning of a long, drawn-out economic unraveling. The social and political implications for such a scenario are hard to fathom. The last time we looked into a problem of this size and scope was in the 1930's, and that event resulted in social and economic problems that ended up manifesting violently in a wave of fascism and ultimately World War II. Still, there are important differences with the situation of the 1930s. So far, the situation is less extreme economically, in unemployment and business bankruptcies, than what happened in the 1930s. On the other hand, governments are now a lot more indebted than was the case at the beginning of the Great Depression; and today's crisis is a lot more global than was the case then.¹⁷

More important still, a financial/banking issue isn't the only one we have to deal with. It happens to coincide with several major global challenges, by now generally accepted: Climate change and mass species extinction, the increase of structural unemployment, and the financial consequences of unprecedented aging in our societies.¹⁸ In some respects, therefore, today's crisis is less dramatic, and in others far worse than what our previous generation had to face.

D. Nationalizing the Money Creation Process

Nationalizing the money creation process itself is an old proposal, if much less conventional one, that reappears periodically in the "monetary reform" literature, particularly during periods of major banking crises, such as the one we are living now. For historical reasons, the right to create money was transferred to the banking system as a privilege, originally to finance wars during the 17th century. So, contrary to what some people believe, our money isn't created by the governments or the central banks, it is created as bank debt. When banks are private, as they are in most of the world, the creation of money is therefore a private business. If the banking system abuses this prerogative, this privilege could or should be withdrawn. The logic is not new: money is a public good, and the right of issuing legal tender belongs at least theoretically to governments.¹⁹

¹⁷ For instance, one could have lived comfortably through the 1930s in Latin America, North Africa and substantial parts of Asia.

¹⁸ For details on each of these challenges, see Lietaer, Bernard, *The future of money: Creating new wealth, work and a wiser world.* (London: Random House, 2001).

¹⁹ For instance, the US constitution specifies that the power of issuing money is an exclusive prerogative of Congress. There is a long list of famous quotes concerning this topic by various American presidents and founding fathers. Here are some samples:

- "If Congress has the right under the Constitution to issue paper money, it was given to be used by themselves, not to be delegated to individuals or corporations." (*Andrew Jackson*, when he dissolved the Second Bank of the United States);
- "History records that the money-changers have used every form of abuse, intrigue, deceit, and violent means possible to maintain their control over governments by controlling money and its issuance." (*James Madison*);
- "If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issue of their currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the banks...will deprive the people of all property until their children

So, while bailing out the banking system through nationalizing them or nationalizing the problem assets are the classical policy options, it can also be expected that proposals for nationalizing the money creation process itself will reemerge, as they have in previous predicaments, including the 1930s. Under a government run monetary system, the governments would simply spend money into existence without incurring interest at its creation; banks would become only brokers of money they have in deposit, not creators of money, as is the case now.

This would definitely make systemic banking crises a problem of the past. It would also provide the possibility to re-launch the economy through a large-scale Keynesian stimulus at a much lower cost to the taxpayers, given that the money so created wouldn't require interest to be reimbursed in the future.

One objection to a government managing the monetary system is that governments may abuse this power, issue more money than is appropriate, and thereby create inflation. That argument is valid. However, given that the current method of creating money through bank-debt has made the 20th century one of the highest inflationary centuries on the historical record, inflation is obviously not a problem that can be claimed to be specific to the process of money issuance by governments. Furthermore, there is no reason that Milton Friedman's proposal for the issuance of money by the central banks couldn't be applied to governments as well: put in place a rule that obliges the issuing body to increase spending by no more than a fixed 2% per year, reflecting the improvements of productivity in the economy.

The most important reason that this solution is unlikely to be implemented is that it will be doggedly resisted by the banking system itself. The financial system has always been and remains today a powerful lobby, and losing the right to create money would hit them at the core of their current business model.²⁰

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- wake-up homeless on the continent their fathers conquered.... The issuing power should be taken from the banks and restored to the people, to whom it properly belongs." (*Thomas Jefferson*);
- "The Government should create, issue, and circulate all the currency and credits needed to satisfy the spending power of the Government and the buying power of consumers. By the adoption of these principles, the taxpayers will be saved immense sums of interest. Money will cease to be master and become the servant of humanity." (*Abraham Lincoln*);
 - "The issue of currency should be lodged with the government and be protected from domination by Wall Street. We are opposed to...provisions [which] would place our currency and credit system in private hands." (*Theodore Roosevelt*);
 - "I am a most unhappy man. I have unwittingly ruined my country. A great industrial nation is controlled by its system of credit. Our system of credit is concentrated. The growth of the nation, therefore, and all our activities are in the hands of a few men. We have come to be one of the worst ruled, one of the most completely controlled and dominated Governments in the civilized world no longer a Government by free opinion, no longer a Government by conviction and the vote of the majority, but a Government by the opinion and duress of a small group of dominant men." (*Woodrow Wilson, who was the president who signed in 1913 the Act creating the Federal Reserve*)

For more information on proposals to re-nationalize money creation, see Joseph Huber and James Robertson, *Creating New Money: A Monetary Reform for the Information Age* (London: New Economic Foundation, 2000)

²⁰ The current modus operandi also provides a hidden permanent subsidy to the banking system through seigniorage. Huber and Robertson estimated this yearly subsidy at 49 billion Pounds for the UK; \$114 billion per year for the US; 160 billion Euros for the Euro zone; and 17.4 Trillion Yen for Japan. These

Our own objection to this solution is that, even if governments were to issue the money, it may protect us from banking crises, but it will nevertheless not solve the core systemic problem of the instability of our money system. In short, it may protect us from banking crises, but not from monetary crises.

V. Understanding Systemic Stability and Viability

The solution we propose below is new, and relates to the identification of the fundamental systemic reason for our monetary and financial instability. Understanding this solution, however, requires we review some evidence as to why a systemic problem is likely, develop a scientifically-sound understanding of its nature, and, finally, identify effective ways to address the trouble.

The good news now is that we know a lot more than in the 1930s; and that we have many more tools available than even a decade ago. Consequently, it is now possible to identify the deeper underlying systemic causes as well as a new way to deal with them. Furthermore, this new way is one that governments can afford, and that it actually addresses a number of other social and economic issues that exist even when there was no financial crisis.

At first sight, it may not be the bankers' preferred solution, but it would actually stabilize their own portfolios while structurally stabilizing the economies of the world. It would also give them a whole new line of business, in activities that would be particularly attractive for local and regional banks. Introducing such a systemic solution is the only way to avoid periodically repeating the banking-crisis exercise, which all conventional approaches are condemned to do because they deal only with some of the symptoms, and not the cause.

A. Beyond the Blame Game

A lot of energy and ink will be spent on trying to allocate the blame for this disaster. Greed in the financial sector, lack of oversight by regulators, policies that over-emphasize deregulation, and incompetence at various levels, will all become favorite targets. Our view is that any or all of these may indeed have played a role, but at the core we are dealing with a much deeper systemic issue, as already stated.

Indeed, while the current crisis may be the biggest one ever, it isn't the first such crisis. The World Bank has identified no less than 96 banking crises and 176 monetary crises in the 25 years since President Nixon introduced the floating exchange regime in the early 1970s.²¹ Furthermore, even before this period, booms and bust cycles involving banking and monetary crises were, in Kindleberger's words, a remarkably "hardy perennial"²². Kindleberger inventories no less than 48 massive crashes ranging from the 1637 tulip mania in Holland to the 1929 crash on Wall Street.

benefits would accrue to the governments in the case of nationalization of the money creation process. For the details on which these estimates are based see Joseph Huber and James Robertson's *Creating new Money: A Monetary Reform for the Information Age* (London: New Economic Foundation, 2000) pgs 79-84.

²¹ Caprio & Klingebiel, 1996

²² Kindleberger, Charles *Manias, Panics and Crashes* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 3d ed. 1996) pg 1.

Such repeated financial breakdowns, in very different countries and times, under different regulatory environments, and in economies with very different degrees of development, should be seen as a first telltale symptom of some underlying systemic or structural problem.

If such a deeper issue is involved, it would explain why each new set of regulations achieve, at best, a reduction in the frequency of banking and monetary crises, without getting rid of them or their horrific economic and socio-political costs. If such a deeper structural problem exists, it would also explain why even some of the brightest and best educated people on the planet have not been able to avoid major financial catastrophes, however diligently they do their work, whether on the regulatory or on the financial services side. Finally, if our money system is indeed a structural “accident waiting to happen”, then even if it were possible to perfectly control greed through innovative, tight, regulations, this will only defer when the next disaster will hit.

B. Stability and Sustainable Viability in Complex Flow Systems

We now have scientific evidence that a structural issue is indeed involved. The theoretical origin of this evidence may be surprising to the economic or financial community, although it wouldn't be such a surprise for scientists familiar with natural ecosystems, thermodynamics, complexity or information theory. The science that explains this issue rests on a thermodynamic approach with deep historical roots in economics.²³ In this view, complex systems, such as ecosystems, living organisms, and economies are all seen as matter-, energy-, and information-flow systems. For example, the famous food chain is actually a matter/energy flow-network built of complex relationships among organisms. Plants capture the sun's energy with photosynthesis; animals eat the plants; species then eat each another in a chain to top predator, only to have all organisms die, decompose, and their energy/matter be recycled by bacteria. Similarly, economies are circulation networks consisting of millions of businesses and billions of customers exchanging different products and services, which when taken as a whole, are supposed to meet the needs of all participants.

The details of this systemic problem are scientifically described elsewhere in peer-reviewed literature, and only a short, simplified summary will be provided here. For readers desiring full technical and mathematical proof of what will be claimed here, please refer to the relevant paper.²⁴

For the past twenty five years, major progress has been made on understanding what makes natural eco-systems sustainable or not. This work is the natural extension of Nobel Prize winning

²³ Modern energy concepts and flow analyses were actually formally applied to economics as early as 1951, by Nobel laureate Wassili Leontief with his input-output analyses, modeling the flow of goods and value in economic systems. Ecologists then applied these same flow concepts and analyses to ecosystems, only to have economists later reapply these enhanced energy understandings to economics. Odum (1971, 1984), Hannon (1973), and Costanza (1984), for example, have all used thermodynamics and flow-network analysis as the basis for understanding the activities in both economic and ecosystem networks; and Georgescu Roegen (1971) developed an entire thermodynamic foundation for economics. Paul Samuelson stated in 1965, in the Preface to Georgescu Roegen's *Analytical Economics*, that he considers Georgescu-Roegen as “a scholar's scholar, and an economist's economist.” He added: “I defy any informed economist to remain complacent after meditating over this essay.” Nevertheless, complacency is what has greeted that book and its successor *Entropy Law and the Economic Process*. It is disappointing that even Samuelson himself didn't update his best-selling textbooks to integrate Georgescu-Roegen's findings.

²⁴ See Robert Ulanowicz, Sally Goerner, Bernard Lietaer and Rocio Gomez “Quantifying Sustainability: Efficiency, Resilience and the Return of Information Theory” *Journal of Ecological Complexity* in press.

chemist Illya Prigogine, and Club of Rome Cofounder Erich Jantsch's work with self-organizing energy-flow systems. In fact, according to Kenneth Boulding (1981), many early economists held energy views. This changed when those who favored Newtonian mechanics during the late 19th century (such as Walras and Jevons) turned economics into today's familiar views on the mechanics of "rational actors" and the reliable self-restraint of General Equilibrium Theory, an approach which completely dominates not only practically all of today's mainstream academic economic literature, but also the boardrooms and political venues of the world.²⁵

Our new approach, as shown below, provides a very concise and solid explanation as to why we need to start using a new set of tools to understand the monetary and economic dynamics as they actually manifest in the real world.

A growing body of empirical and theoretical work, published under different academic banners such as Self-organization Theory²⁶, Universality Theory or Non-linear Dynamics,²⁷ shows that all flow systems follow certain universal principles and patterns. Consequently, as Goerner (1999) says about universality: "all [flow] systems, no matter how complex, fall into one of a few classes. All members of a class share certain common patterns of behavior... The wonderful thing about this universality is that it does not matter much how close our equations are to the ones chosen by nature, as long as the model is in the same universality class... as the real system. This means that we can get the right physics out of very crude models." The existence of parallel patterns and dynamics explains why similar energy-flow concepts and analysis methods apply to economic systems as well as natural ones.

Decades of studying natural ecosystems, in particular, have led to very sophisticated mathematical understandings of how a network structure affects an ecosystem's long-term viability, as judged by its balance between *efficiency* and *resilience*. Efficiency measures the ability of a system to process volumes of the relevant matter-, energy- and/or information-flow. Resilience measures the ability of a system to recover from a disturbance. These variables have been more formally defined as follows:

- 1) *Efficiency*: a network's capacity to perform in a sufficiently organized and efficient manner as to maintain its integrity over time (May 1972); and
- 2) *Resilience*: a networks reserve of flexible fall-back positions and diversity of actions that can be used to meet the exigencies of novel disturbances and the novelty needed for on-going development and evolution (Holling, 1973, 1986; Walker, et al., 2006).

Two key structure-related variables - *Diversity* (the existence of different types of agents acting as "nodes" in the network) and *Interconnectivity* (number of pathways between agents) - play a central role in both efficiency and resilience — but in the opposite direction. In general, a system's resilience is enhanced by more diversity and more connections, because there are more channels to fall back on in times of trouble or change. Efficiency, on the other hand, increases through streamlining, which usually means reducing diversity and connectivity.

²⁵ The misclassification of economics as a system in equilibrium is brilliantly explained in chapters 2 and 3 of Beinhocker, Eric *The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 2006). George Soros has explained the internal dynamics of why financial markets are not moving towards equilibrium in his *The Alchemy of Finance* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988).

²⁶ Prigogine, 1967; Jantsch, 1980

²⁷ See e.g., Cvitanovic, 1984.

The main point is that nature does not select for maximum efficiency, but for an optimal *balance* between the two opposing poles of efficiency and resilience. Because both are indispensable for long-term sustainability and health, the healthiest flow systems are those that maintain an optimal balance between these two opposing pulls. Conversely, an excess of either attribute leads to systemic instability. Too much efficiency leads to brittleness and too much resilience leads to stagnation; the former is caused by too little diversity and connectivity and the latter by too much diversity and connectivity.

Sustainability of a complex flow system can therefore be defined as the optimal balance between efficiency and resilience of its network. With these distinctions we are able to define and precisely quantify a complex system's sustainability in a single metric. Indeed, we now have a way of quantitatively measuring all the relevant components separately: total throughput, efficiency, and resilience. Furthermore, the underlying mathematics are well-behaved enough so that there exists only one single maximum for a given network system. The generic shape of the relationships between sustainability and its constituent elements is shown in Figure 1. Observe that there is an asymmetry: optimality requires more resilience than efficiency!




Figure 1: Sustainability curve mapped between the two polarities of efficiency and resilience. Nature selects not for maximum of efficiency, but for an optimum balance between these two requirements. Metaphorically, this is similar to a ball searching for the lowest point in the curved surface under the influence of gravity. Notice that resilience is roughly two times more important than efficiency at the optimum. Notice also that the arrow of Sustainability is pointed downwards, to be able to preserve the gravity metaphor.

Until recently, total throughput and efficiency have been the only means for us to identify the relative success of a system, whether in nature or in economics. For example, in ecosystems, as in economies, size is generally measured as the total volume of system throughput/activity. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures size this way in economies and Total System Throughput (TST) does so in ecosystems. Many economists urge endless growth in size (GDP) because they assume growth is a sufficient measure of health. GDP and TST, however, are poor

measures of sustainable viability because they *ignore network structure*. They cannot, for example, distinguish between a resilient economy and a bubble, or between healthy “development,” as Herman Daly (1997) describes it, or explosive growth in monetary exchanges simply due to runaway speculation.

Now, however, we can distinguish whether a particular increase in throughput and efficiency is a sign of healthy growth or just a relatively short-term bubble that is doomed to collapse. Over time, nature must have solved many of the structural problems in ecosystems (otherwise, these ecosystems simply wouldn’t exist today.)

It is also interesting to note that all ecosystems have their most critical parameters within a very specific and narrow range, that can be computed empirically with precision, which we call the “Window of Viability”²⁸. (See Figure 2.)

. See Figure 2.




Figure 2: The “Window of Viability” in which all sustainable natural eco-systems operate. All natural eco-systems invariably operate within a fairly narrow range on each side of the Optimum point.

C. Application to Other Complex Systems

The question will undoubtedly be raised whether what we learn from ecosystems still makes sense when applied to other systems, such as economic communities. It is critical to understand

²⁸ In the original literature this window is called a “window of vitality” given that natural ecosystems support complex life forms only within this range. See Ulanowicz, R.E.. *A Third Window: Natural Foundations for Life*. Oxford University Press, New York. 2008; and Zorach, A.C. and R.E. Ulanowicz. 2003. Quantifying the complexity of flow networks: How many roles are there? *Complexity* 8(3): 68-76

that the findings described so far arise from the very *structure of a complex system*, and therefore that they remain valid for any complex network with a similar structure, regardless of what is being processed in the system: it can be biomass in an ecosystem, information in a biological system, electrons in an electrical power network, or money in an economic system. This is precisely one of the strong points of using a web-like network approach instead of machine-like metaphor.

For instance, Vaz and Carvalho (1994) have portrayed the immune system in terms of a network. Might not the elucidation of its Window of Viability provide significant new perspectives on the health of an organism?

The fields of engineering, business and economics have all been focusing almost exclusively on efficiency, and therefore constitute a wide open field to explore the validity of the proposed metrics to improve sustainability. For example, electrical power grids have been systematically optimized for decades towards ever greater technical and economic efficiency. It has come as a surprise to many engineers that, as they have approached higher efficiencies, suddenly large-scale blackouts have been breaking out with a vengeance “out of nowhere”. For instance, a few decades ago, several blackouts hit large areas of the Eastern United States. The data should be available to model these systems as networks because that is what they literally are. One can then quantify their efficiency and resilience, and their Window of Viability. The solution on how to rebalance such a system to make it less brittle, and determine its optimal sustainability would be an obvious “hard science” test application of the metrics described here.

The point being made here is truly profound and has wide-reaching implications for all complex systems, natural or human-made, including our worldwide financial and monetary system. Placing too much emphasis on efficiency tends to automatically increase size and consolidation at the expense of diversity, connectivity, and resilience until the entire system becomes unstable and collapses. In short, excessive focus on efficiency tends to create exactly the kind of bubble economy which we have been able to observe repeatedly in every boom and bust cycle in history, including the biggest bust of them all, the one that we are experiencing today.

D. Application to Financial/Monetary Systems

Viewing economies as flow systems ties directly into money’s primary function as medium of exchange. In this view, money is to the real economy like blood is to your body: it is an essential vehicle for catalyzing processes, allocating resources, and generally allowing the exchange system to work as a synergetic whole. The connection to structure is immediately apparent. In economies, as in ecosystems and living organisms, the health of the whole depends heavily on the structure by which the catalyzing medium, in this case, money, circulates among businesses and individuals. Money must continue to circulate in sufficiency to all corners of the whole because poor circulation will strangle either the supply side or the demand side of the economy, or both.

Our global monetary system is itself an obvious flow network structure, in which monopolistic national currencies flow within each country (or group of countries in the case of the Euro), and interconnect on a global level. The technical justification for enforcing a monopoly of national currencies within each country was to optimize the efficiency of price formation and exchanges in national markets. Tight regulations are in place in every country, to maintain these monopolies. In his seminal paper of 1955 on this topic, Milton Friedman proposed that letting markets determine the value of each national currency would further improve the overall efficiency of the global monetary system. This idea was actually implemented by President Nixon in 1971, to avoid a run on the dollar at that time. Since then, an extraordinarily efficient and sophisticated global communications infrastructure has been built to link and trade these national currencies. The

trading volume in the foreign exchange markets reached an impressive \$3.2 trillion *per day* in 2007, to which another daily \$2.1 trillion of currency derivatives should be added.²⁹ Nobody questions the efficiency of these markets. — but many people are now coming to question their resilience.

The global network of our monopolistic national moneys has evolved into an overly efficient and dangerously brittle system. This system’s lack of rebound capacity, however, shows up not in the technical field of the computer networks (which all have backups), but clearly in the financial realm. This fact has been, as has been spectacularly demonstrated by the large number of monetary and banking crashes over the past thirty years. Such crises, particularly a combined monetary and banking crash, is—other than war—the worse thing that can happen to a country. Even more ironically, whenever a banking crisis unfolds, governments invariably help the larger banks to absorb the smaller ones, under the logic that the efficiency of the system is thereby further increased. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Today’s global monetary ecosystem is significantly overshooting the optimal balance or the Window of Viability, because of its exclusive emphasis on efficiency. It is careening toward brittleness and collapse because a general belief prevails that all improvements need to go further in that the same exclusive direction (red arrow) of increasing growth and efficiency. For instance, the global monoculture of bank-debt money as legal tender is technically justified on the basis of efficiency of price formation and exchanges within each country. Internationally, floating exchanges were also justified because they are “more efficient”. Such an overly efficient system is “an accident waiting to happen”, condemned to collapse, however well competent people try to manage it.

Similarly the issue of diversity matters obviously not only in types of money, but also in economic agents. For example, a town that has but one very large employer will find it harder to

²⁹ Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 2005 *Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 2008 - Final Results* . Washington, DC.

adapt if that company goes under, than a town with several medium size employers and many more small ones. At the other extreme, lack of economic efficiency, for instance through insufficient investments in infrastructure, leads to an inability to handle the large volume transfers needed to maintain flow across complex economies.

As stated earlier, nature has over billions of years selected the conditions under which complex ecosystems are sustainable, otherwise they wouldn't exist today. In contrast, humanity still struggles with the issue of how to create sustainable economies. We know that the theoretical framework applies to both natural and man-made complex systems. Has the time not come to learn in this domain from nature?

E. The Systemic Solution

The systemic solution to our monetary crisis, therefore, is to increase the resilience of the monetary system, even if at first sight that may be less efficient. Conventional economic thinking assumes the de-facto monopolies of national moneys as an unquestionable given. The logical lesson from nature is that systemic monetary sustainability requires a diversity of currency systems, so that multiple and more diverse agents and channels of monetary links and exchanges can emerge, as seen in Figure 4.




Figure 4: The Effect of Diverse and Multiple Complementary Currencies

The operation of complementary currencies of diverse types enables the economy to flow back towards a higher sustainability (green arrow). While this process clearly reduces efficiency, that is the price to pay for increased resilience of the whole. Complementary currencies facilitate transactions that otherwise wouldn't occur, linking otherwise unused resources to unmet needs, and encouraging a diversity and interconnections that otherwise wouldn't exist.

This is the practical lesson from nature: allow several *types* of currencies to circulate among people and businesses to facilitate their exchanges, through the implementation of complementary currencies. These different types of currencies are called complementary because they designed to operate in parallel with, as complements to, conventional national moneys. The problem is the monopoly of one type of currency, and replacing one monopoly with another isn't the solution. As Edgar Cahn's work in Time Dollars demonstrates,³⁰ whenever complementary currencies begin flowing through the mainstream, this strategy will ensure also a much higher increase the degree of diversity and interconnectivity in the system, due to their ability to catalyze business processes and individual efforts that are too small or inefficient to compete for national currencies in a global market place. This approach will certainly appear unorthodox to conventional thinking, but conventional thinking is precisely what got us into this trouble to begin with. This tactic can also resolve the dilemma of what to do now about today's systemic banking crisis.

VI. Our Proposal

Our proposal focuses here on what can and should be done most urgently to reduce the impact of the financial crisis on the "real" economy, the one where businesses produce and sell non-financial goods and services. It involves three components: a) actions by the private business sector, b) decisions by national governments, and c) decisions by city and local governments.

A. The Business Sector

The "real" economy will predictably become the next victim of the financial crisis. Whatever governments do for the banks, credit will be a lot harder for companies to obtain from banks for years to come. Once a domino effect plays out in the real economy, when a chain of bankruptcies is started with all its effects on unemployment and other social problems, it will turn out even harder to stop, than the dominos in the banking system. It is futile to hope that governments will be in a position to save even important businesses after having born the cost of bailing out the banks. However, there is something that companies can do themselves to avoid the worst aspects of this problem.

Another Story

Once upon a time, during a crisis similar to the one we have now started living, sixteen businessmen got together to decide what they could do among themselves. They or their clients had each received a notice from their respective banks that their credit line was going to be reduced or eliminated; hence bankruptcy was only a question of time. They realized that business A had needed the bank loan to buy goods from business B, which in turn needed money to buy stuff from its own suppliers. So they decided to create a mutual credit system among themselves, inviting their clients and suppliers to join. When business A buys something from B, A gets a debit and B the corresponding credit. They created their own currency, whose value was identical to the national money, but with the interesting feature that it didn't bear interest.

The country's banks mounted a massive press campaign to try to squelch this revolutionary idea. Miraculously, that campaign failed, and this little system saved the businesses involved at the time. A cooperative was set up among the users to keep the accounts dealing with that currency. Soon participants could also borrow from that cooperative in that currency at the remarkably low interest rate of 1% to 1.5%. All such loans need to be backed by inventory or other assets. Over time, the system grew to include up to one quarter of all the businesses of the entire country.

³⁰ Cahn, Edgar. (2004). *No More Throw Away People*. Washington, DC: Essential Books.

Sixty-five years later, an American professor carried out an econometric study proving that the secret for the country's legendary economic stability was that strange little unofficial currency, circulating among businesses in parallel with the national money. That well-known economic resilience was usually credited to some mysterious and unknown national characteristic. Whenever there was a recession, the volume of activity in this unofficial currency would expand significantly, thereby reducing the negative impact on sales and unemployment. Whenever there was a boom, business in national currency expanded, while activity in the unofficial currency proportionally dropped again. The surprising implication of this study was that the spontaneous counter-cyclical behavior of this little system actually helped the central bank of the country in its efforts to stabilize the economy.

This is not a fairy tale, but is also a true story, the one of the WIR system. The country is Switzerland and the sixteen founders met in Zurich in the year 1934. And the system is still operational today. The annual volume of business in the WIR currency is now about \$2 billion per year, and the American professor is James Stodder from Rensselaer University. His remarkable quantitative study³¹ uses more than 60 years of high quality data to prove the points made in this story. The WIR system is also now accepting deposits and making loans in both Swiss Francs and WIR.³²

We propose that businesses take the initiative of creating such Business-to-Business (B2B) systems at whatever scale makes most sense to them. The big advantage, compared to what happened in Switzerland, is that with what is available with today's information technologies, setting up such a system can be achieved in a fraction of the time and costs of what happened in the 1930s. And, timeliness is going to be critical if one wants to avoid the social and economic ravages that will be unleashed by the unraveling of complex business supply chains. In the U.S., a nation-wide system would be justified. In Europe, ideally, such a system should be conceived to be able to operate at the Euro zone level. Otherwise, we are going to see a lot of the economic gains achieved by European integration go to naught over the next decade.

There is one more thing that the businesses who get involved in such systems should consider doing: lobbying their respective governments to have them accept their B2B currency temporarily, in partial payment of business taxes. This could apply only temporarily, i.e. for the period during which the banking system will not be in a position to fulfill its traditional role of financing the real economy to the extent that is necessary. Partial payment of taxes – it could be as little as 10 or 20% - would be the most effective incentive that governments could provide to accelerate the widespread acceptance of this currency. The lobbyists have a simple but powerful argument: governments have just spent trillions of taxpayers money to save the banking system, in the hope that this would avoid that the rot spreads to other businesses. The strategy proposed here doesn't cost the government any money, will actually increase tax revenue, and is the best systemic way to avoid that the rot will spread anyway, whatever they do to help the banks.

B. National Governments

When everything is said and done, governments will not be willing or able to force banks to lend out to the real economy, anymore than you can push on a string. Therefore, in addition and parallel to accepting the usual bank-debt conventional money, during the transition period —

³¹ James Stodder, "Reciprocal Exchange Networks: Implications for Macroeconomic Stability". Albuquerque, New Mexico: Paper presented at the International Electronic and Electrical Engineering (IEEE) Engineering Management Society (EMS) August 2000,

³² www.WIR.ch and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WIR_Bank

until the banking system has recovered fully enough to play its traditional role — accepting some complementary currency for payment of taxes makes a lot of sense. Which currencies should be acceptable for payment of what types of taxes is a political question that remains open for each government to decide.

As stated above, by accepting this currency in partial payment in taxes, the government provides a powerful incentive for businesses and people to accept this currency. Governments should probably not get involved in creating or managing such systems. Their role should be to assess and determine the criteria of quality and reliability that makes the currency qualify for acceptance by the government. They also have a built-in interest in receiving payments in a robust currency. It is obvious that the existence of such a currency facilitates exchanges that otherwise wouldn't happen, while conventional money or credit are difficult to obtain. These additional exchanges, in turn, increase the taxable income of the businesses involved, thereby starting a virtuous loop that counteracts the credit reductions by the bank.

There are two ways for a governmental entity to decide what percentage of taxes could be payable in complementary currency. The first one is to determine how much that entity purchases from the business sector. For instance, if 20% of the budget is for purchases from a specific group of corporations, it could make sense to accept up to 10% or 15% of payment in the currency of that specific group. Another approach is to levy taxes from a business in proportion to the volume of business that it realizes in that currency. In other words, all dollar sales are taxable in dollars, and all sales in complementary currency are payable in the corresponding complementary currency. For example, if a company does 10% of its business in complementary currency, its taxes would be payable in that currency in the same proportion.

This strategy will increase taxable income to governments at different levels, particularly during a recession when taxable income dwindles. When people and businesses are strangled by lack of money, taxable income is automatically squeezed as well. By accepting some payments in currencies other than bank debt money, by definition more governmental income is possible. This isn't theory. For instance, during the crisis of the Ruble of the late 1990s, the Russian government accepted corporate taxes paid in copper in payment of taxes. What we propose is a lot less extreme: complementary currencies are a standardized medium of exchange which governments can spend to provide services in the locations and communities that accept the complementary currency.

One important decision for national governments will be to allow cities and local governments to choose themselves the complementary currency that they are interested in encouraging by accepting it in payment of the city or state taxes. Why this is important is explained next.

C. Cities and Local Governments

There are two reasons why we recommend allowing cities and local governments to choose their own complementary currencies to implement this strategy. First, cities and local governments will be the first governmental entities to get into still deeper trouble than they are today; and second, they represent diversity and resilience at work. Given that this approach is radically new, it is simply safer to test out a new system as a pilot at a city or local level, rather than directly on a larger scale at the national level.

Indeed, cities and other local government entities will find themselves in the first line to bear the brunt of the social effects of the looming recession, while at the same time they will see their tax revenue shrink, and conventional financing through debt become much harder to obtain. This kind of problem is not going to be limited only to the US.

The London-based *Observer* asks:

What could possibly come along in the middle of this series of economic nightmares to make things even worse? How about a total depletion of local government finances that pay for the things that make up the very fabric of American society. Imagine that rippling across the rest of the world, reducing public services to skeleton operations... “What is most disconcerting about the way this turmoil is panning out,’ says Sujit Canagaretna, senior fiscal analyst at the Council of State Governments (CSG), ‘is that most state governments were already in a terrible state. But now things have worsened considerably and the credit markets have a real choke hold on almost all state treasuries. It is so bad that economic activity in most states has all but ground to a halt.” ... As the spectre of a long and painful recession looms ever larger across the globe, it is troubling to note that these dual problems facing governments across America — falling tax revenue and reduced access to debt — are universal. Brace yourselves for another great American export.”³³

The second argument for local currencies is that some diversity in experimenting with a strategy that is new can only be beneficial to all concerned. If specific issues are considered a political priority, other types of complementary currencies than the B2B one we described above could be considered. For instance, if carbon reduction is considered an important priority, a carbon reduction currency program could be launched and accepted in partial payment in taxes. Some applications of the eco-money programs in Japan are precedents that are relevant in this domain. Similarly, local or regional taxes could be paid partially in conventional money, and partially in regional currencies.³⁴ Or international businesses could pay some of their taxes in Terras, a proposal for a global commercial currency which is fully backed by a basket of commodities.³⁵ In short, a whole new set of tools to create incentives for specific behavior patterns, either corporate or individual, is now available, and in most cases have already been tested somewhere in the world.³⁶

D. Some Pragmatic Considerations

The speed at which the pragmatic application of this strategy is greatly facilitated in our times, thanks to the availability of various softwares designed to manage complementary currencies, and the Internet as a communication tool. For instance, the WIR cooperative, which we talked about above, has a large scale system operational in Switzerland in four languages that deals simultaneously with national money and WIR. There are also several other fully operational software packages available for specific complementary currency applications.

It would be a good idea to consider particularly open source software for use in this case, as this would provide the flexibility to add new functions, or new currencies on the same smart card,

³³ James Doran, “America’s Latest Export: Empty Municipal Coffers,” *The Observer*, Oct. 12, 2008, pg. 8.

³⁴ This strategy is explained in Bernard Lietaer’s *Pour une Europe des Régions: les Regios, compléments nécessaires à l’Euro*, (Paris: Fondation Mayer, 2008).

³⁵ See www.terratrc.org for technical details.

³⁶ See Bernard Lietaer, *The Future of Money: Creating New Wealth, Work and a Wiser World* (London: Century, 2001) and *Of Human Wealth: New Currencies for a New World* (Boulder, CO: Citerra Press, forthcoming 2008).

without having to wait for the propriety software developers to catch up with their backlog. For instance, the Strohalm Foundation in the Netherlands has an open source software for mutual credit systems used for social purpose applications, which is already in operation in various countries. Similarly, the European Union has funded in cooperation with the French government the development of the SOL system using three different types of complementary currencies on the same smart card, and the bulk of this system is also available in open source.³⁷ This application is currently in pilot test phase in five different regions in France, and could easily be expanded for additional languages, and a fourth currency application for the B2B currency that is described above.

Obviously, implementing a strategy of this nature should be done in careful steps, starting with pilot application on a limited scale. A European wide project, for instance, should be started with a cooperative venture on a smaller scale.

E. Answering Some Objections

The first objection will obviously arise from the banking system, that would prefer to keep the status quo. One argument will be that they will see the proposed B2B currency as excluding the banking system from their usual function; in short technical terms it “disintermediates” the banks. This objection is valid if and only if the banks themselves choose not to get involved in providing accounts and transactions in the B2B currencies. It is interesting to note that several banks - local and regional banks - have gotten involved in providing account and payment services for several complementary currency projects. This is the case, for instance, of the Bank of Ithaca, who deals with Ithaca HOUR accounts in the city of Ithaca, New York; or of the Raiffeissenbank in Vorarlberg, Austria. The logic is that local or regional banks can compete with the giant banks only by providing local services that the big ones don't, and of course a client with an Ithaca Hour account with the Ithaca Bank will also tend to open a dollar account as well...So banks are going to be disintermediated by a broader use of B2B currencies only if they themselves remain aloof. Even if they don't get involved, however, banks would still benefit from the introduction of B2B currencies. The reason is that the counter-cyclical stability, as proven by the WIR precedent, is also helpful to the banking system's portfolios. Finally, since our proposal only temporarily requires banks give up their monopoly on issuing legal tender, it provides them a much less drastic compromise than, for instance, nationalization or losing the right to issue legal tender altogether.

The second objection that is quite predictable will come from traditional economic thinking: using multiple currencies within a national economy reduces the efficiency of the price formation process and of the exchanges among economic agents. While this argument is valid, we know now that this overarching emphasis on efficiency is precisely what has reduced the resilience of the system, and made it so brittle.

F. Some Advantages of the Proposed Approach

Our proposal, therefore, provides a *systemic* solution to the instability of the monetary system, something which the current approaches are not even trying to achieve. Systemic solutions are the only ones that will avoid repeatedly having to go through the same type

³⁷ See <http://www.sol-reseau.coop>

of problem in the future. For example, as the WIR example demonstrates, complementary currency systems have proven to be a key factor in fostering counter-cyclical stability. It has achieved this not only during the Great Depression of the 1930s, but also during every subsequent business cycle of the Swiss economy.

A multi-scale multi-stakeholder strategy has a number of advantages for the different parties involved, particularly during the transition period that we now have entered.

- This approach will avoid or reduce the strangulation of the real economy by the banking credit contraction that unquestionably is going to occur.
- The decision that governments may take – accepting partial payment of taxes in money other than exclusively bank debt money – rests completely within their own political decision power. This strategy is also very flexible: a government can decide to accept payment of certain taxes only, only for a given percentage, for specific types of complementary currencies chosen to be robust and have other positive effects, and/or only for specific fiscal years.
- Until now, taxes have been payable only in “legal tender,” which means conventional bank-debt money. Any currency is an incentive scheme, and our current way of dealing with taxes and subsidies is limited to that single instrument, which needs to be scarcer than its usefulness to keep its value. With complementary currencies, a whole additional array of options become available, which can focus on - and fine tune precisely - the objectives that one wants to reach. We can, therefore, tailor the complementary currencies accepted for payments of taxes to the massive challenges currently faced around the world.
- Complementary currencies have proven a useful tool for enabling the design of incentive schemes in a wide variety of domains, regardless whether there is a crisis or not. The evidence for this can be found in a number of publications.³⁸
- Perhaps most importantly: this strategy will avoid repeating the worst part of the 1930s scenario where a Second Wave strangulation was left to play out fully, which resulted in massive bankruptcies in the productive economy, intolerably high unemployment and untold suffering, and a toxic political fallout that has proven a dangerous mess to disentangle when started. Hjamar Schacht, Hitler’s central banker, pointed out correctly that the electoral popularity of Nazism was directly due to mass “despair and unemployment”...

VII. Conclusion: Synthetic Table of the Options

The following table summarizes the implication of each of the five approaches to any large scale systemic banking crisis, as described here. Those implications are different for different actors. The following points of view are considered: the impact on bankers; on taxpayers and central

³⁸ See for instance: Edgar Cahn, *No more Throwaway People*, (Washington: Time Banks USA, 2004); Deirdre Kent, *Healthy Money, Healthy Planet: Developing Sustainability Through New Money Systems* (New Zealand: Craig Potton Publishing, 2005); Ellen Hodgson Brown, *The Web of Debt*, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 2007); Bernard Lietaer, *The Future of Money*, (London, Random House, 2001); and Bernard Lietaer & Stephen Belgin, *Of Human Wealth: New Currencies for a New World*, (Citerra Press, forthcoming 2008); Thomas Greco, *Money: Understanding & Creating Alternatives to Legal Tender*, (Vermont: 2003); Edgar Cahn . & J. Rowe. *Time Dollars*.

governments; on local governments; on the 2d wave effects, and on the systemic cause. The different icons represent:



Degree of problem or dislike;



Degree of solution or preference



Unaddressed, not dealt with in any way.

Options for Managing a Systemic Banking Crisis

Approach	Bankers	Taxpayers/ Central Governments	Local Governments	2d Wave	Systemic Cause
DO NOTHING 1929-1932	Disaster	Disaster	Disaster	Disaster	Unaddressed
Conventional Nationalizing Problem Assets	Preferred	Most Expensive (no leverage)	Unaddressed	Delayed	Unaddressed
Nationalizing Banks	Equity Dilution	10x leverage	Unaddressed	Delayed	Unaddressed
Unconventional Nationalizing Money Creation	End of current business model	Long term solution (but inflation?)	Unaddressed	Governments spend money into existence	Unaddressed
Complementary Currencies	End of money creation monopoly	Long term solution	Long & short term solution	Long & short term solution	Systemic Solution

Abridged Bio of the Author

Bernard Lietaer has been active in the domain of money systems for a period of 30 years in an unusual variety of functions. While at the Central Bank in Belgium, he was responsible for the implementation of the convergence mechanism (ECU) to the single European currency system. During that period, he also served as President of Belgium's Electronic Payment System. His consultant experience in monetary issues on four continents ranges from multinational corporations to developing countries. He was General Manager, Co-Founder and Chief Currency Trader for the Gaia Hedge Funds, one of the world's largest off-shore trading funds, during which time *Business Week* identified him as "the world's top currency trader" in 1992. He is the author of fourteen books, written in five languages, including *The Future of Money* translated in 18 languages. More information about the author and this proposal is available on www.lietaer.com.

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